Fr. Christiano Pesch, S.J.

On the Triune God

Deo Uno et Trino, part 2

Sonnet 3.7 Translation

DE DEO TRINO

A.I. TRANSLATION
SONNET 4

ON THE TRIUNE GOD
ACCORDING TO PERSONS

FROM THE DOGMATIC TREATISES
VOL II

BY
CHRISTIANO PESCH S.J.

ORIGNAL LATIN: BERN. BLEY S.J. PROVINCIAL SUPERIOR
OF LOWER GERMANY COLOGNE,
AUGUST 31, 1923

TO THE MOST
HOLY MOTHER OF GOD

CONTENTS

TREATISE II. ON THE TRIUNE GOD

SEC. I.	The existence of the Holy Trinity	1
PRO. LXIV.	That God is a proper name of the Divine Persons	3
PRO. LXV.	That the Baptismal formula proves the Holy Trinity	11
PRO. LXVI.	The Holy Trinity in the Old Testament	17
PRO. LXVII.	The Holy Trinity in Ecclesiastical Tradition	22
PRO. LXVIII.	The Holy Trinity is a Mystery in the strict sense	33
PRO. LXIX.	That the Holy Trinity is not against reason	40
SEC. II.	On the Divine Processions	44
PRO. LXX.	That only the Father does not proceed	48
ART. I.	On the procession of the Son	51
PRO. LXXI.	The Son proceeds by generation	51
PRO. LXXII.	The generation of the Son is Intellectual	54
PRO. LXXIII.	The Word proceeds from the knowledge of all truth	60
ART. II.	On the procession of the Holy Spirit	62
PRO. LXXIV.	The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son	62
PRO. LXXV.	That this procession is from one principle	71
PRO. LXXVI.	The Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son	74
PRO. LXXVII.	The procession of the Holy Spirit is through the will	78
ART. III.	Comparing the procession of the Son and Holy Spirit	84
PRO. LXXVIII.	The Holy Spirit does not proceed by generation	84

SEC. III.	On Divine relations	90
ART. I.	The existence of relations in God	90
PRO. LXXIX.	There are real relations in God	90
PRO. LXXX.	The relations are the Divine Persons	93
PRO. LXXXI.	There is no subsistence in the divine except relatively	98
ART. II.	The distinction between essence and relations	103
PRO. LXXXII.	Relations are only virtually distinct from the essence	103
PRO. LXXXIII.	The relations do not add to the perfect Divine substance	108
SEC. IV.	On properties, notions, and circuminsession	112
PRO. LXXXIV.	That there are personal properties in God	112
PRO. LXXXV.	On personal notions in God	114
PRO. LXXXVI.	On circuminsession or perichoresis	117
APPENDIX	Precepts for speaking of this Holy mystery	124
SEC. V.	On the mission of the Divine Persons	126
PRO. LXXXVII.	The mission is the eternal procession	126
PRO. LXXXVIII.	The mission is either invisible or visible	128
PRO. LXXXIX.	Substantial gift in invisible mission	131
PRO. XC.	Created Grace founds relation to uncreated Grace	136
PRO. XCI.	Indwelling not proper, but appropriated to the Spirit	144

PREFACE

This translation of *On the Triune God According to Persons*, taken from Volume II of the Dogmatic Treatises by the distinguished neo-scholastic theologian Christiano Pesch, S.J., is presented as a resource for students and scholars of Catholic theology who seek to engage deeply with classical Trinitarian doctrine.

Originally published in Latin in 1923 with ecclesiastical approval by Bernhard Bley, S.J., then Provincial Superior of Lower Germany, this treatise represents a mature and rigorous expression of Roman Catholic dogmatic theology in the tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas, as received and developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Pesch's scholastic method—marked by clarity, precision, and fidelity to the magisterial tradition—offers a penetrating exploration of the divine persons of the Most Holy Trinity.

This edition is the fruit of an AI-assisted translation effort using the Sonnet 4 language model, a powerful large language model designed for accurate and nuanced rendering of complex texts. While every effort has been made to ensure fidelity to the original Latin, readers are encouraged to consult the source text for scholarly purposes or when precision is paramount. Readers should note that the digital copy of the Latin text occasionally presented challenges in discerning certain numerical references clearly, and we therefore recommend exercising caution when encountering citations of Scripture or other works, verifying such references against the original Latin text whenever possible.

It is hoped that this translation will serve not only as an introduction to Pesch's theological genius but also as an invitation to renewed reflection on the mystery at the very heart of Christian faith: the Triune God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

TREATISE II.
ON THE TRIUNE GOD ACCORDING TO PERSONS.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

442. We confess in the symbol: "I believe in one God, the Father almighty, and in Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, consubstantial with the Father, and in the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, who together with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified."

This mystery of the Most Holy Trinity [1] is the fundamental dogma by which the Christian faith is distinguished from natural religion and from Judaism with respect to its material object, and it is at the same time the supreme test of our subjective faith, because we cannot embrace this doctrine except through the complete submission of our intellect under the authority of God revealing. For it is a mystery truly and strictly so called, which is not only entirely inaccessible to human reason left to itself, but which even when revealed cannot be positively understood by us.

443. Nevertheless, we should not therefore cease from the study of perceiving and defending this mystery as well as we can, but we should follow the example of the ancient Fathers and great theologians, who labored earnestly and strenuously in cultivating this doctrine and exhorted others to cultivate it further.

Thus especially that great Athanasius, who above others labored much for the defense of this dogma, wrote, and suffered. Thus Basil in his book Against Eunomius, Gregory of Nazianzus in his Theological Orations, Gregory of Nyssa in his book Against Eunomius; thus among the Latins after Tertullian, Hilary in his 12 books On the Trinity, Augustine in his 15 books On the Trinity, and many others. Among the precursors of scholastic theology, this mystery was treated especially by Anselm, William of Paris, and Richard of St. Victor; the scholastics themselves disputed concerning this dogma in their exposition of the first book of the Sentences, while later ones did so in their commentaries on the first part of the Summa. Among these latter, Gregory of Valencia and Diego Ruiz are highly praised.

---

[1] Nomen τῆς τριάδος hoc sensu primum occurrit apud Theophil. Antioch. Ad Autol, 2, 15: M 6, 1077), latina vox Trinitatis apud, Tertull. (Adv. Prax. c. 2: M 2. 157.

444. Therefore, following in the footsteps of the holy Fathers and theologians, we shall endeavor to ensure that our reason, illuminated by faith, seeking diligently, piously, and soberly, may attain some understanding of this mystery, God willing, and one that is most fruitful (First Vatican Council). But because the matter with which we are dealing is a mystery, of which naturally we do not even have a suspicion, before all else the existence of this mystery must be proved from the sources of revelation, and then its notion must be refined as much as possible.

445. This will be the division of the treatise:

Section I. On the existence of the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity.

Section II. On the procession of the divine persons.

Section III. On the divine relations.

Section IV. On the properties and notions of the divine persons.

Section V. On the mission of the divine persons.

These sections cohere among themselves in this way: procession is in some manner the way to constituting the divine persons; formally the divine persons are constituted by relations; the constitution of persons is followed by personal properties; but by mission the divine persons are manifested to us.

SECTION I.

ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE MYSTERY OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY

Proposition LXIV. Sacred Scripture, just as it teaches the numerical unity of God, so testifies that there are three really distinct persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, to whom the name of God belongs in the proper sense.

446. Note: That the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are frequently named in Scripture, where discourse concerns God and divine matters, is a most well-known fact. This being presupposed, the question is asked whether the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three really distinct persons, or whether these are merely different names of the same being; and if they are really distinct, whether all three are called God in the proper sense or only in an improper sense.

447. Various heresies concerning the Trinity are enumerated by Saint Damasus I (Denz. 58ff.). The Patripassians denied the real distinction of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, who said that the Father himself became incarnate and suffered. The same are called Monarchians, because they chose this as their watchword: "we hold the monarchy," that is, the unique divine principle (monad). This doctrine was defended by Praxeas, against whom Tertullian wrote (M 2, 154); and by Noetus, against whom Hippolytus wrote (M 10, 803: 16, 3370; cf. Epiphan., Haer. 57; M 41, 993) [1] ; likewise by Epigonus and Cleomenes, who taught at Rome. This heresy became more famous through Sabellius, a disciple of Cleomenes, who at least initially taught in the same manner as the Patripassians, whence the same heretics were called sometimes Patripassians, sometimes Sabellians. God was called by them υἱοπάτωρ (Son-Father), to signify the essential and numerical identity between the Father and the Son. Later, however, the Sabellians seem to have modified their heresy. For according to the testimony of Epiphanius (Haer. 62; M 41, 1051), they taught that there are three realities in God, which would constitute one person, just as body, soul, and spirit would make one man. The Patripassians were frequently condemned by ecclesiastical authority (cf. Denz. n. 60 85 231). Sabellius was particularly defeated by Dionysius of Alexandria, from whose writings only fragments survive (cf. M. P. L. 5, 117 ff.).

---

[1] Cf. Der Katholik 1905. II 1 sqq. 112 sqq. 182 sqq. 266 sqq.

448. Those who denied that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the same God in the proper sense are those whose doctrine is customarily called "dynamic monarchianism." These taught that Christ was a man endowed only with divine power. Among the defenders of this doctrine are named two Theodoti—the elder, a tanner (cf. M P. G. 10, 27), the younger, a money-changer—and Artemon. Theodotus the younger thought that before Christ, the supreme power of God had already appeared in Melchizedek, who was greater than Christ, for which reason the Theodotians were also called Melchizedekians. Above all others, however, Paul of Samosata must be named here, according to whom Christ in himself is a mere man, in whom the Wisdom or Word of God dwells and operates by way of power and teaching. He wanted the divine Wisdom, insofar as it exists in God, to be homoousios with God in such a sense that through the word "homoousios" every real distinction between the Father and the Word would be excluded. In this sense this term was rejected by the Synod of Antioch (A.D. 269), although others explain this action differently (cf. Franzelin, De Trad., ed. 4, 168 note). Just as Sabellius, so later Marcellus of Ancyra and his disciple Photinus conceded indeed that Christ was distinct from the Father and was the Logos, but that this Logos was προστατικόν or προφορικόν, different from God, while to this Logos there corresponded in God the Logos ἐνδιάθετον or knowledge, which was not really distinct from God. The same God in himself was entirely one; insofar as he had manifested himself through creation, he was the Father; insofar as he had appeared in Christ, he was the Son; insofar as he had given himself to the apostles and the Church, he was the Holy Spirit. The Trinity therefore according to these heretics was nothing but a threefold manifestation of God ad extra (cf. Denz. n. 66 85 231; Wirceburgenses, De Trin. n. 297 sqq.). According to all these, Christ merited the name of divinity for himself through his good works.

449. The Arians or Eunomians denied that the Son was consubstantial with the Father, affirming that he was a creature, dissimilar to the Father in all things, ἀνόμοιον, for which reason they were called Anomoeans (Epiphan., Haer. 76; M 42, 515 sqq.). The Semi-Arians conceded similarity (ὁμοιούσιον), but not perfect equality (see I 515) [2] .

From the Semi-Arians there proceeded especially those who (like Basil of Ancyra) denied that the Holy Spirit was God, whence they received the name Pneumatomachi (cf. Epiphan., Haer. 73; M 42, 401), among whom Macedonius stands out, who taught that the Son was indeed similar to the Father in all things, but that the Holy Spirit was a creature of the Son (cf. Theod. Schermann, Die Gottheit des Heiligen Geistes nach den griech. Vätern des 4. Jahrhunderts, Freiburg 1901, 3sqq.).

These heresies were condemned by the councils of Nicaea (A.D. 325), Rome (A.D. 379), Constantinople I (A.D. 381), and others. All heretics who teach that

[2] Cf. Ant. Beck, Die Trinitätslehre des hil. Hilarius von Poitiers, Mainz 1903, 94 sqq.

the Son or Holy Spirit is lesser than the Father are called Subordinationists (cf. Denz. n. 19 sqq. 39 sq. 54 58sqq. 85 275sqq.). Concerning the ancient anti-Trinitarian heresies, see Pohle, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik (Paderborn 1920) 246 sqq.

Several errors concerning the Trinity were already condemned around the year 260 by St. Dionysius of Rome in a letter given to St. Dionysius of Alexandria: "Now indeed it would be fitting to dispute against those who, dividing and severing the monarchy—which is the most august preaching of the Church of God—into three certain powers and separate hypostases and three deities, destroy it. For I have heard that certain ones among you who preach and teach the divine Word are teachers of this opinion, who indeed are diametrically opposed, so to speak, to the opinion of Sabellius. For he blasphemes, saying that the Son himself is the Father and vice versa; but they in some way preach three gods, while they divide the sacred unity into three diverse hypostases, completely separated from one another. For it is necessary that the divine Word be united to the God of all, and that the Holy Spirit remain and dwell in God, and thus that the divine Trinity be reduced and gathered into one as it were into a certain summit, that is, into the almighty God of all. For the doctrine of the foolish Marcion [cf. V, n. 454], which cuts and divides the monarchy into three principles, is indeed diabolical, but not that of the true disciples of Christ. For these know well that the Trinity is indeed preached in divine Scripture, but that there are three gods is taught neither in the Old nor in the New Testament. But no less blameworthy are those who think that the Son is a work (ποίημα), and consider that the Lord was made, like one of those things that were truly made, when the divine oracles testify that he was begotten, as is fitting and proper, not created or made.... For if the Son was made, there was a time when he was not; but he always was, if indeed he is, as he himself declares, in the Father (John 14:10-11).... Therefore the admirable and divine unity is not to be separated into three divinities, nor is the dignity and greatness of the Lord to be diminished by the term 'creation,' but we must believe in God the Father almighty and in Christ Jesus his Son and in the Holy Spirit; but the Word is to be united to the God of all... Thus indeed the divine Trinity and the sacred preaching of the monarchy will be preserved intact" (Denz. n. 48 sqq.).

450. The heresiarchs of the sixteenth century—Luther, Calvin, Zwingli—retained the dogma of the Trinity. Indeed, Michael Servetus, a Spanish physician, was burned at Geneva under Calvin in A.D. 1553 for denying the Trinity. Later others renewed the error of Servetus, among whom the most notable are Laelius and Faustus Socinus (the former died A.D. 1562, the latter A.D. 1604), who are the fathers of the sect of the Socinians. This sect had great growth from its connection with the Arminians, who had been expelled from Holland. These heretics taught a certain subordinationism, nor did they concede that Christ was God. This doctrine was spread especially through Poland and Transylvania, but it

also had its followers in England (Arthur Bury, The Naked Gospel). Those who deny the Trinity are customarily called Unitarians.

451. In our age among Protestants, few of those who are called orthodox preserve the faith of the Trinity; but by far the greater number of others, who call themselves liberals, deny this mystery and reject the Apostolic Symbol. Some of these derive the faith of the Trinity from the doctrines of the gentiles. Others, like Harnack (Entstehung und Entwicklung des Kirchenrechts und der Kirchenverfassung in den zwei ersten Jahrhunderten, Leipzig 1910, 187 sqq.), explain the matter from the attempt of Christians to oppose a Christian formula to Jewish formulas. But these explanations are vain, because the faith of the Trinity appears immediately from the beginning in the Christian religion, not as something gradually developing but as a fixed and firm article (cf. Fr. Diekamp, Über den Ursprung des Trinitätsbekenntnisses, Münster 1911). Even those Protestants who teach the Trinity in words often explain this dogma from false philosophical principles in such a way that nothing but the name remains. Thus it is very common to say that the Son is the manifestation of the divine idea in the external world, and that the Holy Spirit is the manifestation of the divine idea in the souls of the faithful. We shall hear more about this matter in the treatise on the Incarnate Word (IV, n. 6). The absurd doctrine of the Theosophists concerning the Trinity (or rather quaternality) is set forth in La Civiltà catt. 1910, I 660 sqq., II 3sqq. 286 sqq.

Among Catholics, Günther had collected Sabellian, Arian, and tritheistic errors into his doctrine, which was condemned by the Church (Denz. n. 1655). For the Modernists, the dogma of the Trinity is a human invention like other dogmas, whose origin they explain from a certain simple enthusiasm (cf. Carbone, De modernistarum doctrinis 148sq. 356sqq.).

Our proposition contains three parts: 1) that there is one God; 2) that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three distinct persons; 3) that all three are called God in the proper sense. As for the arguments, see J. Lebreton, Les origines du dogme de la Trinité, ed. 4, Paris 1919, 245 sqq.

452. Part I. God is One.

Since this part has already been proven previously, it suffices here to recall one or another passage to memory: "Hear, O Israel, your God is one God" (Mark 12:29; Deut. 6:4). "Is he the God of the Jews only? Is he not also of the Gentiles? Yes, of the Gentiles also. For there is one God" (Rom. 3:29-30). "One God and Father of all" (Eph. 4:6). More on this above (n. 132 ff.).

On account of the unity of the divine essence, the Church does not venerate the individual divine Persons separately taken with public worship. Concerning this matter, Leo XIII says in the encyclical Divinum illud of May 19, 1897: "Our predecessor Innocent XII absolutely refused those who requested certain solemnities proper to the honor of the Father. And although the individual

mysteries of the Incarnate Word are celebrated on certain feast days, nevertheless the Word according to his divine nature alone is not celebrated with any proper feast; and even the solemnities of Pentecost were not instituted in antiquity so that the Holy Spirit might be honored simply per se, but so that his advent or external mission might be commemorated. All these things indeed have been established by wise counsel, lest anyone might perhaps slip from distinguishing the Persons to distinguishing the divine essence... In prayers which are addressed to one Person, mention is likewise made of the others; in the forms of supplications, when individual Persons are invoked separately, a common invocation of them is added; to psalms and hymns the same praise is added to all—to the Father and Son and Holy Spirit; blessings, rites, and sacraments are accompanied or completed by the invocation of the holy Trinity" (Acta S. Sedis 29, 646).

453. Part II. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three really distinct.

"I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete, that he may remain with you forever... But the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things" (John 14:16, 26).

a) Here Christ expressly says that he is other than the Holy Spirit. b) Similarly, he is other than the Father (cf. John 1:1-2, 14; 5:32), whom he asks, from whom he went out, to whom he will return (John 16:28), whose Son he often calls himself (Matt. 11:27; Luke 22:70), by whom he was sent (John 5:37) to do his will (John 6:38), by whom he will be glorified with the glory which he had before the world existed with him (John 17:5). All these things presuppose a real distinction. c) There is a real distinction between the Father and the Holy Spirit; for no one sends himself to teach others (John 14:16, 26), no one proceeds from himself (John 15:26). Therefore the Holy Spirit appears in visible form as distinct from the Father and Son. "Jesus being baptized... saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and coming upon him. And behold, a voice from heaven saying: 'This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased'" (Matt. 3:16-17). Therefore there are three distinct persons: Jesus, the Holy Spirit appearing in the form of a dove, the Father speaking from heaven. The same distinction of three persons is perceived in the form of baptism, concerning which more below (n. 459ff.). God sent the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost in a visible manner (Acts 2:4). The apostles make their decrees with the Holy Spirit: "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us" (Acts 15:28). The Holy Spirit dwells in a special way in the hearts of men, wherefore the apostle warns: "Do you not know that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have from God?" (1 Cor. 6:19). "And do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, in whom you are sealed" (Eph. 4:30). The Holy Spirit works supernatural gifts, "dividing to each

one individually as he wills" (1 Cor. 12:11). Therefore it is established that there are three really distinct among themselves: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

God as God can indeed also be called spirit (John 4:24) and holy. Nevertheless, as is evident from what has been said, by this name τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα or simply τὸ πνεῦμα, a divine person distinct from God the Father and Son is designated as if by a proper name. Hence sometimes attention is needed to judge whether in Scripture the name Spirit, said of God, signifies God according to essence, or one determined divine person, and which one. However, where special reasons do not stand in the way, the name Holy Spirit is to be understood not of the Father nor of the Son but of the third divine person. This is evident if it is said that the Holy Spirit is given or sent by the Father or Son, or if all three persons are distinctly named, or if it concerns offices which in Scripture are specially attributed to the Holy Spirit.

Although the gifts of the Holy Spirit are also sometimes called spirits (1 Cor. 14:32), nevertheless they are not called τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα nor τὸ πνεῦμα simply, but with an addition, such as spirit of prophecy. Almost always from the context it is sufficiently clear whether there is discourse about some created thing or about the person of the Holy Spirit (cf. Matt. 10:20; 12:31ff.; 28:19; Mark 13:11; Luke 12:10-12; John 15:26; 16:13; Acts 2:4; 15:28; Rom. 8:9-11, 14ff., 26; 1 Cor. 2:10ff.; 12:7ff., and similarly many other passages). That angels, the human soul, and wind are called spirits creates no difficulty, because confusion with the Holy Spirit is not possible.

Therefore, that the Holy Spirit is a person and one distinct from the Father and Son is manifest from Sacred Scripture. Cf. W. Tosetti, Der Heilige Geist als göttliche Person in den Evangelien. Düsseldorf 1918.

454. Part III. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are called God in the proper sense.

a) That the Father is God is taught so clearly in Sacred Scripture that no controversy has ever arisen concerning this matter. For not only is he often called simply God (e.g., John 5:18; 6:46, etc.), but he is also called the living God (Matt. 16:16), the only true God (John 17:3), Lord of heaven and earth (Matt. 11:25), and many other similar things which are well known.

455. b) We will prove the divinity of the Son more abundantly in the treatise on the Incarnate Word (IV, n. 5ff.). Therefore a few things suffice here. The Son is called the Word (John 1:14) and the Word is affirmed to be God: Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος (John 1:1). Thomas confessed that Christ is God (John 20:28); St. Paul testifies: "To the Son [God said]: 'Your throne, O God, is forever and ever'" (Heb. 1:8). Christ is called "our great God and Savior," ὁ μέγας θεὸς καὶ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν (Titus 2:13; cf. Rom. 9:5). Moreover, Christ is the Son of God in that sense in which no other, not even an angel, can be called son (Heb. 1:5): he is the only-begotten Son

who is in the bosom of the Father (John 1:18); he is the proper Son (Rom. 8:32), the true Son (1 John 5:20). Christ "called God his own Father, making himself equal with God" (John 5:18), which Christ does not deny when the Jews object to this. He is Son from eternity and unto eternity (John 8:35, 58). His are whatever things are the Father's (John 16:15); he himself works whatever things the Father works (John 5:17-21); he himself "upholds all things by the word of his power" (Heb. 1:3), and many similar things. Therefore without doubt Christ is called God in the proper sense.

456. c) That the Holy Spirit is God, Sacred Scripture testifies in various ways. For several times the Holy Spirit is said to be the same as God: "Ananias, why has Satan filled your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit?... You have not lied to men but to God" (Acts 5:3-4). "Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwells in you?" (1 Cor. 3:16). "Do you not know that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have from God?... Therefore glorify and bear God in your body" (1 Cor. 6:19-20). "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And there are differences of ministrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God who works all in all" (1 Cor. 12:4-6). In this text either the Holy Spirit himself is called Lord and God, or, if these two words refer to Christ and God the Father, the Holy Spirit is counted together with them as freely accomplishing the same divine works; therefore as both distinct from them and with them true God, just as also in 2 Cor. 13:13: "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God and the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all" [3].

457. Similarly other divine attributes and operations are ascribed to the Holy Spirit. "God has revealed to us through his Spirit. For the Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God. For what man knows the things of a man except the spirit of man which is in him? Even so no one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God. Now we have received the Spirit who is from God" (1 Cor. 2:10-12). The Holy Spirit inspired the prophets (2 Pet. 1:21) and predicts future things (1 Pet. 1:11; Acts 20:23). He himself chooses preachers of the gospel, such as Paul and Barnabas (Acts 13:4). He himself, remaining with the apostles forever, teaches them all truth (John 14:16, 26); in his power the apostles forgive sins (John 20:22); he himself gives the apostles to speak in various tongues (Acts 2:4); generally he bestows all graces, "dividing to each one individually as he wills" (1 Cor. 12:8-11). Indeed, the accomplishment of the Incarnation is attributed to him (Luke 1:35). Moreover, the Holy Spirit in the New Testament is said to have spoken those words which in the Old Testament are ascribed to God (Acts 28:25-26; Isa. 6:9ff.). Furthermore, Christ ascribes his sanctification and mission according to his human nature to the Holy Spirit (Luke 4:18ff.); he says

---

[3] De 2 Cor. 3. 17 supes n. 137 nota.

that he casts out demons by the power of the Holy Spirit (Matt. 12:28), and in this way he confesses that the Holy Spirit is greater than he [as man]. "Therefore I say to you... whoever speaks a word against the Son of man, it will be forgiven him; but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him either in this age or in the age to come" (Matt. 12:32).

Furthermore, wherever in Scripture the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of God (Rom. 8:9; 1 Cor. 2:11), the Spirit of the Father (Matt. 10:20), the Spirit of the Lord (Luke 4:18), and similar things, the discourse is so openly about a divine being that, unless it were established from elsewhere concerning the person of the Holy Spirit as distinct from the Father, one could easily persuade himself that a divine attribute is simply signified (cf. Greg. de Val., disp. 2, punct. 1, § 24).

458. Conclusion. From the entire doctrine of Christ and the apostles, therefore, it is manifestly gathered that there are three really distinct who are called God in the proper sense. Since, however, a rational being, insofar as it is one in itself and distinct from every other, is customarily called a person (ὑπόστασις), and that by which this being is what it is is called its essence or nature, therefore, to briefly embrace the doctrine handed down in Scripture, the councils and Catholic doctors employ this formula of speaking: God is one in nature and three in persons (cf. Th. de Régnon, Études de théologie positive sur La Sainte Trinité 1, Paris 1892, 129ff.). This formula will be explained more fully later.

Proposition LXV. The Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is specifically proven from the baptismal formula in Matthew 28:19: Πορευθέντες μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, βαπτίζοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος [4] .

I.

459. Three really distinct persons are taught by this text. For the Father and the Son are undoubtedly personal names. (Can it be said: to baptize in the name of some thing?) There is no speech about some indefinite Father and some indefinite Son, but about the Father and his Son, which is already evident in itself, since no one can say "Father and son" without absurdity, understanding someone who is the father or son of another unknown person. Furthermore, this is established from the entire doctrine of the gospels, in which these names of Father and Son and Holy Spirit have one determinate meaning. If this is so, it is established that the Father and Son are distinct persons, since no one can be his own Son or his own Father.

---

[4] Certain authors have attempted to demonstrate that the primitive form of Matthew 28:19 was: “Go, teach all nations in my name,” and that the Trinitarian formula was inserted into the text later, having been derived from the liturgical formula used in baptism. They aim to prove this by citing the fact that Eusebius frequently refers to the verse in this abbreviated form, as for example in Demonstratio Evangelica III, 67 (Migne PG 22, cols. 233, 240, 243 sq.). This thesis has been particularly advanced by Conybeare in Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, Gießen 1901, pp. 275 sqq.

To this one must respond: Eusebius does not only cite that shorter form, but also uses both a more concise version: “Go, teach all nations,” without any mention of “in my name” (e.g., Demonstratio Evangelica I, 346 [PG 22, 40–44, 68]), and the complete Trinitarian formula: “Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit,” as in Epistula ad Caesarium III (PG 20, col. 1537). From the context it is evident that Eusebius adapts the form of citation according to his theological or rhetorical purpose: he uses the shortest form when emphasizing the rapid spread of Christianity; he includes “in my name” when intending to highlight the divine origin of that expansion; and he uses the full Trinitarian expression when the discourse concerns the Trinity or the sacrament of baptism.

It should also be noted that Eusebius never claims that Matthew 28:19 originally said “in my name.” Rather, it appears that he composed or abbreviated the phrasing freely in accordance with his exegetical aims. There exists no manuscript evidence nor any version of the New Testament that supports the variant “in my name”; all extant Greek codices and ancient translations uniformly contain the Trinitarian formula. Furthermore, all ecclesiastical writers prior to Eusebius unanimously attest to the Trinitarian text (cf. De Sacramentis I, n. 382).

A useful summary of this entire debate may be found in Lebreton, Les origines du dogme de la Trinité, pp. 553 sqq., where the relevant texts of Eusebius and earlier Fathers are either cited in full or clearly indicated. Lebreton concludes decisively on p. 563: “Il ressort de cette discussion que les conclusions de M. Conybeare sont définitivement à écarter,” i.e., “It follows from this discussion that the conclusions of Mr. Conybeare must be definitively rejected.”

Consequently, the Holy Spirit is also a distinct person, because he is enumerated in the same manner as the Father and Son. Furthermore, unless he were a distinct person, he would be an attribute of the Son. But it is said καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, by which manner of speaking attributive predication is plainly excluded. Therefore, three distinct persons are truly enumerated.

II.

460. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are true God. For to be baptized is to be freed from sin, to be justified, to be given grace (Titus 3:5-7). But to be baptized in the name of someone is to be baptized by his power and authority. But no one has the power and authority to free from sin and give grace except God himself. Therefore, to be baptized in the name of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit is to be baptized in the name of God.

Furthermore, to be baptized into the name (εἰς τὸ ὄνομα) of someone is to be consecrated and devoted to him as the object of worship (Romans 6:3-13; 1 Corinthians 1:12-15; Galatians 3:26-28). But men neither ought nor can be so consecrated and devoted to anyone except to God alone, as is evident in itself (cf. Romans 6:11). These two expressions: to baptize in the name or into the name do not have different meanings by reason of grammatical construction, but both locutions signify the same thing: only regarding the fact, the Latins see authority more closely expressed in this formula, while the Greeks see the term to which man is consecrated.

III.

461. The unity of nature is not indeed expressly stated in this text, but is sufficiently indicated; for, apart from the fact that from the entire revealed doctrine it is supposed to be known that these three, if they are true God, are not three Gods, but one God, it is also openly signified that the same name belongs to these three. But that name is put for essence in Scripture has been shown elsewhere (above n. 105), and all the more so here, where certainly the meaning is not to be baptized in some material sound, but to be baptized in the authority of him whom the name signifies, and to be consecrated to the majesty of him whom the name represents. Therefore, these three have one authority, the same majesty.

All these things Saint Augustine embraces in these words: "Lord, our God, we believe in you, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. For Truth would not say: 'Go, baptize all nations in the name of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit,' unless you were Trinity. Nor would you command us to be baptized, Lord God, in the name of him who is not Lord God. Nor would it be said by the divine voice: 'Hear, O

Israel, the Lord your God is one God,' unless you were Trinity in such a way that you were one Lord God. And if you, God the Father, were yourself and your Word Jesus Christ the Son were yourself and your gift the Holy Spirit were yourself, we would not read in the writings of truth: 'God sent his Son.' Nor would you, O Only-begotten, say: 'whom the Father will send in my name,' and: 'whom I will send to you from the Father'" (De Trinitate 15, 51: Migne 42, 1097 sq. Cf. Saint Athanasius, Epistle 3 to Serapion n. 6; Migne 26, 634).

462. Scholium: On the Johannine Comma.

The Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is enunciated in these words: "For there are three who bear witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one" (1 John 5:7). Concerning this text, its dogmatic authenticity can neither be denied nor called into doubt. For since it has been received for many centuries both into the Vulgate and into the liturgy, this text cannot contain false doctrine, since dogmatic error cannot be received in such a way by the Catholic Church. Therefore, this text undoubtedly provides a firm dogmatic argument, and in this sense it is authentic. But it is another question whether this comma is genuine in the sense that the apostle Saint John himself wrote these words. Concerning this matter, there is not one opinion among

scholars, even Catholic ones. Let us briefly hear the reasons which are customarily proposed for each opinion [5] .

I.

Arguments against the genuineness of the Johannine comma (cf. Cornely, Introd. III 668 sq. Dr. K. Künstle, Das Comma Ioan., Freiburg 1905. J. Lebreton, Les origines du dogme de la Trinité, 598 sqq. Van Steenkiste-Camerlynck, Epist. cath, explicatae, Brugis 1907, 169 sqq.).

---

[5] There exists a decree of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition concerning the Johannine Comma:

On Wednesday, January 13, 1897, in the general congregation of the Sacred Roman and Universal Inquisition held before the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords Cardinals deputed against heretical depravity, the following doubt was proposed: Whether it may be safely denied or at least called into question that the text of 1 John 5:7, which reads: "For there are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one," is authentic?

After all matters were carefully examined and the vote of the consultors had been obtained, the aforementioned Most Eminent Cardinals ordered the response to be given: In the negative.

Then, on Friday, January 15 of the same month and year, in the usual audience granted to the Reverend Father Assessor of the Holy Office, an accurate report having been made on the matter to Our Most Holy Lord Pope Leo XIII, His Holiness approved and confirmed the resolution of the Most Eminent Fathers. (Signed: I. Can. Mancini, Notary of the Sacred Roman and Universal Inquisition.)

When this decree became known, not only did Protestant theologians assert—though their lack of familiarity with the norms of Catholic doctrine renders their misunderstanding excusable—that Catholics were henceforth prohibited from subjecting the Johannine Comma to any critical examination whatsoever, but even certain Catholic theologians (which is more difficult to comprehend) went so far as to claim that, after this decree, a Catholic could no longer deny or even question the genuineness of the Comma without, by that very act, calling into doubt or denying that the Catholic Church is the infallible custodian and judge of the sacred books. When questioned on this matter, Cardinal Vaughan, in a letter to Mr. W. Ward, responded in the following terms: "I have ascertained from an excellent source that the decree of the Holy Office on the passage of 'the Three Witnesses,' which you refer to, is not intended to close the discussion on the authenticity of that text; the field of Biblical criticism is not touched by this decree" (Revue Biblique 1898, p. 149).

Moreover, it is evident from what has already been stated in the propaedeutic treatise (Vol. I, n. 521) that a response given by the Congregation to a specific dubium—even when confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff in a non-definitive form—does not constitute a final or irreformable judgment. Therefore, now as before the issuance of that decree, it remains permissible to subject the Comma to critical inquiry, so long as such inquiry is conducted with due regard for the weight of critical arguments and without any irreverence toward the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office or the Roman Pontiff. However, it must also be stated with clarity that the dogmatic authenticity of the passage—that is, its legitimacy as a source for doctrinal or magisterial use—was never licitly to be denied or doubted, either before or after the decree. What remains open to critical investigation is the question of textual authenticity, not the ecclesial authority or doctrinal application associated with the passage within the tradition of the Church.

463. This text is not found in any Greek manuscript before the fifteenth century. None of the Greek Fathers ever cited this text or employed it against the Arians. Likewise, the text was unknown to the most ancient and celebrated Latin Fathers. Thus, for example, Saint Augustine never mentions this text either in his entire work On the Trinity or in any other theological work (cf. Against Maximin 2, 22, 3: M 42, 794 sq.). Saint Leo the Great in his letter to Flavian (ep. 28, 5: M 54, 775) cites the entire context with the preceding and following words, but with this comma omitted. However, Facundus, bishop of Hermiane († circa 570), in his book In Defense of the Three Chapters 1, 3 says: 1 John 5:8 is explained mystically by Saint Cyprian concerning the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit (M 67, 536). Therefore, Facundus himself certainly did not read the Johannine comma, and he thinks that Cyprian's words: "Concerning the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit it is written: And the three are one" (in the book On the Unity of the Church 6), should be referred to 1 John 5:8; from which many conclude that this comma, which is now read in the text, was from the beginning a certain explanation of the following verse that arose in the African church, and this explanation later crept into the text itself. Indeed, not even Saint Jerome himself read this comma, and therefore, unless the Roman correctors had erroneously thought that a certain preface to the Catholic epistles was by Saint Jerome, according to the principles they followed in editing the Vulgate, they would have expunged this comma. But all scholars today acknowledge that prologue to be a spurious work (cf. M. P. L. 29, 863 sqq.).

Up to the eighth century, the Johannine comma is not found in any manuscript of the Vulgate; from that time, however, it was gradually introduced, though not yet immediately accepted by all. Thus, for example, the Venerable Bede in his commentaries does not yet report the text. That comma was a marginal note, later received into the text, also appears from the fact that those words are read with great variety of readings and are placed sometimes after the verse which is now the eighth, sometimes before this verse.

464. But if these things are true, nothing can be proven about this comma from the Tridentine decree on the authenticity of the Vulgate. The decree is this: "If anyone does not accept as sacred and canonical the complete books with all their parts, as they have been accustomed to be read in the Catholic Church and as they are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition, and knowingly and deliberately despises the aforesaid traditions, let him be anathema" (sess. 4; Denz. n. 784). Therefore, if it can be proven that some reading was not in the old Vulgate edition, the Council of Trent decreed nothing about this. Cardinal Franzelin himself admits this: "If concerning any such text it could be demonstrated that it is not from the old Vulgate edition, its conformity with primitive Scripture could not be said to have been declared by the decree of the council" (De Script. et Trad. [ed. 3] 530). For this reason, many Catholic theologians do not hesitate to call into doubt or even deny the genuineness of the

Johannine comma. Paul Martin has written much eruditely to elucidate the origin of the Johannine comma (cf. Revue des sciences ecclésiastiques, Amiens 1887, 203 sqq.).

II.

Arguments for the genuineness of the Johannine comma (cf. card. Franzelin, De Deo Trino thes. 4: Lamy in The American Eccl. Review, New York 1897. II 449 sqq.).

465. That comma could not have been commonly received from the ninth century unless it had already been in the manuscripts before then.

In the year 484, 461 African bishops cite the text against the Arians (Victor of Vita, History of the Persecution 2, 82, al. 3, 11; M 58, 227), which could not have happened unless it had been accustomed to be read by common use in the churches of Africa. Priscillian in the fourth century cites the words (ed. Schepss p. 6) [6], likewise Saint Fulgentius (Against the Arians 10; M 65, 224) and already before him Vigilius of Thapse (? On the Trinity 1; M 62, 243 246); the cited words of Cyprian should be referred here. Indeed, Tertullian seems already to have had regard for that comma, when he says: "Thus the connection of the Father in the Son and of the Son in the Paraclete makes three coherent ones, one from another, who are three one, not one. As it was said (John 10:30): 'I and the Father are one'" (Against Praxeas c. 25) [7]. From which it is evident, they say, that this reading flourished in the African church in the third century, indeed already before then. This is confirmed because those words are cited in two treatises, one of which is ascribed to Augustine, the other to Athanasius, but which are by an uncertain author. The comma is also found in certain Spanish and Gallic documents whose authors are not known. Cassiodorus also, who was a wise estimator of biblical matters, adduces verse 7 (On 1 John: M 70. 1373). A certain trace of the text is found (?) in Origen (On Psalm 122. 2) and some later Greeks. The Fourth Lateran Council also (1215), in which there were Greeks and Latins, cites that comma (Denz. n. 431).

466. Having set forth these things, Franzelin concludes: "As regards the passage called into question, we do not now contend that critical and historical supports of such a kind are available that by them alone genuineness would be demonstrated as certain and placed beyond doubt: but since from our Catholic

---

[6] Nevertheless, the form of the words is otherwise: As John says: 'There are three who give testimony on earth: water, flesh, and blood; and these three are one; and there are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Spirit; and these three are one in Christ Jesus.'

[7] Cf. A. Bludan, Das Comma Johanneum bei Tertullian und Cyprian. Theol. Quartalschrift, Tübingen 1920, 1 sqq.

principles genuineness is fully proven, we simultaneously affirm that Protestants from their principles and critical supports cannot demonstrate interpolation."

He wants genuineness according to Catholic principles to follow from the definition of the Council of Trent. For he thinks the Johannine comma is comprehended in these words: "complete books with all their parts, as they have been accustomed to be read in the Catholic Church." But, he says, the comma was certainly accustomed to be read at that time, furthermore it is a dogmatic text, concerning which texts that decree treats. Therefore it pertains to Sacred Scripture. But others deny this conclusion and maintain that dogmatic texts which were critically doubtful were not declared authentic by this decree: for no certain manuscript of the Vulgate was declared authentic, but generally the old Vulgate edition. Hence, since it is doubtful whether this comma pertains to the old Vulgate edition, indeed it is more probable that it does not pertain to it, nothing has been decided about the comma.

467. If you compare all these things, you will easily understand that perhaps the question has not yet been solved with absolute certainty in either direction, and therefore it must be said: The matter is not yet entirely clear.

Moreover, even if it were established that the text is genuine, its explanation would nevertheless have difficulties, because it is not easily understood what the heavenly testimony of the three persons is: and besides, it must be demonstrated that these three are said to be one in essence, not in testimony alone, because immediately it follows that water, blood, and spirit are also one, certainly not essentially, but morally in testifying. Indeed, some say that verse 7 makes the context so difficult that already from this interpolation appears, while others on the contrary think that without this verse the context scarcely, and not even scarcely, holds together.

Proposition LXVI. The Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is Variously Indicated in the Old Testament

468. Note: It is one thing to ask whether from the Old Testament alone the Most Holy Trinity can be known with certainty, and whether this mystery pertained to the faith of the Israelite people; it is another thing to ask whether, given the revelation of the New Testament, the doctrine concerning the distinction of divine persons can be found indicated in the Old Testament. We affirm this latter point, because the Holy Fathers and Catholic theologians have constantly taught this, indeed it is openly presupposed in the Scripture of the New Testament (e.g., Heb. 1:5 ff.). Concerning this matter Alcuin states: "All Scripture of the Old and New Testament, divinely inspired, if understood in a Catholic manner, insinuates this: that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God of the same substance and inseparable in the unity of divinity" (De Trin. 1, 2: M 101, 14). Cf. Ant. Beck, Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Hilarius, Mainz 1903, 161 sqq.

I.

469. The plurality of persons is indicated by the plural form in which God speaks about himself. For although the name Elohim and similar terms can indeed be explained by themselves as a majestic plural, nevertheless in this way it cannot be sufficiently shown how God could have said: "Let us make man in our image and likeness" (Gen. 1:26). For he himself, who is the efficient and exemplary cause of man, signifies that he is plural (consulting and deliberating among themselves), in whom there is one common principle of the image: "Let us make man in our likeness" and "God created man in his own image." Therefore the Holy Fathers reject as false that interpretation according to which either a single divine person speaks with himself, or God addresses the angels. The sayings of the Fathers have been collected by Petavius (De Trin. 2, 7, 4 sqq.).

For example, let Augustine be heard: "Nor is it said in vain: 'Let us make man in your image,' as if the Father were speaking to the Son, or 'in my image'; but it is said: 'in our image.' This is most correctly understood from the person of the Trinity itself" (Contra serm. arian. c. 16; M 42, 695). The same holy Doctor rejects the explanation concerning angels [8] : "Nor is it right to believe that man was made in the image of angels, or that the image of angels and of God is the same; therefore the plurality of the Trinity is correctly understood. This Trinity, however, because it is one God, even when it had said: 'Let us make,' it says, 'And God made man in the image of God'; it did not say: 'The gods made' or 'in the image of gods'" (De civ. Dei 16, 6, 1: M 41, 484). And this explanation concerning the Trinity, according to Epiphanius (Haer. 23, n. 5; M 41, 303), is most fitting both to the common understanding of the faithful and to the truth.

Other expressions which are referred to the Trinity by the Holy Fathers are: "Behold, Adam has become like one of us" (Gen. 3:22); "Come, let us go down and confuse their language there" (Gen. 11:7); "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord, God of hosts" (Is. 6:3; cf. John 12:39 ff.); the triple invocation of the Lord in the formula of blessing (Num. 6:24-26), and other similar passages. Cf. concerning these J. Lebreton, Les origines du dogme de la Trinité (ed. 4) 507 sqq.

II.

470. The second and third persons of the Most Holy Trinity are sometimes expressly named.

First, the promised Messiah is said to be true God: "God himself will come and save you" (Is. 35:4). "Prepare the way of the Lord... behold, the Lord God will

---

[8] The same explanation was already rejected by St. Irenaeus (cf. Klebba, Die Anthropologie des hl. Irenäus, Münster 1894, 15 sqq.).

come in strength" (Is. 40:3, 10. Cf. Mark 1:3). "His name shall be called Emmanuel" (Is. 7:14. Cf. Matt. 1:23). "His name shall be called God" (Is. 9:6). "Behold, days are coming, says the Lord, and I will cause to spring up for David a righteous branch... and this is the name by which they will call him: The Lord our righteousness" (Jer. 33:14 f.). No less clearly is the Messiah signified as a person distinct and begotten by the Father: "Your throne, O God (Elohim), is forever and ever... therefore God, your God, has anointed you with the oil of gladness..." (Ps. 44:7-8. Cf. Heb. 1:8-9). "The Lord said to my Lord: Sit at my right hand... from the womb before the morning star I have begotten you" (Ps. 109:1-3. Cf. Matt. 22:42-45). "The Lord said to me: You are my Son; today I have begotten you" (Ps. 2:7. Cf. Heb. 1:5). From these passages it is understood how the Jews in the times of Christ manifested no difficulty in admitting several divine persons, but immediately understood that the name "Son of God," by which the Messiah was called, signified a person divine in the proper sense (cf. Luke 1:35; John 1:32-34, 49; 9:35-38). Cf. Lebreton l. c. 121 sqq.

471. It is well known that divine works or attributes are often ascribed to the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament (cf. Job 33:4; Wis. 1:6f.; Is. 11:2; 61:1 etc.). But the personal distinction of the Holy Spirit, unless in the light of the New Testament and from hermeneutical principles alone, can scarcely be demonstrated from the Old Testament. However, the Holy Spirit is said to be sent, as: "You will send forth your Spirit, and they will be created" (Ps. 103:30), to be given or poured out: "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh" (Joel 2:28; cf. Acts 2:16 ff.), and other similar expressions. All three persons are named in Wis. 9:1, 4, 17: "God of my fathers who made all things by your Word... Give me wisdom, she who sits by your throne... But who will know your mind, unless... you send your Holy Spirit from on high?" Cf. Lebreton l. c. 100 sqq.

That passage of Ps. 32:6 is most commonly explained by the Holy Fathers concerning the Trinity: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the Spirit of his mouth all their power." Thus, for example, St. Basil: "Therefore, just as the Word as creator established the heaven, so the Spirit, who is from God, who proceeds from the Father, that is, who is from his mouth (so that you may not judge him to be some external thing or creature, but may glorify him as having a hypostasis from God), brought in all their powers at once. Therefore all heavenly power has been established by the Spirit, that is, it has its solidity and firmness and constancy in holiness and all virtue, fitting for sacred powers, from the help of the Spirit... Since therefore the Savior is the Word of the Lord, and the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of his mouth, and both equally contributed their work in creating the heavens and their powers, therefore it was said: 'By the word of the Lord the heavens were established...'" (In Ps. 32, n. 4; M 29, 334).

III.

472. The distinction of divine persons is exhibited quite clearly in the sapiential books, especially in Prov. ch. 8; Wis. ch. 7 ff.; Ecclus. 24.

In Ecclus. ch. 24, uncreated Wisdom is described as a divine person, originating from another divine person. This Wisdom says of herself in Prov. 8:22: "The Lord possessed me [kanani, i.e., has me by generation] (cf. Gen. 4:1) in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning." Therefore Wisdom is eternal, conceived and begotten before the creation of things (vv. 24-25). This Wisdom was with God, was the object of divine joy (I delighted, I brought him joy), was with God as the artificer of things (v. 27 ff.). When these passages are compared with the beginning of the Gospel of St. John, it becomes manifest that Wisdom is the Word. This was so commonly admitted by the Holy Fathers that the Arians formed an argument from verse 22 against the divinity of the Son, because the Greek version has: "The Lord created me." Therefore, they said, the Son is a creature. But Catholics did not respond that this verse should not be referred to the Son, but that the word "created" should be understood in another way (cf. Petav., De Trin. 2, 1).

A most beautiful description of Wisdom is found in the book of Wisdom ch. 7, from v. 21: "Wisdom, the artificer of all, is a spirit of intelligence, holy, unique... who encompasses all spirits... She is a vapor of the power of God and a certain pure emanation of the clarity of almighty God... She is the brightness of eternal light and a spotless mirror of God's majesty and an image of his goodness. And though she is one, she can do all things, and remaining in herself she renews all things. She reaches from end to end mightily and orders all things sweetly" (cf. Heb. 1:3).

In Ecclus. ch. 24, Wisdom says of herself: "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High [she is therefore the Word], the firstborn before every creature. I made an unfailing light to rise in the heavens... I dwelt in the highest places and my throne was in a pillar of cloud... in me is all grace of the way and of truth..." Cf. Lebreton l. c. 115 sqq.

The difficulty is in v. 14: "From the beginning and before the ages I was created." There would probably be no difficulty if we knew the Hebrew word; perhaps it was the same as in Prov. 8:22. Furthermore, from the context it is clear how Wisdom is said to be created, namely by proceeding from the mouth of God before every creature; therefore in such a way that by origin she is distinct from every creature and exalted above every creature (cf. St. Athanasius, Serm. 2 contra arian. n. 44; M 26, 239). Some Holy Fathers (such as Athanasius in the same oration nn. 53 ff.) explain that saying also concerning the incarnate Word, which is a creature according to human nature, or concerning the Word in some way poured out into creatures, especially rational ones, because these were made according to the image of God, but the Word is the substantial image of the Father and the exemplary idea of all creatures. Hence "I was created" is the same as "I was expressed in creatures." Cf. Hurter II, n. 144.

IV.

473. The theophanies of the Old Testament are referred to the person of the Son by the great consensus of the Holy Fathers (cf. Régnon, Etudes sur la Sainte Trinité III, Paris 1898, 88 sqq.).

Because he who appears is called both angel and God, they conclude that the divine person who appears is not the Father, but the Son, since the Father cannot be an angel, i.e., sent by another, but only the Son and the Holy Spirit can be. Therefore, since the same one is called both the Angel of the Lord and the Lord himself, there are two persons to whom the name Lord belongs: one sending, the other sent.

These appearances of the angel of the Lord are narrated in Gen. 16:7 ff.; 18:1 ff., which is the most notable chapter referred to this matter; Gen. 21:17; 31:11 ff.; similarly Ex. 3:2 ff., where according to the Hebrew text it reads: "The Angel of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire from the midst of the bush." With these texts the Holy Fathers compare those places where the future Messiah is called "the angel of great counsel" (Is. 9:6 according to the Greek text) and "the angel of the covenant" (Mal. 3:1). "Therefore he is God who is also an angel, because he who is also God's angel is God born from God. But he is called God's angel because he is the angel of great counsel. But the same one was afterward shown to be God, lest he who is God should be believed to be an angel" (Hilarius, De Trin. l. 4, n. 24: M 10, 114). In the same way these theophanies are referred to the Son by Justin, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Cyprian, Athanasius, Basil, Cyril of Jerusalem, Chrysostom, Jerome, Cyril of Alexandria, Leo the Great, Isidore of Hispalis (cf. Der Katholik 1882 II 151 sqq.). Therefore we correctly say that in the theophanies of the Old Testament the distinction of divine persons is exhibited.

474. Scholion: Whether in the theophanies of the Old Testament God appeared immediately.

Those Holy Fathers who teach that the Word appeared in the Old Testament do not thereby teach that the Word immediately formed that appearance and appeared and spoke under it. On the contrary, the common opinion of the Holy Fathers is that in the theophanies a created angel appeared immediately, who bore the person of the Word and spoke in his name and authority. It is known and conceded by all that this was the opinion of Augustine (De Trin. 3, 11; M 42, 881; In Io. tr. 3, n. 17; M 35, 1403; De civ. Dei 12, 29; M 41, 508 f.), Jerome (In Gal. 3, 19; M 30, 113), Gregory the Great (Moral. Praef. c. 1: M 75, 510). But those err who think that these alone taught thus. For Eusebius teaches the same: "Just as among the prophets... it was indeed a man that was seen, but God who spoke through what appeared, as through an instrument... so certainly also to Moses,

who is introduced, the supreme God who has all things under himself sings the things that are proposed through him who appears, the angel" (Demonstr. evang. 5, 13; M 22, 390). Chrysostom: "He says the law was arranged, i.e., handed over to him [Moses] through the angel who appeared to him in the bush... Here he shows them [the Jews] to be disobedient to God and angels and prophets and the Spirit and all" (Hom. 17 in Act. 7, 53, n. 3; M 60, 138). Similarly St. Athanasius, St. Basil, Theodoret, St. Cyril of Alexandria.

475. Among the scholastics St. Thomas teaches: "In all those bodily appearances a body was formed and assumed and moved by an angel, but nevertheless in the body assumed through the angel it is said that the angel appears and sometimes God. Sometimes [the angel] wishes to instruct man about divine power... and then he forms the assumed body to express the eminence of divine majesty, and this Gregory also says, assigning the reason why the angel who spoke to Moses is sometimes called angel, sometimes Lord" (In 2, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 6; cf. 1, 2, q. 98, a. 3; 1, q. 51, a. 2; a. 3 ad 5; 1, 2, q. 112, a. 1; 3, q. 30, a. 3).

Suarez: "The second opinion is that God never appeared before the incarnation in a body immediately and personally assumed by God himself or any divine person, but through the mediation of some angel. This is the common opinion of the scholastics... And this opinion is indeed most true" (De angelis 6, 20, 28, in which entire chapter he excellently expounds the question of theophanies; cf. De lege vet. 9, 2).

This opinion seems certain from the doctrine of St. Paul, who says that the immediate appearance of God is a singular privilege of the new covenant (Heb. 1:1-2; 2:1-3; 13:2; Gal. 3:19. Cf. Acts 7:30-32, 53).

Proposition LXVII. The Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is proven from the perpetual ecclesiastical Tradition.

476. Note: In the year 325, at the Council of Nicaea against the Arians, the doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity was defined (Denz. n. 54). Hence no one can doubt that from the fourth century onward this doctrine has always been acknowledged and preached in the Catholic Church.

That the same doctrine had already been in force before this time is shown by the fact that Arius and the Arians did not dare to propose their heresy clearly and openly, but endeavored to conceal their mind with various artifices; this is a sign that they well understood that the profession of the Church was opposed to their heresy. Concerning these Arian subterfuges, Saint Athanasius already complains in a certain letter given to the bishops of Egypt, and demands from the Arians: "If they are confident and believe this faith [of Arius] to be ecclesiastical, let them openly declare their opinion" (n. 18: M 25, 579). But where it first became clear what the Arians intended, immediately the Catholic bishops, without hesitation, rejected their doctrine as a pestiferous heresy both before the

Nicene Council and in the Nicene Council itself. The Fathers of that Council defined: that the Son is not a creature, but has been begotten from eternity; that He is not of another nature than the Father, but "begotten from the Father, the only-begotten, that is, from the essence of the Father, true God from true God, consubstantial with the Father."

That the Council understood numerical consubstantiality, not merely specific consubstantiality such as exists among several human beings, needs no proof, although some have absurdly doubted this matter. For the Council did not admit three gods, but professed faith "in one God." More details can be found in Franzelin, theses 8 and 9.

Certain recent Protestants distinguish between the paleo-Nicene Fathers (Athanasius with his followers) and the neo-Nicene Fathers (Basil with his followers), claiming that the former admitted numerical consubstantiality of the three divine Persons, while the latter admitted only specific consubstantiality.

But was Basil perhaps a tritheist? He indeed writes: "Furthermore, to those who reproach us with three gods, let this be said: we confess one God not by number but by nature." But there he understands "one by number" as one composed from many, which he explains with examples: "The world is called one, even though many elements compose it; a man is called one, who consists of united parts." But God is free from such numerical unity. "Confessing the identity of nature and admitting the consubstantial, we flee composition" (Ep. 8, n. 2 sq.; M 32, 248 sq.). "The Arians accuse us of preaching three gods. But truth fights for us, when we demonstrate both publicly to all and privately to those who approach us that whoever says three gods is anathematized by us, and is not even judged to be a Christian" (Ep. 189, n. 2; M 32, 685). "One is God the Father, one is the Son, not two gods, since the Son has identity with the Father. Number the Father separately and the Son separately: but lest you be torn into polytheism, confess one substance in both" (Hom. 24, n. 3: M 31, 605).

Gregory of Nyssa, with the exaggerated realism of the Neoplatonists who teach that universal human nature exists objectively as universal, attempts to use this to explain the consubstantiality of the three divine Persons; but this very attempt, by no means successful, shows that he admitted true numerical unity. For, as he himself explains, in human beings that common human nature seems to be multiplied because many accidents are added to nature in individual human beings, which constantly change. But in the Holy Trinity nothing of this sort ever occurs... Therefore it is by no means to be professed that in the three Persons of the divine essence there are three gods, according to what they are as God, but one and the same God on account of the identity of substance, which is signified by the name of God... We assert one God, the maker of all things, although He is considered in three Persons or hypostases of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit (Adversus Graecos ex communibus notionibus: M 45, 180-185; cf. Contra Eunomium 1. 1: M 45, 320 sq.).

477. That the faith of the Trinity was always in the Catholic Church both before and after the Nicene Council is already established from the testimony of Augustine alone, who writes: "All whom I have been able to read, who wrote before me concerning the Trinity, which is God, Catholic interpreters of the divine books both old and new, have intended to teach according to the Scriptures that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit of one and the same substance suggest the divine unity with inseparable equality; and therefore they are not three gods, but one God: although the Father begot the Son, and therefore the Father is not He who is the Son; and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of the Father and Son, Himself also coequal with the Father and Son and pertaining to the unity of the Trinity" (De Trin. 1, 4: M 42, 824). The same Athanasius had already objected to the Arians: "You, O new Jews and disciples of Caiaphas, what Fathers of your sayings can you exhibit? Certainly you will never produce any prudent and wise one; for all shrink from you except the devil alone" (De decr. nic. n. 27: M 25, 466).

Our task here will be to prove that even before the Nicene Council the same doctrine of the Fathers existed, although not always conceived in the same words nor bound to the same fixed terms.

478. Argument 1. a) The most ancient faith of the Church is exhibited by the Symbols, all of which, without exception, propose the faith of the Trinity (cf. Denz. n. 2 sqq.). Gregory Thaumaturgus, explaining the Symbol against the Samosatenes: "One," he says, "is God, Father of the living Word, of subsisting Wisdom. One Lord, alone from alone, God from God... invisible from invisible. One Holy Spirit having subsistence from God... Perfect Trinity, which is not divided nor alienated in glory and eternity and kingdom, unchangeable and invariable, always the same Trinity" (M 10, 984). [9]

b) The same faith appears from the Doxology, by which from apostolic times "the same glory was attributed to the Father and Son and Holy Spirit," which [doxology], as Saint Basil says, "those who prescribed from the beginning and handed down to posterity, established in the churches by use progressing always with time through long custom" (De Spir. Sancto c. 29, n. 71: M 32, 199).

c) The Martyrs professed the same faith, as is evident from their acts. Saint Polycarp (†156): "For all things I praise You [true God], I bless You, I glorify You through the eternal and heavenly high priest Jesus Christ, beloved Son, through whom to You with Him and the Holy Spirit be glory both now and in future ages" (Martyr. Polyc. 14, 3). Saint Epipodius (†178): "I confess Christ to be God with the Father and Holy Spirit, and it is worthy that I pour out my soul to Him, who is

[9] De symbolis cf. Bacмer, Das apostol. Glaubensbekenntnis, Mainz 1893: Blume, Das apostol, Glaubensbekenntnis, Freiburg 1893; Kattenbusch, Das apostol. Symbol, Leipzig 1894; tom. II, 1900.

both creator and redeemer to me" (Ruinart, Acta [ed. veron.] 65). Saint Vincent the Levite (†304): "I confess the Lord Christ, Son of the most high Father, unique of the unique, I profess Him with the Father and Holy Spirit to be one sole God" (ib. 325). Similar things are read in the acts of Saint Euplus, Saint Afra, Saint Tarachus, Saint Pionius.

479. Argument 2. From the Holy Fathers.

a) Athenagoras (ca. 180): "Who would not be amazed, when he hears those [Christians] called atheists [by the pagans], who teach God the Father and God the Son and the Holy Spirit, and show their power [essence] in unity and their distinction in order" (Legat. n. 10; M 6, 909).

Irenaeus (ca. 180) often expounds this doctrine: "The Church received from the apostles and their disciples that faith which is in one God, the Father almighty, and in one Jesus Christ the Son of God... and in the Holy Spirit, who preached through the prophets" (Adv. haer. 1, 10, 1: M 7,550). "The Word and Wisdom, the Son and Spirit, are always present to Him [God the Father], through whom and in whom He made all things freely and spontaneously, to whom He speaks saying: 'Let us make man to our image and likeness.' And that the Word, i.e., the Son, was always with the Father, we have demonstrated through many proofs. That Wisdom also, which is the Spirit, was with Him before every constitution, He says through Solomon: 'God founded the earth by Wisdom'" (L. c. 4, 20, 1-3; M 7, 1032 sqq.).

Tertullian concedes to Praxeas that there is only one God, but this does not prevent the Trinity, "as if not thus also all things are one, while all things are from one, namely through the unity of substance" (Contra Prax. c. 2; M 2, 157). "This matter belongs to Jewish faith, to believe in one God in such a way that you are unwilling to count the Son with Him and the Spirit after the Son. For what will be the difference between us and them except this difference?... Three believed constitute one God, so that one might be believed anew through the Son and Holy Spirit... who also formerly was preached through the Son and Holy Spirit but was not understood" (ib. c. 31: M 2, 196). Hippolytus has similar things (Contra Noetum: M 10, 803 sq.), concerning which Epiphanius reports (Haer. 67; M 41, 995).

Pope Dionysius (†266) against the Sabellians and tritheists: "The impiety of that one [Sabellius] consists in this, that he says the Son is the Father and vice versa; these others in some way preach three gods, when they divide the holy unity into three hypostases, mutually alien and completely separated. For it is necessary that the divine Word be united to the God of all, and that the Holy Spirit remain and live in God, and finally it is absolutely necessary that the divine Trinity be reduced and gathered into one as into a certain summit—I mean the almighty God of all... It must be believed in God the Father almighty and in Jesus Christ His Son and in the Holy Spirit. Thus indeed both the divine Trinity and the

preaching of the holy monarchy will be preserved intact" (apud S. Athan., De decr. nic. n. 26; M 25, 462; cf. Denz. n. 48 sqq.).

From the later Fathers let us hear the saying of Augustine: "You know, beloved, in that invisible and incorruptible Trinity, which our faith and the Catholic Church holds and preaches, that God the Father is not the Father of the Holy Spirit, but of the Son; and God the Son is not the Son of the Holy Spirit, but of the Father; but God the Holy Spirit is not the Spirit of the Father alone or of the Son alone, but of the Father and Son. And this Trinity, although the property and substance [subsistence] of individual persons is preserved, nevertheless on account of the very individual and inseparable essence or nature of eternity, truth, and goodness, is not three Gods, but one God" (Sermo 71, n. 18; M 38, 453 sq.).

b) Lest difficulty arise from the sayings of certain Fathers writing after the Nicene Council, let Saint Gregory Nazianzen be heard, who says that many did not think rightly concerning the Holy Spirit, like the Sadducees, that among the pagans some were not far from Christian doctrine, but on the contrary that some "of our wise men," i.e., certain Christians devoted to theological speculation, had formed false notions concerning the Holy Spirit. And therefore they neither venerate nor despise Him, but are affected toward Him in some middle way, or rather miserably and destructively. These "wise men" are not understood to be Catholics but heterodox. Concerning Catholics he says: "Of these moreover, who believe Him to be God, some are pious and orthodox in mind [but are silent about this matter, moved either by fear or some other reason]: others do not fear to profess piety with their very lips." Then using a certain irony, he again speaks of certain "wiser ones," who with the Catholics admit three divine persons, but teach subordinationism. Then he refutes all those wise Christians in order (Orat. 31, n. 5: M 36, 138). Therefore in this place it is not shown, as some wish, that among the Catholics themselves there was no consensus concerning the Holy Spirit, but it is shown only, what is evident from elsewhere, that in that age various heretical opinions concerning the Holy Spirit had arisen. Only those who confess the Holy Spirit to be God without any restriction are called pious and orthodox by Gregory, while the rest are convicted of error.

In the same oration (n. 26) we read these things: "The Old Testament preached the Father openly, the Son more obscurely. But the New Testament clearly showed us the Son, and indicated the divinity of the Spirit somewhat obscurely. Now indeed the Spirit Himself converses with us and declares Himself to us more openly... He also applies Himself to the disciples individually, imparting Himself according to the capacity and measure of those receiving; namely in the beginning of the Gospel perfecting miracles, after Christ's passion being breathed upon them, after the ascension appearing in fiery tongues..."; (n. 27): "You see the illuminations gradually shining upon us and the order of theology, which it would be good for us also to maintain, so that we neither bring

forth all things into light suddenly and all at once, nor conceal them to the very end... The Savior had certain things which He said the disciples, although they were otherwise filled with manifold teaching, could not then bear... And again He said that it would come to pass that they would be taught all things by the coming Spirit (John 16:7 sqq.). Therefore I consider the very divinity of the Holy Spirit to be one of their number, to be declared more openly later, namely then, when after the Savior's complete restoration [resurrection and ascension] the knowledge of Him would be mature and perceptible, since faith would no longer be abrogated on account of so remarkable a miracle" (M 36, 162 sq.). You see that Gregory does not speak of a revelation of the Holy Spirit which was made in his age, but of the revelation made to the apostles themselves from the day of Pentecost (cf. Schermann, Die Gottheit des Heiligen Geistes 146 sqq.).

The same Saint Gregory explains why Saint Basil for the most part did not call the Holy Spirit God, but appealed to Him by other expressions taken from Sacred Scripture which signify the same thing. For in those turbulent times Basil had to look out for his flock, lest the gravest harm be inflicted upon it by adversaries. Furthermore [Basil] judged it necessary to arrange his speeches with judgment, from David's counsel and opinion, and to tolerate for a while the time of war and the rule of heretics, until a time of freedom and serenity should succeed and bring freedom and license of tongue. For they [the Arians] were eager to seize upon the naked and open statement about the Holy Spirit, that He was God, so that they might expel him [Basil] from the city along with his theological language, while they themselves would occupy the church and make it a stronghold of their crime, and thence afterward, as from a certain citadel, they would plunder all that remained. But he, in other expressions taken from Scripture having the same force, and with necessary arguments, so compressed his adversaries that they could in no way resist and struggle against them, but—which is the greatest power and prudence of speech—they were constrained by their own words... For that he otherwise acknowledged the Holy Spirit to be God better than anyone else is clearly evident from this, that he often preached these things openly, as far as time permitted, and privately among those by whom he was questioned he confessed it without hesitation, and indeed demonstrated it more openly in his conversations with me...; not simply affirming this, but—what had very rarely happened to him before—invoking upon himself the most horrible thing of all, namely that he should fall from the Spirit Himself, unless he venerated the Spirit as consubstantial and equal in honor with the Father and Son. And if anyone will admit me as his associate also in such great matters, I will divulge something that was unknown to most before. For when time reduced us to the greatest straits, he himself adopted this plan, that he would attribute to himself the dispensation (οἰκονομία), but to us the freedom of speaking, since no one would bring us to trial and eject us from our country on account of the obscurity of our name. And thus our gospel was firm and strong, supported by

the protection of both" (Orat. 43, n. 68-69: M 36, 587 sq.). Therefore Basil in no way doubted the divinity of the Holy Spirit, but spoke cautiously about this matter only on account of adversaries and spared weak Catholics who nevertheless thought rightly. This they called "to dispense the truth or words," i.e., to propose the truth in a pedagogical manner (cf. Schermann l. c. 95 sqq.).

That Saint Basil did not doubt at all concerning the divinity of the Holy Spirit is manifest; for he wrote an entire work "On the Holy Spirit" to defend this doctrine, since "it is proper to confess God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit, as the divine oracles and those who have understood them more sublimely have taught" (Ep. 8, n. 2; M 32, 247); and thus he often attributes the name of God to the Holy Spirit (De Spiritu Sancto c. 19, n. 48; M 32, 155; cf. ep. 179, n. 7; M 32, 694). Nevertheless he did not ascribe special force to the word God in this question; for he thought this name to be not of the divine essence but of God's action ad extra, since many other names, said in Scripture concerning the Holy Spirit, rather signify His essence and internal properties. "For God is named from having established all things or from seeing all things." Whence he concludes: "The Holy Spirit knows all things: therefore He is God" (Ep. 8, n. 11; M 32, 265; cf. ib. 23 sqq.). Here therefore the error is not in theology but in etymology (cf. Schermann l. c. 107 sq.). Similar things that are read among the Holy Fathers are of some moment in describing the history of theology or dogmas; they do not denote diversity in faith. Cf. F. Nager, Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Basilius des Großen, Paderborn 1912.

480. Scholion on the Difficult Expressions of the Ante-Nicene Fathers.

Petavius, when in the first book of his work On the Trinity he had written rather harshly about certain ante-Nicene Fathers, as though they had not only used an imperfect manner of speaking but had also deviated somewhat in the matter itself from Catholic doctrine, later published a special treatise in which he explained his position more clearly. This treatise is now the Preface to his books On the Trinity. "Very few," he says, "are those who dissent in the matter from the common faith, and if we seek sincere and pure Catholics, there are absolutely none. I said 'in the matter itself'; for in manner of speaking we have shown in the third and fourth chapters of the first book On the Trinity that some varied a little. Then, of whatever kind finally are the writings and testimonies of these men, nevertheless in the principal matters, and those which pertain to the sum of the entire mystery, as they are harmonious among themselves, so they agree with us" (ib. c. 1, n. 12).

Then he proceeds to show that the same faith has always existed in the church; for unless it had been so, the Nicene Fathers and even before them the Antiochene and Alexandrian fathers could not have appealed so confidently against the anti-Trinitarians to the ancient Fathers and the consensus of the

entire Christian people. "Therefore the Nicene Fathers and other Catholic councils expounded no other faith concerning the Trinity than that which πατροπαραδότως [by paternal tradition], that is, by tradition handed down through their ancestors from the apostles, was present in the minds of all" (ib. c. 2, n. 2). Then from the works of the ancient Fathers he collects all those passages in which the genuine doctrine concerning the Trinity appears: from the Shepherd, Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, Justin, Irenaeus, Athenagoras, Theophilus of Caesarea, Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Dionysius of Rome and Alexandria, Theognostus, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Methodius, Tertullian, Cyprian, Novatian, Minucius, Arnobius, Lactantius, and thus he concludes: "With this abundance of most holy and most learned men as witnesses, we are confident that we have vindicated our faith and have abundantly accomplished what was proposed, so that all might understand that the faith of the Catholic dogma concerning the Trinity ran through the series of tradition and as if through a channel from Christ and the apostles to Nicene times, from which thenceforth it is carried forward with full sails and uninterrupted course even to the furthest ages of the world" (ib. c. 6, n. 1). [10]

481. It remained for Petavius to indicate by what reasoning the sayings of the saints that were perhaps less aptly expressed could be understood in a Catholic sense, and how those Fathers, notwithstanding a manner of speaking alien to ours, had preserved intact the substance of the mystery and the sum of the faith. Because he himself omitted this, other theologians after him carefully supplied it, especially Cardinal Franzelin and, in a more popular manner, Th. de Régnon (Etudes de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité, Paris 1892-1899). It suffices to note the following:

From the principle of Catholic tradition it stands firm that erroneous doctrine (if we are speaking universally of Catholic understanding and not only of the error of one or another ancient doctor) could never have been admitted into the church, and this all the less if we are dealing with a principal truth consigned by the apostles themselves in the Scriptures, necessarily declared to the faithful in apostolic preaching, to be explicitly believed by all the faithful and professed in baptismal initiation itself and daily in the symbol, even sealed with blood before tyrants. Only the manner of speaking could be indeterminate and ambiguous, which is to be explained according to the clearer sayings of subsequent Fathers, who profess to teach nothing other than what they received from their elders. Moreover, whatever may be said of certain speculative inquiries and less apt formulaic expressions, all the Holy Fathers professed in words by no means doubtful that there is absolutely one God, not many, and on the other hand that

[10] De tota hac quaestione cf. Défense des SS. Pères accusez [accusés] de Platonisme. Par J. F. Baltus S. J. Paris 1721 (Defensio Petavi ibi habetur a p. 407), et Theol. Quartalschrift. Tübingen 1850, 249 sqq.

the Word and Holy Spirit are true God, to be adored with divine worship. Therefore a distinction must be made between the faith of the Holy Fathers and philosophical attempts, nor should obscure disputations and reasonings be so explained that the Holy Fathers seem to have taught either multiple gods or to have denied the divinity of Christ or the Holy Spirit (cf. Schwane, Dogmengeschichte I, ed. 2, Freiburg 1892, 72 sqq.).

The more difficult modes of speaking can be reduced to these:

482. a) They say the Father is superior to the other persons, who come in second and third place (e.g. Justin, Dial. cum Tryph. n. 56; M 6, 598; and Apol. 1, n. 13; M 6, 347; cf. ib. notae ad n. 61 et 127: col. 614 et 771). But they understand only that the Father has no principle, while he himself is the principle of the Son and Holy Spirit. Therefore they refer the name God above all or ὁ θεός with the article to the Father alone, because he is αὐτόθεος [God in himself] without principle. In enumeration they call the Father God, the Son Lord because of the unity of principle, says Gregory Nazianzen (Or. 25, n. 15; M 35, 1219). For the same reason Tertullian calls the Father "the whole substance," the Son "the derivation of the whole," and applies the words "the Father is greater" to Christ's divinity, because Christ is begotten, but the Father unbegotten; thus the Son is "otherwise in measure than the Father" (modulo alius a Patre), namely in the measure of subsisting (Contra Prax. 9; M 2, 164). However, it must be acknowledged that Tertullian in expounding this dogma does not always speak correctly. The same applies to Hippolytus and Origen.

483. b) They teach that the Father begot the Son voluntarily, against the Arians and earlier heretics. For the Arians asked whether the Father begot the Son willingly or unwillingly. Therefore he begot willingly, insofar as he did not beget unwillingly or by blind necessity, but thus he begot him willingly, as God is willing (Athan., Contra arian. orat. 3, n. 66; M 26, 462. Cf. Ruiz, De Trin. disp. 92 et 93).

484. c) They teach that the Son and Holy Spirit minister to the Father in creation. But the same Fathers say that the ministration of the Word and Spirit, "whom all angels serve and to whom they are subject," is far different from the ministry of a creature (Irenaeus, Haer. 4, 7, 4: M 7, 993; cf. 2, 30, 9; 4, 20, 1: M 7, 822 1032). For the Word ministers as the eternal idea of all things. Therefore they say the Word was always inherent (insitum) with the Father, but became prolative or manifested in the creation of things (Theophilus, Ad Autol. 1. 2, n. 10; M 6, 1063). This manifestation is a certain generation of the Word ad extra, temporal and free (cf. Ruiz, De Trin. disp. 110, sect. 6 sq.).

485. d) They say the Word appeared visibly in the Old Testament and in the incarnation, while the Father is entirely invisible (Iren. 1. c. 4, 20; M 7, 1032). For they think the theophanies of the Old Testament are certain preludes to the incarnation; from which opinion it has happened that they seem to deny immensity to the Son, because they consider his human nature, either already

born or prefigured. But they add a reason of fittingness for why the Father does not himself appear, because it is fitting that he be manifested ad extra through him who is his internal manifestation or Word. When they say the Father cannot appear by reason of his immensity, they speak of this order of things in which he who appears is said to be "sent." But one cannot be sent to some place unless he who is not yet there. Only the Son according to human nature is not everywhere. Therefore he can be sent to some place. Similarly, whoever is sent must necessarily be sent by another. But the Father has no one to send him.

486. If these things are kept in mind, all difficulties can be resolved. Indeed, it is conjectured that the Fathers themselves, if they had been questioned, would have explained their mind correctly, from the case of Dionysius of Alexandria. For when he had been accused at Rome because, speaking against Sabellius, he had called the Son a ποίημα [work/creation] of the Father, he responded that false things had indeed been imputed to him, but nevertheless this expression could be used in an absolute sense. "For as I do not think the Word to be a thing made and I call God not the maker but the Father of it, even if I had said in passing that God is ποιητήν [maker], speaking of the Son, thus also there would be place for defense. For the wise men of the Greeks call themselves ποιητάς [makers] of their own discourses (λόγων), although they are fathers of their own discourses" (Athan., De sent. Dionys. n. 21; M 25, 511).

St. Basil writes these things about Dionysius to Maximus the philosopher (ep. 9, n. 2): "The writings of Dionysius which you request did indeed come to us, and very many of them; but the books are not present, and therefore we did not send them. But our opinion is this: We do not admire all things of this man; indeed there are some which we entirely disapprove. For he is, as far as we know, the one who first provided men with the seeds of that impiety which now resounds around us—I mean the Anomoean heresy. But the cause, I think, was not depravity of opinion but vehement zeal for opposing Sabellius. Therefore I am accustomed to compare him to a cultivator of trees who, when straightening a recently bent plant, then by immoderately pulling it back errs from the middle and brings the plant to the opposite side. We have discovered that something of this sort happened to this man also. For when he was vehemently opposing the impiety of the Libyans [Sabellians], he did not understand that by excessive zeal for contending he was falling into the contrary evil. And when it would have sufficed for him to demonstrate that the Father and Son are not the same in subject (τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ), and to hold these decisive points against the blasphemer so as to have a manifestly complete and abundant victory, he established not only the otherness of hypostases but also difference of essence and grades of power and diversity of glory. Whence it happened that he exchanged one evil for another evil, but deviated from right doctrine. Hence also he is not consistent with himself in his writings, now indeed rejecting consubstantial because of him who wrongly used this word to destroy the hypostases, now however admitting it in

those things which he wrote for defense to his namesake [Pope Dionysius]. In addition to these things he uttered words about the Spirit by no means worthy of the Spirit, separating him from the adored deity and numbering him among inferior things along with created and ministerial nature. Therefore that man is of such a kind" (M 32, 267 sq.).

Therefore according to Basil, Dionysius was not indeed of depraved opinion, but used badly sounding words. Because Basil thinks thus, he marvels greatly in his book On the Holy Spirit (c. 29, n. 72) that Dionysius writes: "But to God the Father and the Son our Lord Jesus Christ with the Holy Spirit be glory and dominion forever and ever, amen" (M 32, 202).

The editor of Basil (Maranus) annotates on that letter: "I would not want to be so vehement a defender of Basil that I would contend he bears absolutely no fault in this matter. For although he censures only the words of Dionysius, he nevertheless censures them in such a way as if they did not differ from the customary speeches of the Arians. But certainly Dionysius was beyond this fault. He had said many things which would utterly overthrow the Arian heresy, some which seemed to favor it, absolutely nothing which openly expressed it. The Arians fabricated that Dionysius had said: 'The Son, since he is a thing made, was not before he was made,' in Athanasius, De Dionys. n. 4; but Athanasius proves that neither these nor other such things occur in Dionysius. Perhaps such false testimonies deceived Basil; or the most holy man did not notice that if anything had been said less fittingly by Dionysius, it both differed of its own accord from the Arians and ought to be explained from other passages, as was done by Athanasius, whose work if Basil had seen, I do not doubt that he would have given ready and eager assent" (M 32, 269, nota 9).

Bardenhewer indeed, following Basil's judgment, thinks Dionysius is accepted too kindly by Athanasius (Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur II, Freiburg 1914, 218). It is difficult to make a certain judgment, because Dionysius's complete works no longer exist. But because Dionysius himself affirms that he never proposed Arian doctrine, and that his words were only twisted in a bad sense by "sycophants" (apud Athan., De sent. Dionysii n. 20; M 25, 510), therefore it seems he should be trusted in this matter. Certainly what Basil says—that Dionysius is not consistent with himself, when at one time against Sabellius he denies that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, at another time writing to the orthodox he admits the same term—Dionysius could have acted entirely correctly, rejecting that consubstantiality by which the real distinction of divine persons is removed, but admitting that consubstantiality by which the three divine persons are of one and the same nature.

By this example it becomes clear that it is not ineptly, but justly and necessarily that we must explain the ambiguous sayings of the Fathers in a true sense, as long as it is not certainly established that they deviated from truth. For since the terms nature, person, hypostasis only later received a plainly

determined sense, it could happen that some of the ancient Fathers explained the correct sense in words which, when later understood in another sense, had to be rejected (cf. Franzelin 1. c. thes. 10-11: Stentrup, Christolog. I 97. De Methodio Olympio cf. Der Katholik 1887 II 114 sq.). Already St. Basil well explains how many evils have arisen from the fact that many do not properly distinguish between substance and hypostases (Ep. 38, n. 1; M 32, 326).

487. Therefore, those senses which we connect with certain terms are not to be imported into the writings of the first Fathers, but from the writings of the Holy Fathers themselves it must be learned how they wished their sayings to be understood. If this is observed, it easily appears that the same faith has always existed in the church. For what Origen testifies he received: "We have learned to believe [in God] that there are three hypostases: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit" (In Io. t. 2; M 14, 128), the same later ones professed: "For there is one divinity and one God in three hypostases" (S. Athan., De incarn. contra arian. n. 10; M 26, 1000). [11] See other examples in the Würzburg theologians (De Deo Trino n. 289 sqq.) and in L. Murillo, El progreso en la revelación cristiana, Roma 1913, 259 sqq.

Proposition LXVIII. The Most Holy Trinity is a mystery in the strict sense. Theologically certain (Sum. 1. q. 32. a. 1).

488. Note: A mystery in the strict sense is a truth which human reason, even after its revelation has been made, cannot positively know as possible (cf. Suarez, De incarn. q. 53, a. 1, disp. 44, sect. 8). If such a truth is enunciated, we indeed understand the meaning of the proposition through analogical concepts, but we are completely ignorant whether the predicate should be affirmed or denied of the subject. We can apprehend mysteries in some way, at least through analogical concepts; otherwise no revelation of them could be made. Thus we

[11] How much attention must be paid to the sense in which terms are understood can be shown by many examples, even those taken from later Fathers. Thus, for example, St. Cyril of Alexandria, who expounded the doctrine concerning the incarnate Word so carefully and so orthodoxly, nonetheless teaches that in Christ two hypostases remained unmixed (Schol. de incarn. c. 11; M 75, 1381). Who would dare on account of these words to ascribe to St. Cyril a false doctrine concerning the person of Christ? Evidently the holy Doctor in this place uses the word hypostasis in a more primitive sense, by which this word signifies a real being or substance. For, as St. John Damascene says, the name hypostasis has a double sense. Sometimes it signifies that which simply exists; and in this sense substance and hypostasis are synonymous. Thus some Fathers said: "natures, that is, hypostases." Sometimes the word hypostasis signifies that which subsists in and through itself, and thus it signifies an individual, like Peter, Paul, this horse (Dialect. c. 42: M 94. 611; cf. ib. col. 591, not. 22). St. Basil especially established fixed terminology: "Essence is the common, hypostasis is the particular" (Epist. 236, 6; M 32, 884). Concerning the terms φύσις, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον among the earlier Fathers cf. E. Weigl, Untersuchungen zur Christologie des hl. Athanasius, Paderborn 1914, 75 sqq.

know what is understood by God, what by nature, what by person, what by triune and one, and therefore we understand the meaning of this question: Is God one in nature and triune in persons? But we cannot find a positive and true response except when taught by revelation. See more on this matter in Institut. propaedeut. Prop. XI.

489. Argument 1. From the Holy Fathers.

St. Gregory of Nyssa: "The ineffable profundity of the mystery cannot be declared by any discourse—how the same reality is both numerable and escapes number, and is perceived in distinction and understood in unity, and is distinguished in hypostasis and not divided in subject [i.e., the underlying nature]" (Orat. catech. c. 3; M 45, 18). St. Hilary: "What is required [the exposition of this mystery] is immense: what is dared is incomprehensible, that discourse about God should be beyond the definition of God. He has established the names of nature: Father, Son, Holy Spirit. It is beyond the significance of speech, beyond the intention of the senses, beyond the conception of intelligence: whatever is sought beyond this is not enunciated, not attained, not grasped. The nature of the reality itself consumes the significance of words, impenetrable light blinds the contemplation of the senses, whatever is contained by no limit exceeds the capacity of intelligence. Perfect knowledge is to know God in such a way that, although you know Him as not unknowable, nevertheless you know Him as ineffable" (De Trin. 1. 2, n. 5 sqq.; M 10, 54). St. Fulgentius: "Whenever the weakness of human condition, about to know itself immediately, endeavors to exceed the bounds of its own smallness to some extent, and, pregnant with the concept of heavenly illumination [i.e., aided by revelation], begins to give birth to investigation of its creator and redeemer, only that immutable eternity of the Trinity, I believe, will be found worthy of the miracle of incomprehensibility, which so exceeds all that we can think or know, just as it surpasses all that we are" (Ad Trasimund. 2, 1; M 65, 245). St. Jerome: "Concerning the mystery of the Trinity, the right confession is the ignorance of knowledge" (Prooem. ad 1. 18 in Is.; M 24, 627). To this pertain those things which the Holy Fathers wrote or said against the Eunomians. For just as these Arian heretics, trusting too much in human reason, denied the plurality of divine persons as being incomprehensible, so the Holy Fathers showed from revelation that God is necessarily incomprehensible to us, and that incomprehensibility proves nothing against the doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity.

490. Argument 2. From the doctrine of theologians.

The same thing that the Holy Fathers teach, almost all scholastics teach with one voice. Thus St. Thomas: "Whoever strives to prove the Trinity of persons by natural reason derogates from faith" (1, q. 32, a. 1). St. Bonaventure: "In no way is the Trinity of persons knowable through creatures by reasoning [i.e., by

reasoning ascending from creature to God]" (In 1, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 4). Bañez: "It is impossible to demonstrate the truth of this mystery by natural reason. This conclusion must be held as certain according to faith" (In 1, q. 32, a. 1, concl. 1). Similarly Suarez (De Trin. 1, 11-12), Ruiz (De Trin. disp. 41-43) and all expositors of St. Thomas ad q. 32. Nevertheless, not all say that our proposition is of faith, but all concede that it is at least theologically certain.

491. Argument 3. From ecclesiastical definitions.

It has never indeed been expressly defined that the Most Holy Trinity is a mystery in the strict sense; but on the other hand it has been generally established that there are among revealed doctrines mysteries in the strict sense, which "divine mysteries by their very nature so exceed created intellect that, even when delivered by revelation and received by faith, they nevertheless remain covered by the veil of faith itself and enveloped in a certain darkness, as long as we are pilgrims away from the Lord in this mortal life," and those are struck with anathema who teach that "all dogmas of faith can be understood and demonstrated by reason properly cultivated from natural principles" (conc. vatic., De fide cap. 4 et can. 1; Denz. n. 1796-1816; cf. Collect. Lacens. VII 525 sq. 553). But no one can deny that among all revealed truths, the Most Holy Trinity is the highest and most hidden. Therefore, whoever denies that it is a mystery in the strict sense must consequently deny that any such mysteries are contained in revelation; and thus offends against the Vatican definition.

Since these things are so, it is not surprising that those who attempted to prove this mystery by philosophical reasons fell into errors and were condemned by ecclesiastical authority. Thus Raymond Lull, according to whom "all articles of faith can be proved and are proved by necessary, demonstrative, evident reasons" (Denz., ed. 9, n. 474). Thus in our days Günther, who taught that it was the task of theologians of our age "to make the dogma of the Trinity no longer a disgrace but an honor to the human mind" [12] . But, says Pius IX, "neither few nor light things are found in the aforementioned [Günther's] books which depart not a little from Catholic truth both in words and in matters. In this number are especially considered those things which the author defends and affirms about the most august Trinity. For he did not sufficiently understand that philosophy in those things which pertain to religion should not dominate but serve, nor should it scrutinize the height of God's mysteries, but should reverently and humbly revere it" (Denz., ed. 9, n. 1513-1514; cf. 1509-1525).

492. Argument 4. From reason.

[12] "Es sei die große Aufgabe der Theologie unserer Zeit, das alte Kreuz des Verstandes [das Geheimnis der heiligsten Dreifaltigkeit] aus einem Schandpfahl in ein Ehrenzeichen des freien Geistes zu verwandeln" (Vorschule 1, 121).

All our knowledge of divine things is a posteriori. Therefore whatever creatures cannot manifest about God, we cannot know about God. But creatures cannot manifest the Trinity. Therefore [we cannot know the Trinity]. For there is nothing in creatures which cannot be sufficiently explained unless God is supposed to be triune. Although creatures lead us to knowledge of being from itself, powerful, intelligent, willing, nevertheless these attributes, as they are absolute, belong to God as He is one in nature, and are found in the same way perfectly in each of the divine persons. It is also certain by faith that the divine persons are not a triple, but one principle of the world (Denz. n. 428-704).

Furthermore, since the divine essence and perfections are not known by us otherwise than as they are manifested by creatures, it follows that nothing appears in the divine perfections which might serve us as a principle for proving the Trinity. Indeed, because it never happens in created things that one nature in number exists in several supposita (suppositis), we cannot naturally conceive the notion of person positively except by conceiving an incommunicable essence. Therefore perfect nature and suppositum to philosophers using only natural reason is one and the same thing, nor can they correct this error by natural means alone, just as they can correct other imperfections which are present in our concepts of the One God. For since perfections are found in creatures more or less limited, men using reason are indeed led to conceive pure perfection without any limit; but since no trace of that distinction appears in creatures by which suppositum is so distinguished from nature complete in itself that when the former is multiplied the latter is not simultaneously multiplied, men are naturally inclined to judge that supposita cannot be multiplied unless natures are multiplied; and this all the more because this seems to be required by that principle: Things which are not distinguished from one third thing are not distinguished among themselves.

But divine revelation, although it corrects our concepts by an external norm, nevertheless does not so change their internal nature that they begin to represent what they did not represent before. Therefore we cannot conceive a divine person by the mere removal of imperfection which is in our concepts, but we necessarily conceive it under the double notion of absolute and relative, how these cohere among themselves, faith alone teaches.

493. Argument 5. From the resolution of opposing reasons.

Raymond Lull thus attempts to demonstrate the plurality of divine persons: "Where there is concord, there is plurality of persons. But in God there is concord. For in divine goodness there is the act of making good, which act has a most perfect term, which is the most perfect thing capable of being made good. Therefore there is concord of the one making good and the one capable of being made good in the act of making good. Therefore there is plurality of persons. But there are not more than three persons. For in God there is majority of action. But

that essence is in majority of action in which one agent suffices, one passion, one act. Therefore in God there is one making good, one capable of being made good, and one passive making good. Or: there is one distinctive and generative with respect to the Son, and this is the Father; and one distinguishable, generable and producible, and this is the Son; and one distinguishing through breathing and loving, and this is the Holy Spirit."

Response: Having read these things, any prudent person will easily assent to Ruiz saying: "The demonstrations by which Raymond proves the Trinity are ridiculous, the ravings of one dreaming and of an unsound mind" (disp. 41, sect. 1). For Raymond, if he proceeds from the principle that God has the act of making good, either understands that act by which God is formally good, and thus proves nothing: or understands real communication of substance, and thus supposes what is to be proved (cf. Suarez, De Trin. c. 11; Vazquez, De Trin. disp. 133).

494. In our age especially German philosophers boasted that they had found effective demonstrations of the Trinity. For they said that God, since He is conscious of Himself, is both knower and known and the unity of knower and known. God as knower is the Father, as known He is the Son, and indeed consubstantial. Thus Hegel [13] .

Some Catholic theologians followed this pantheist philosopher, among whom Günther is most well known, who attempts to demonstrate the Trinity from the "moments of self-consciousness," as he says. If, he says, we remove all imperfection from our intellectual operations, in them we will have the best way by which we arrive at knowledge of the Trinity. For whoever has self-consciousness conceives himself: whoever conceives himself by intellectual generation opposes something to himself, but simultaneously knows this opposite to be himself. But these three things: subject, object, identity, are

[13] "Gott ist die Tätigkeit des reinen Wissens... Zum Wissen gehört ein anderes, das gewußt wird, und indem das Wissen es weiß, ist es ihm angeeignet. Hierin liegt, daß Gott, das ewig an und für sich Seiende, sich ewig erzeugt als seinen Sohn.... Was aber so sich von sich unterscheidet, hat nicht die Gestalt eines Anders-seins, sondern das Unterschiedene ist unmittelbar nur das, von dem es geschieden worden" (Religionsphilosophie II 185).

substantial in God. Therefore the subject is the Father, the substantial object is the Son, the substantial identity is the Holy Spirit [14] .

495. Response: It is easily seen how vain this argumentation is. For it is false according to the principles of natural reason that God cannot know Himself unless by producing something really distinct from Himself, or, as Günther says, by duplicating His substance. This is asserted gratuitously (cf. below n. 506). Indeed, since the Son and Holy Spirit understand themselves while producing nothing, it is clear that the Güntherian deduction is false. And if the Father knows the Son as completely equal to Himself, why is the Holy Spirit required to constitute identity? Because, he says, from opposition alone it is not established whether the conception is total or partial emanation [15] . Partial emanation of the divine substance! Furthermore, how does it cohere with this exposition that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the will, not through the intellect?

The three divine persons according to Günther do not have a nature one in number, but only one in form, or they have an "absolute relation" among themselves (l. c. II 298). For since "the form of the person is self-consciousness" (l. c. II 296), the three divine persons necessarily have three self-consciousnesses and consequently three intellects and three wills, or they are three gods (cf. De Verbo incarnato IV, n. 147). Therefore that Günther in his speculations did not explain the Catholic dogma but departed very far from revealed doctrine needs no proof. "But simultaneously from all the things said is set before our eyes what we have chiefly regarded in this whole exposition, namely that the sincerity of the dogma itself cannot be preserved if, with its supernatural character denied, an internal conformation of concepts and demonstration of truth from notions and principles of reason alone independently of revelation is undertaken. And from this it further becomes clear why it is of such great moment that the supernatural character of mysteries be sincerely acknowledged by Christian philosophers and

---

[14] "Da alles Selbstbewußtsein eine Überzeugung vom Sein ist, so kann diese nur aus einer vorausgegangenen Zeugung erwachsen.... Im göttlichen Selbstbewußtsein tritt das Prinzip als solches zu sich als solchem in den Gegensatz und hat demnach seine Überzeugung in einem Momente, in dem jene zwei Glieder als solche sich ganz und identisch wiederfinden, weil es von beiden ausgegangen ist als ein Prinzip neben beiden" (Vorschule I 108 sqq.). "Subjekt Objekt Identität: oder Satz, Gegensatz und Gleichsatz, das ist die Trinität. Der Sohn entsteht dadurch, daß Gott sich in sich als Substanz real entgegenstellt oder durch Emanation verdoppelt" (l. c. 108). "Beide Faktoren aber (Vater und Sohn) bezeugen ihre gegenseitige substantielle Gleichheit durch ein zweites Moment der Entgegensetzung in doppelseitiger Emanation, das einen dritten Faktor setzt (den Heiligen Geist), in dem sich die totale Wesensidentität beider zur objektiv realen Anschauung bringt" (l. c. 109). "So ergibt sich eine reale Objektivierung der einen Wesenheit sowohl in der zweiten als der dritten Person, folglich eine Dreiheit oder triplizierte Existenz einer und derselben göttlichen Substanz" (l. c. 119).

[15] "Weil im bloßen Gegensatz als solchem noch keine vollendete Identität liegt: weil die Emanation, wodurch er eingeführt wird, auch eine partielle sein kann, d. h. nicht notwendig eine totale sein muß" (l. c. II 536).

theologians" (Franzelin, De Trin., ed. 3, 298. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorz. I, ed. 2, 399 sqq. Piccirelli, De Deo Uno et Trino 1130 sqq.) [16] .

496. Corollary: Therefore the Most Holy Trinity is naturally understood only by itself. Nor is there any other way of communicating this understanding to creatures except the beatific vision. For it is repugnant that the internal possibility of this mystery be positively understood through any abstractive knowledge.

---

[16] Similarly the Church has reprobated this doctrine of Rosmini: "With the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity revealed, its existence can be demonstrated by arguments purely speculative, negative indeed and indirect, but such that through them that truth is recalled to philosophical disciplines and becomes a scientific proposition like others; for if it were denied, the theosophical doctrine of pure reason would not only remain incomplete, but also, teeming with absurdities on every side, would be annihilated. The three supreme forms of being, namely subjectivity, objectivity, sanctity, or reality, ideality, morality, if transferred to absolute being, cannot be conceived otherwise than as subsisting and living persons. The Word, insofar as it is the beloved object, and not insofar as it is the Word, i.e., an object subsisting in itself known through itself, is the person of the Holy Spirit" (Prop. 25-26; Denz. n. 1915 sq.).

From the positive aseity of which we spoke above (n. 121), Schell strives thus to prove the Trinity, given revelation: "The Trinity is the form of absolute being from itself and through itself: The Trinity is the aseity of the living God explained through revelation... God's essence is aseity, is causality by which perfect being causes itself. Insofar as the divine essence is the act of knowledge and logical principiation of itself, it is also the immanent reason of generation and nativity of the Word, of the opposition of Father and Son, of speaking truth and spoken truth. As the act of knowledge, as the identity of infinitely perfect knowledge with truth, divinity, i.e., essence caused by itself, manifests itself through the eternal procession of the Word from the Father and through the relative and opposite existence of these two persons. Being and knowing in God are the same. God's existence and essence is the act of knowledge; therefore it also has an internal principle of knowledge, logical necessity and truth, which principiates it intrinsically, making it able to be grasped and understood, manifesting it as spiritual light and perfect intelligence. God consists of logical necessity and of perfect intelligence of the logical necessity of the first truth. Insofar as thinking this necessity He speaks it and is the principle in the divine principiation of Himself, He is called Father. Insofar as thinking this logical necessity with perfect intelligence and because of its internal truth He proceeds from it and through it is principiated in eternal existence, He exists as Son. This logical principiation of infinite being of itself has its complement in the ethical principiation of itself. For knowledge postulates power and act of willing as a real postulate of the actuation of itself; but will intrinsically presupposes knowledge. Ideal truth, which in intellectual consciousness is logical necessity, in the will becomes ethical necessity. Therefore God's existence must be considered as the effect of the act of will of infinite virtue, internal truth, holy necessity. Insofar as God is conceived as holy necessity which causes His existence, as eternal act of will which produces it with perfect sanctity, because with autocracy, He is the principle of spiration. His infinitely perfect essence as moral necessity and holy power of will is the principle quo of this production. Insofar as God in His existence is principiated through this holy necessity and moral action of will, He is God the Holy Spirit" (Kathol. Dogmatik II, Paderborn 1890, 21-31 sq.).

These things are alleged as specimens; they do not need refutation, since that positive aseity on which this whole reasoning is founded is alien to reason and to traditional doctrine (above n. 121).

497. Scholium 1: We have abstained in this proposition from the scriptural argument. For although it is openly taught in Sacred Scripture that the Most Holy Trinity is a hidden mystery which we have known by revelation alone (Matt. 11:27; Luke 10:22; John 1:18; 6:46; 10:15; 1 Cor. 2:7-11, etc.), nevertheless it is not clearly and directly stated that we cannot, after revelation has been made, positively know the Trinity through at least analogical concepts, which is required for the notion of mystery in the strict sense.

498. Scholium 2: Given revelation, the intellect can find reasons by which it shows the fittingness of this mystery. Some reasons are taken from creatures, in which there is some trace of the Trinity, indeed a certain image of the Trinity, as in man. But this mystery is especially wont to be illustrated from the immanent processions in our intellect and will (S. Thom. 1, q. 45, a. 7: q. 93, a. 8).

Other reasons are taken from God's side; for the most perfect good must communicate itself most perfectly; moreover, perfect society and friendship pertain to most perfect beatitude; finally, God should not lack an adequate object of infinite charity (S. Thom., In 1, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 4). These reasons indeed do not prove that such society and friendship are possible, but with this possibility supposed they prove fittingness (S. Thom. 1. q. 32, a. 1 ad 2). Cf. Suarez 1, 12; Ruiz disp. 43 et 44.

Perhaps Richard of St. Victor can be explained in this sense, who thinks he has reasons for proving the Trinity not only probable but also necessary (De Trin. 1, 4; 3, 5; 9, 1). Nevertheless he brings forward no other reasons than those we have just mentioned. But these necessarily prove fittingness given revelation, but not the truth of the matter from internal and natural principles. Cf. Franzelin thes. 19; Beraza, De Deo creante n. 285 sqq.

Proposition LXIX. It cannot be demonstrated that the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is contrary to reason. Of faith.

499. Note: We do not attempt here to show positively from natural principles the non-repugnance of the mystery, for such a positive proof of non-repugnance would be a positive proof of possibility. Rather, we show only negatively that no reasons can be advanced which demonstrate the impossibility of the mystery.

500. Argument 1. From the harmony of faith and reason.

It is certain that the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity has been revealed by God. But the light of reason cannot conflict with the light of faith. Therefore, the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity cannot be contrary to reason, and consequently

no true arguments can be advanced against this mystery (cf. S. Thom., Prooem. in Boeth. De Trin. q. 2, a. 3).

501. Argument 2. From the incomprehensibility of God.

For someone to prove the repugnance of the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, he must show that the divine nature and divine persons according to their proper mode are such that there cannot be three persons in one divine essence. But the proper mode of divinity is entirely hidden from us and infinitely surpasses the capacity of our intellect. Therefore, no creature from natural principles can define anything about the Most Holy Trinity, because this mystery pertains to those things which can be known only from God's proper mode, not from his operations ad extra. Thus, if the notion of essence and person existed in God in the way we abstract these concepts from created things, certainly the Trinity of persons could be said to conflict with the unity of essence. But because the mode of divine things is far different, our reason cannot without arrogance judge according to its own concepts about the proper mode of divine things.

If we now admit on account of natural evidence that God is simultaneously immutable and free, although these two are contradictory in creatures, is it not reasonable to believe God when he testifies that in himself there is no repugnance between things that are repugnant in creatures?

502. Argument 3. From the solution of difficulties, which are reduced to approximately these:

a) Things that are not distinguished from one third thing are not distinguished from each other. But the divine persons are not distinguished from one divine essence. Therefore they are not distinguished from each other.

Response: I distinguish the major premise. Things that are not distinguished from one absolute thing are not distinguished from each other by any absolute consideration, I concede the major; they cannot be distinguished from each other by relative considerations, I deny the major, I concede the minor. I distinguish the conclusion: The divine persons are not distinguished by absolute essence, I concede the conclusion; they are not distinguished by relations, I deny the conclusion.

If you object: But the relations are identified with the essence. Therefore they are identified with each other. Response: I distinguish the minor assumption: The relations are identified with an essence which by its nature can exist in only one, I deny the minor assumption; they are identified with an essence which on account of its infinity can exist in three really distinct relations, I concede the minor assumption and deny the conclusion.

Indeed, faith absolutely requires that the principle posited in the major of the first syllogism remain intact. For we are taught to believe in one undistinguished God, not three gods, and three distinct persons, not one person.

If faith were to subvert the principle of identity in one third thing, as understood by mathematicians, the doctrine of faith would have no meaning. For without this principle we would not understand that the three persons are undistinguished in divinity, but we would say there is one God and simultaneously three gods, which is certainly absurd. Therefore faith does not destroy this principle, but absolutely presupposes it.

Generally it should be noted that all metaphysical principles remain true in the Most Holy Trinity, yet on account of the matter the application of principles has special difficulty, since we do not perceive what power infinite being has of joining with supreme simplicity under one respect real distinction under another respect. For metaphysical principles consider a thing under one and the same abstract consideration, nor do they declare anything about the physical order, namely whether in this order things really distinct under one consideration can be really one under another consideration. Therefore fallacy is easily committed in application by the fact that a metaphysical supposition is changed into a physical supposition, and what is valid concerning an abstract concept is transferred to a concrete thing. Thus in the proposed difficulty the argumentation would be valid only if the Father were identified with the divine essence insofar as this abstracts from the concrete mode of subsisting. But this is not true; for the Father is identified with the divine essence formally, as it subsists in the Father, and not as it subsists in the Son, and similarly for the other persons. These considerations are valid for solving all difficulties.

503. b) One is not equal to three. But this is affirmed in the Most Holy Trinity. Therefore.

Response: I concede the major; I deny the minor. For we do not say that one divine essence is three essences, or that three persons are one. But "one" and "three" in this axiom are understood under the same respect.

504. c) Every divine essence is the Father. But the Son is divine essence. Therefore the Son is the Father.

Likewise: The Father is opposed to the Son. But the deity is the Father. Therefore the deity is opposed to the Son.

Likewise: This divine essence is the Father. But the Son is this divine essence. Therefore the Son is the Father.

Response: In all these and similar syllogisms the syllogistic law is violated. For either the distribution of terms is not complete, as in the first syllogism; for "every divine essence" ought to be explained by enumeration of the individuals to whom this essence belongs, so that the meaning would be: Every thing which is divine essence is the Father—which is false. Or the appellation is varied, as in the second syllogism; for in the major "Father" is taken according to its most formal signification: "Father as Father," not "Father as God"; but in the minor "deity" is not taken most formally: not "deity, insofar as it formally signifies divine nature,

is the Father," but "deity, as it exists in the Father, is the Father." [17] Or in an expository syllogism the singularity of the middle term is not complete, as in the third syllogism, because the divine essence is not completely singular except in the persons.

These are posited by way of example, so that it may be understood how carefully one must attend to the mode of suppositing and signifying in this matter. For fallacies occur far more easily in disputations about divine things than in other matters, because the subject matter is so moderately known to us. Other examples are found in Ruiz in disp. 15.

But the difficulties which are drawn from the notion of origin and relations will be solved later (n. 628 sqq. 644sqq.). Cf. Franzelin thes. 20; Piccirelli, De Deo Uno et Trino 1055 sqq.

---

[17] Concerning this distinction P. Régnon says: "They say the Son proceeds from the divine intellect, but insofar as it is the intellect of the Father. They say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the divine will, but insofar as the will is common to the Father and Son. I accept these phrases, since there is no other way of responding to the objection. There are those who seem to understand them. I, to confess candidly, see in them nothing but a suitable way of extricating oneself in a good manner" (La S. Trinité 1 314).

These last words, if they signify anything, seem to indicate that theologians, pressed by difficulty, have taken refuge in the obscurity of those terms and conduct themselves as if they understand what is taught by these terms. But it is not so. This distinction was not invented by theologians, but is the very doctrine of the Church, according to which the divine essence, insofar as it is identified with the Father, produces the Son, and insofar as it is identified with the Son, is produced by the Father. Therefore, these words teach a virtual distinction between the essence as it is the same as the Father, and the essence as it is the same as the Son. No one understands this virtual distinction, on which the hinge of the entire mystery turns. Nor is this affirmed, but this alone is undertaken: to show that by the very terms in which the Church professes this dogma, no contradiction is enunciated, since the same thing is not simultaneously affirmed and denied of the same thing under the same respect. Now this is immediately evident from that distinction. But what corresponds to this distinction in the nature of things, to perceive according to its proper mode is above the capacity of every human being.

SECTION II.
ON THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS.

505. After we have considered the substance, if it is permissible to speak thus, of the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, a more precise knowledge of it must now be acquired. This task indeed cannot be completed by the mere application of philosophical theorems to those things which we have seen thus far. For when the philosopher hears that there are three persons in one divine nature, he has absolutely no natural means of discerning whether all the divine persons have an equally immediate relationship to the divine essence, or whether one person proceeds from another as from its principle. But we are taught by revealed doctrine that there are true processions in God. It should be noted that the Greeks use αἰτία in place of principle (not excluding the word ἀρχή), but in the same sense; whence this word "cause" also passes to certain Latin writers. But now from constant usage the Latins do not speak of the cause but of the principle of the divine persons, while the word "cause" is reserved for divine production ad extra.

506. Procession in general is the production of a thing from its principle; it is transient if the effect proceeds outside the principle, as the world proceeded from God creating; it is immanent if the thing produced remains within its principle, as understanding remains in the intellect. God is said to be a being from himself, because he did not proceed from an external principle through transient action: but the Son and the Holy Spirit are said to proceed from another as from an internal and immanently acting principle. These are entirely different concepts. In the aspect of deity, the Son and the Spirit are no less from themselves than the Father; but in the aspect of personality they are situated differently than the Father.

We are dealing here with immanent production. This production is either taken passively, and thus it is the origin of a divine person from another or others through the communication of essence. Or it is taken actively, and thus it is an immanent operation by which the divine nature is communicated with the proceeding person.

Since in God there is no transition from the potency of understanding and loving to the act of understanding and love, but all things are pure act, eternal, immutable, the processions themselves are also pure act, eternal, immutable. Therefore immanent procession in the divine does not indicate anything that

passes from non-existence to existence, or that is made in the proper sense, as happens in the immanent processions of our intellect and will, but only indicates the relation between principle and what is principiated, in a similar manner as, for example, the human soul without new action, by substantial influence alone, is the principle of its immortality and of its other properties. There is however this difference, that the soul is not the principle of really distinct supposita, but in God the terms of the productions are hypostases really distinct from the producer. This is the mystery hidden in God, whose like is not found in creatures. For in creatures substantial influence does not produce really distinct terms, while the influence of immanent action produces only accidental terms. Therefore these two classes of relations of principles to what is principiated can in some way be applied according to analogy to explain the divine processions in whatever manner, but the disparity must always be attended to.

From these things several points are gathered: α) Since the divine saying and active spiration obtain in the Word and Holy Spirit a completely adequate term, such terms cannot be multiplied further... β) We speak or produce an [internal] word in order that we may understand, and we elicit an act of will in order that we may love; but the eternal Father, since he is from himself and essentially understanding, speaks or produces the Word because he understands; likewise the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit because they love the divine essence and each other. γ) In us the word is the term of intellective action, and love is the term of volitive action, insofar as they are precisely actions; but in the divine there is no action or dependence of one upon another, except perhaps grammatical, or that which is conceived and expressed by us in the manner of action, but there is only substantial influence, by virtue of which one person from the exigency of essence and quite necessarily is, because another is. For in reality, by the very fact that the divine essence, for example, as intellectual act is in the Father, without new or indeed any action it is as understood, or having this mode of being, which is the Word. Wherefore it is as essential to the divine nature to have the Word, as it is essential to it to be in the Father. δ) Therefore the procession of the Word (and the same is true of the procession of the Holy Spirit) formally is the intellectual speaking of the Word itself or the person of the Word itself as proceeding from the act of intellect, insofar as it is in the Father; which act therefore does not properly have the nature of action but rather, as has been said, of the proximate principle quo of production" (Piccirelli, De Deo Uno et Trino 985 sq.).

These things have been said so that from the very beginning, insofar as it can be done, imperfections may be removed from the concept of this matter—imperfections which necessarily inhere in our thought, based as it is on created things, and especially when we think about divine mysteries, can easily be an occasion of error. But individual points must be considered more precisely in the

course of the treatise. How processions do not conflict with divine perfection will be said later (nn. 628 ff. 644 ff.).

507. a) That there are divine processions is established from Sacred Scripture: "I proceeded from God" (John 8:42). "I will send you from the Father the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father" (ibid. 15:26). "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn before every creature" (Sirach 24:5). The same has often been defined by councils and is clearly enunciated in the creeds.

Now with these things presupposed, it must be considered of what divine procession is to be predicated. Here again we can suppose that the divine essence does not proceed, both because this has been defined by the Fourth Lateran Council (Denz. n. 432), and because, if the essence proceeded, the divine essence would be multiplied and the unity of the divine nature would be destroyed. Moreover, actions and passions belong not to nature, but to supposita. Therefore production, neither active nor passive, can belong to the divine essence. Thus it remains only to see to which divine persons and in what sense procession belongs.

b) Since the Catholic doctrine concerning divine processions is extensively expounded in the symbol of the Eleventh Council of Toledo (concerning which cf. Künstle, Antipriscilliana, Freiburg 1905, 73 ff.), it will be helpful to excerpt certain things from this symbol: "We confess and believe the holy and ineffable Trinity, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, to be naturally one God of one substance, one nature, and also one majesty and power.

And we profess that the Father indeed is not begotten, not created, but unbegotten; for he takes his origin from no one, from whom both the Son received nativity and the Holy Spirit procession; therefore he himself is the source and origin of all divinity...

We also confess that the Son was born from the substance of the Father without beginning before all ages, yet was not made, because neither did the Father ever exist without the Son nor the Son without the Father; and yet not as the Son is from the Father, so is the Father from the Son, because not the Father from the Son but the Son from the Father received generation. Therefore the Son is God from the Father, but the Father is God yet not from the Son; the Father indeed of the Son, not God from the Son, that one the Son of the Father and God from the Father, nevertheless the Son equal to the Father in all things, because he neither began to be born at some time nor ceased. He also is believed to be of one substance with the Father, on account of which he is also called homoousios with the Father... For the Son is to be believed to have been begotten or born not from nothing nor from some other substance but from the womb of the Father, that is, from his substance. Therefore the Father is eternal, eternal also the Son. But if the Father always was, he always had a Son to whom he was Father; and on this account we confess the Son born from the Father without beginning. Nor do we

call this same Son of God, because he was begotten from the Father, a small portion of divided nature, but we assert that he begot without division, because it belongs to divinity alone not to have an unequal Son. This Son also is Son by nature, not by adoption, whom God the Father is to be believed to have begotten neither by will nor by necessity, because neither does any necessity fall upon God, nor does will precede wisdom.

We also believe the Holy Spirit, who is the third person in the Trinity, to be one and equal with God the Father and Son, of one substance and also one nature, yet not begotten or created but proceeding from both, to be the Spirit of both. This Holy Spirit also is believed to be neither unbegotten nor begotten, lest either, if we should say unbegotten, we should speak of two Fathers, or, if begotten, we should be shown to proclaim two Sons: who nevertheless is called the Spirit not of the Father only but simultaneously of the Father and Son. For he does not proceed from the Father into the Son, or proceed from the Son to sanctify creation, but he is shown to have proceeded simultaneously from both, because he is recognized to be the love or holiness of both. This Holy Spirit therefore is believed to be sent by both, just as the Son by the Father; but he is not held to be less than the Father and Son, just as the Son on account of assumed flesh testifies himself to be less than the Father and Holy Spirit.

This is the related narrative of the holy Trinity, which ought to be called and believed not triple but triune. Nor can it be correctly said that in one God there is Trinity, but one God is Trinity.

But in the relative names of the persons the Father is referred to the Son, the Son to the Father, the Spirit to both; and when these three persons are spoken of relatively, nevertheless one nature or substance is believed. Nor as we proclaim three persons, so do we proclaim three substances. For what the Father is, he is not to himself but to the Son; and what the Son is, he is not to himself but to the Father; similarly also the Holy Spirit is referred relatively not to himself but to the Father and Son, in that he is proclaimed the Spirit of the Father and Son. Likewise when we say 'God,' it is not said relatively to something, just as Father to Son or Son to Father or Holy Spirit to Father and Son, but God is said specially to himself.

Therefore individually each person is confessed and believed to be complete God, and all three persons together one God, one and undivided and equal deity, majesty or power in them, which is neither diminished in individuals nor increased in the three, because it has nothing less when each person is individually called God, nor more when all three persons are declared one God. This holy Trinity therefore, which is one and true God, neither departs from number nor is captured by number.

For in the relation of persons number is perceived; but in the substance of divinity, what is numbered is not comprehended. Therefore in this alone do they suggest number, that they are toward each other, and in this they lack number,

that they are toward themselves... Nor because we have said these three persons to be one God, can we say that the same one is Father who is Son, or that he is Son who is Father, or that he who is Holy Spirit is either Father or Son. For he is not the Father who is the Son, nor he the Son who is the Father, nor is the Holy Spirit himself either Father or Son; although the Father is the same thing that the Son is, the Father and Son the same thing that the Holy Spirit is, that is, by nature one God... For we distinguish persons, we do not separate the deity...

Nor however are these three persons to be considered separable, since none is believed ever to have existed or done anything before another, or after another, or without another; for they are found inseparable in what they are and in what they do, because we believe there was no interval of time between the generating Father and the generated Son or the proceeding Holy Spirit, in which either the generator would at some time precede the generated, or the generated would be lacking to the generator, or the proceeding Spirit would appear posterior to the Father or Son... Therefore we neither confuse those three persons of one and inseparable nature, so we by no means proclaim them separable, since the Trinity itself has deigned to show this to us so evidently that even in those names by which it willed the persons to be recognized individually, it does not permit one to be understood without another. For neither is the Father known without the Son, nor is the Son found without the Father; for the relation itself of the personal name forbids the persons to be separated, which even when it does not name them simultaneously, it suggests simultaneously. But no one can hear any one of these names without being compelled to understand the other also. Since therefore these three are one and one is three, nevertheless there remains to each person its own property. For the Father has eternity without nativity, the Son eternity with nativity, but the Holy Spirit has procession without nativity with eternity" (Denz. n. 275 ff.).

In this symbol therefore are taught the unity of the divine nature, the distinction of the divine persons, the processions, relations, properties, inseparability or circumincession. Concerning the natural unity and personal distinction we have already spoken. Therefore it remains to speak concerning processions, relations, properties, inseparability.

Proposition LXX. Only the Father Does Not Proceed. De Fide (Sum. 1, q. 23, a. 4)

Part I. The Father Does Not Proceed.

508. Argument 1. Sacred Scripture, just as it explicitly teaches that the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed, never says this about the Father; indeed, because it constantly presents only three divine persons, it implicitly teaches that the Father does not proceed. For either the Father would proceed from the Son and the Holy Spirit, and this is absurd, because a principle cannot proceed from

those of whom it is the principle; or he would proceed from some other being, and there would be four divine persons.

509. Argument 2. From tradition it is established that the Father is ἀγένητον or ἀγέννητον, by which word can be excluded being created, being proceeding through generation, being proceeding simply. [1] In fact, this word has been employed to exclude every procession from the Father. Thus in the Athanasian Symbol: "The Father is made by no one, neither created nor begotten." To be unbegotten is the same as to be from no one, says St. Basil (Contra Eunom. 1. 1, n. 15; M 29, 547. Cf. Athan., De synod. n. 47: M 26, 775: De decret. Nic. Synodi n. 28 sqq.; M 25, 467 sqq.). The Symbol of the Council of Toledo XI (A.D. 675): "And we profess the Father indeed not begotten, not created, but unbegotten; for he draws his origin from no one" (above n. 507 b). The Fourth Lateran Council, De Fide cath. c. 1: "The Father from no one" (Denz. n. 428). The Council of Florence, decree for the Jacobites: "The Father, whatever he is or has, he does not have from another, but from himself, and is a principle without principle" (Denz. n. 704).

The same thing that ἀγέννητος signifies is ἄναρχος, which is very frequently predicated of God the Father to signify that the Father is a principle without principle. Thus St. Gregory Nazianzen: "Therefore the Father is without beginning; for he has being neither from another nor from himself" (Orat. 20, n. 7; M 35, 1074). And elsewhere: "The name of the one without beginning is Father; of the beginning, Son; of the one with the beginning, Holy Spirit. But the nature of the three is one, God" (Orat. 42, n. 15; M 36, 476). St. Cyril of Jerusalem: "First let the dogma concerning God [the Father] be established as a foundation in your souls, that God is one alone, unbegotten, without beginning..." (Catech. 4, n. 4; M 33, 458). See other references in Petavius (De Trin. 5, 5). Following the Greeks, St. Hilary calls the Father unbegettable and "uninitiate" (De Trin. 4, 6; M 10, 100). Furthermore, ἄναρχος, as it is explained by the Greek Fathers themselves, does not primarily signify one who is without beginning, but one who is without principle (and consequently without beginning). The Son is ἀρχὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, but the Father is ἀρχὴ ἄναρχος, a principle without principle. Therefore ἄναρχος in reality is the same as ἀγέννητος, because both terms are employed to exclude from the Father every principle from which he might have proceeded (cf. below n. 638, and Jac. Bilz, Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Johannes von Damaskus, Paderborn 1909, 108 sqq.).

510. Argument 3. Confirmation from reason: Processions in divine things are only through immanent actions. But immanent actions are only two:

[1] Cf. P. Stiegele, Der Agennesiebegriff in der griechischen Theologie des 4. Jahrhunderts, Freiburg i. B. 1913.

understanding and willing; for power is a principle of acting toward external things. From the intellect proceeds the Son, from the will the Holy Spirit, as we shall see later. Nor can there be multiple words and multiple loves, because one Word is already infinitely perfect and one Love infinitely perfect. Therefore besides these two there is no other procession in God (S. Thom. 1, q. 27, a. 5; De pot. q. 9, a. 9; Contra gent. 4, 26).

Part II. Only the Father Does Not Proceed.

511. There are only three persons. But the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed. Therefore only the Father does not proceed. Furthermore, there cannot be two absolute unproduced persons in God, because thus one person would have a different essence from the other, and neither would be the one and true God. Since there is one God, two unbegettables cannot exist, since God is one precisely because unbegettability belongs to one alone (S. Hilarius, De syn. c. 26, n. 60; M 10, 521. Cf. S. Thom. 1, q. 33, a. 4 ad 4). Therefore, because in God no absolute perfection is incommunicable, there cannot be two divine persons who have various absolute perfections by which they are distinguished among themselves. But real relations in God can be none other than those of origin, because without the origin of one from another there are no real distinctions and therefore no real relations (cf. below n. 637 sq.).

Therefore processions belong only to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Concerning the procession of each, therefore, we must now treat.

It would be useful to premise certain things which, while the faith remains the same, pertain to the manner of conceiving and speaking.

Since it is necessary for us to represent the divine essence and the divine persons with distinct concepts, we can proceed in such a way that we first think of the divine essence as that which is most radical in God and common to the three persons, then the three persons as having the same common essence. According to this manner of conceiving, the divine essence neither generates nor produces nor is begotten nor proceeds, but the Father generates, the Son is generated, the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit.

We can also proceed in such a way that we first think of the person of the Father as the source of the entire Trinity, who has the divine essence included in himself and communicates it with the Son and through the Son with the Holy Spirit. According to this manner of conceiving it is permitted to say: the Father is the unbegotten and generating essence, the Son is the begotten essence and simultaneously spirating with the Father, the Holy Spirit is the spirated essence.

In fact both manners of speaking occur, the former more commonly among the Latins, the latter more frequently among the Greeks, but also both in one and the same author, as in St. Augustine. Hence doubts and disputes have arisen. Peter Lombard (1. d. 5) prefers the former manner of speaking and does not willingly admit the expression by which the essence is said to be generating or

begotten. On the contrary, Richard of St. Victor altogether maintains that it is correctly said that essence begets essence (De Trin. 1. 6, c. 22). When the Council of Toledo XIV had said: "Will begat will," this did not please the Supreme Pontiff Benedict II, who nevertheless acquiesced after the words were explained orthodoxly. The Council of Toledo XV again repeats the same doctrine: "We have said according to essence: will from will just as also wisdom from wisdom. For this is God's being, which is willing; this willing, which is knowing" (Denz. n. 294). The Council of Toledo XVI speaks similarly (Denz. n. 296). These events took place in the seventh century.

St. Thomas judges concerning this manner of speaking thus: "To express the unity of essence and person, the holy doctors sometimes spoke more explicitly than the propriety of speech allows. Hence such expressions are not to be extended but explained, namely that abstract names should be explained through concrete ones or even through personal names, so that when it is said: essence from essence or wisdom from wisdom, the meaning is: the Son, who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father, who is essence and wisdom" (1, q. 39, a. 5). [2] Ruiz (De Trin. disp. 80, sect. 4, n. 7) says that even now it is permitted to speak according to the manner of those ancient doctors, provided one correctly explains his meaning. Nevertheless it is more advisable now to abstain from that manner of speaking and only concede that it is not false but less proper and in need of explanation. For already through many centuries the other manner of speaking has been in constant use in theology, from which usage to depart without sufficient reason is to create unnecessary difficulties. This manner of speaking has been made most fixed by the Fourth Lateran Council, which teaches: "We, with the sacred council approving, believe and confess with Peter Lombard, that there is a certain one supreme reality, incomprehensible indeed and ineffable, which truly is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, three persons together and individually each of them... and that reality is not generating nor begotten nor proceeding, but it is the Father who generates, and the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds" (Denz. n. 432). This definition was made against the false doctrine of Abbot Joachim, not against the manner of speaking of the ancient Fathers. Yet it could not happen that the manner of speaking itself would not also become stable through this definition (cf. what I wrote in "Theologische Zeitfragen" II 5 sqq.). Now let us proceed to consider the matters themselves.

ARTICLE I.
ON THE PROCESSION OF THE SON.

[2] At the same time he warns that it can in no way be said: "The Father begot himself God," because that "himself" would refer to the same suppositum (1. q. 39, n. 4 ad 4).

Proposition LXXI. The Son proceeds from the Father through generation. De fide (Sum. 1. q. 27, a. 2).

512. Argument 1. From Sacred Scripture.

The second person is called Son in Sacred Scripture, true Son, proper Son, who is in the bosom of the Father (Rom. 8, 3 32. 1 Jo. 5, 20). But a true and proper Son is one who is generated by the Father. "Therefore Son, because begotten, and because Son, certainly begotten" (S. August., De Trin. 5, 6, 7: M 42, 914). For this reason the Son is often expressly called "only-begotten" (Jo. 1, 14 18: 3, 16 18. 1 Jo. 4, 9). Cf. above n. 454.

Furthermore, that the words (Ps. 2, 7): "You are my Son, today I have begotten you," were spoken concerning the second divine person, the apostle testifies (Hebr. 1, 5). For although some think that in this passage the discourse concerns directly the humanity of Christ, nevertheless all concede and must concede that the ultimate reason why Christ can be called Son begotten by the Father in such a manner is the eternal generation of the Son. For if this is removed, Christ is the Son of God in the same metaphorical sense in which angels and other rational creatures are often called sons of God. But the apostle himself excludes this very thing. Therefore this manner of speaking by the apostle either directly signifies or at least openly presupposes the eternal generation of the Son (cf. Hebr. 5, 5; Act. 13, 33: Cyrill. Aler., Dial. 2 de Trin.; M 75, 747 sqq.; cf. below n. 645).

Similarly in Ps. 109, 3 it is said of the Son: "From the womb before the morning star I have begotten you," which reading indeed is not entirely certain, but much more probable than the Hebrew text, which is commonly considered corrupt (cf. Ruiz disp. 4, sect. 1). Moreover, this reading has been so universally received that it is at least an efficacious argument from tradition, because the church could not have thus received false doctrine.

513. Argument 2. From the symbols [creeds].

When it had already been said in the Apostles' Creed: "I believe in Jesus Christ, His only Son," this term "His only Son" was later declared more fully, as in the Nicene Creed: εἰς Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενή.... and in the Athanasian Creed: "The Son is from the Father alone, not made nor created, but begotten," and thus elsewhere often (cf. Denz. n. 19 86 276 703 etc.), so that it is not necessary to seek many testimonies in such an open confession of the church. Besides, those things which the Holy Fathers wrote against the Arians can be compared (more below n. 518 sqq.).

514. Argument 3. From reason.

Supposing meanwhile that the Son proceeds from the intellect of the Father, his generation is thus shown: Generation strictly speaking is the origin of a living

being from a living being; for non-living things are not said to be generated in this sense. Yet not every origin of a living being is called generation. Thus living creatures are not generated by God, but created. Similarly, hairs, although they may be considered living things that proceed from another living being, do not have the nature of something begotten or of a son. Therefore, generation requires that a living being proceed from a living being into the likeness of the species, or that the generator and the generated have the same nature. However, this likeness must not be present accidentally, but by virtue of the production. For if there were, for example, equivocal generation, a worm could arise again from the corpse of a dead worm of the same species, although another animal could also have arisen from the same mass. In this case the second worm would not have been generated by the first, because it would not have been made such by virtue of the production, but accidentally. Therefore a procession which is generation must formally tend toward likeness. They are accustomed to express this by saying: "generation is from a conjoined principle," because the generator communicates from his own substance with the generated. But by the very fact that the procession is such that it formally tends toward the communication of substance, it also formally tends toward effecting likeness, and indeed the more perfect the more perfectly the substance is communicated. Thus is understood the customary definition of generation: "It is the procession of a living being from a living being conjoined in likeness of nature by virtue of production."

Now let us apply these things to the procession of the second divine person. This is the procession of a living being from a living being, because it is through an immanent act of God. It is in likeness, indeed in identity of nature, and indeed by virtue of the procession, because intellection by its nature tends toward effecting likeness between the mental word and the known object. But since God is eternal act, the divine Word is also eternal, proceeding without change; it is act from act, not act from potency; nor is it an accident, but subsisting nature, because divine understanding is the very substance of the one understanding. Therefore it is not received in any subject, although the second person has its being received from the Father: for in the divine being itself are contained both the principle of the Word and the Word itself; the divine substance itself is principle and principled, so that the being of the principled is not other than the being of the principle. Therefore this procession is most perfectly from a conjoined principle. Besides, what we here suppose, that the Son is the Word and proceeds from the intellect, must be proved in the next Proposition (S. Thom. 1, q. 27, a. 1 2).

515. Scholium. In what sense the Son is said to be conceived and born.

For the generation of animals, active power is required in the father and passive power in the mother. To the passive power belongs conception and birth.

Similarly in intellectual generation, action and passion are distinguished: for the intellect not only forms the word, but also conceives; therefore the word is called a concept. Hence, if we transfer these things to the divine intellect, we can speak not only of generation, but also of the conception and birth of the Word, and thus attribute to God the Father all those things which in carnal generation belong distinctly to father and mother, so that thus the Son is Son in the most perfect sense as only-begotten, both because no other divine person is Son, and because he is totally the Son of the one Father, and has no other progenitor or principle. The Holy Fathers express this. According to this manner the Word speaking is introduced in Sacred Scripture: "The depths were not yet, and I was already conceived... before the hills I was brought forth" (Prov. 8, 24 25). Similarly there is discourse about the womb and bosom of the Father (cf. S. Thom., Contra gent. 4, 11 in fine; 1, q. 27, a. 2 ad 2).

516. Nevertheless, it is not therefore permitted to call God the mother of the Word, because this name "mother" essentially signifies imperfection. Therefore this name is never attributed to God in Sacred Scripture. But when certain heretics dared to introduce this name and other names of kinship into the Holy Trinity, the Holy Fathers denied that this could be done except through blasphemy (cf. Iren. 1, 5; M 7, 491; Greg. Naz., Orat. theol. ultima; M 36, 134; Epiph., Haer. 62; M 41, 1051).

517. Here it can also be asked why the Son in the sapiential books is called by names of feminine gender. "I am the first-born, I am the mother of fair love..." The proximate reason is grammatical, because the word chokma (σοφία) is of feminine gender; which word indeed signifies wisdom in the abstract and is used of both created and uncreated wisdom. The other reason is real, namely to signify the maternal benignity and tender charity of God toward men. On the other hand, the name "daughter" signifies no imperfection in the genus of procession, as does the name "mother," and therefore the former is less avoided in Scripture than the latter.

Proposition LXXII. The Son proceeds from the Father through intellectual generation. Theologically certain (Sum. 1, q. 34, a. 1 2; q. 35).

518. Argument 1. The Son of God is the Word of God. But the Word of God has its principle in the intellect of God. Therefore, the Son of God proceeds from the intellect of God.

Regarding the major premise: In St. John's Gospel chapter 1 and in his first Epistle chapter 1, the same one who is called the Word is later called the Son. Similarly, in Revelation 19:13 it is said of Christ: "And his name is called the Word of God." Therefore, the Holy Fathers against the heretics consistently teach as a doctrine of faith that the Son and the Word are the same (Ruiz disp. 57, sect. 2 et 3). Likewise the pontiffs and councils. Thus Pope Damasus: "Since the Son

himself is the Word of God" (Denz. n. 65). The Council of Chalcedon (451 AD) teaches: "one and the same only-begotten Son, God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ" (Denz. n. 148), and so frequently elsewhere.

There can be doubt whether the Son is called Word properly or metaphorically. This latter position was taught not only by various heretics, but among the scholastics even by Durandus (In 1, dist. 2, q. 3, et dist. 27, q. 3). Ruiz, however, thinks that the proper acceptance of Word is so joined with the Catholic faith that it is an error to concede metaphor or impropriety in the Word (disp. 55, sect. 4; cf. disp. 57, sect. 2). The reason is that it cannot be conceded that the most serious mysteries of our faith are constantly proposed under a metaphorical name, especially since the Fathers and theologians have always thought they could rightly conclude from this name the mode by which the Son proceeds from the Father. If it were otherwise, it would also be permissible to explain the names of Father and Son tropically and thus destroy the entire dogma. But it is not permitted to transfer the vocabulary of Scripture to metaphorical signification at will, unless urgent reason compels it. Therefore St. Cyril of Alexandria says against Eunomius: "What, I ask, will you determine concerning John, who calls the Son the Word and attributes to him this most proper appellation, which most manifests his essence? For he says: 'In the beginning...' You see how this name and appellation of Word expounds the essence of the Son, which signifies according to nature" (Thesaur. assert. 19; M 75, 314). St. Athanasius defends the same most vigorously in his orations against the Arians, and similarly all the Fathers who wrote against the Arians. Likewise the scholastics in 1, dist. 27, or in 1, q. 34, a. 1 ad 1. In this place St. Thomas adds the reason: "Although Word might be said metaphorically, it would nevertheless suppose something in God which would properly be Word. For the metaphor would consist in this, that just as external words signify internal concepts, so Christ explained the internal concept of the Father, which he wished to explain to us. But where there is concept, there is word. Therefore in God there is Word, and this Word is the Son."

Regarding the minor premise: Either the Word of God is understood as uttered (as certain heretics wished) or as immanent. But not uttered, because it is uncreated, eternal, personal. Therefore immanent. But the immanent Word is produced by the intellect. Therefore the Son proceeds from the intellect of the Father, as from his principle. This is the doctrine of the Holy Fathers. Thus St. Gregory Nazianzen teaches that the Son is called Word, "because he is related to the Father as word to mind" (Orat. theol. 4 vers. fin.; M 36, 129). Fulgentius, De incarnat. n. 21 (M 65, 585). St. Augustine expounds this at length, De Trin. 15, 10-17 (M 42, 1069-1079). Moreover, by the very fact that the Son is the immanent Word of God, he became the uttered Word of God in the incarnation (indeed in some way in creation), and was manifested as distinct from the Father; but he

could not have become the uttered Word unless he had first been the immanent Word.

The Greek Fathers compare the procession of the divine Word with the word that proceeds from the human mouth, because the mind is in speech and speech is in the mind (cf. Athan., De sententia Dionysii n. 23; M 25, 513). Nevertheless they clearly teach that the Son is called Word because he proceeds from the intellect of the Father. St. Basil explains this copiously in his homily on "In the beginning was the Word" n. 3 ff. (M 31, 475 ff.). Let us hear a few words: "Who was in the beginning? The Word, he says. When you hear Word, beware lest you fall into earthly and humble thoughts, but examine the signification of the voice. Why Word? So that it may be clear that he proceeded from the mind. Why Word? Because he was begotten without passion. Why Word? Because he is the image of the begetter, showing the whole begetter in himself, separating nothing from him and subsisting perfect through himself." St. Cyril of Alexandria: "The Son is called Word and wisdom and splendor and character and power of the Father. He is called Word and wisdom because he is from the mind and in the mind proximately and indivisibly, and because of the mutual, so to speak, interpenetration" (In Io. l. 1, c. 5; M 73, 82. Concerning "mutual interpenetration" see below n. 642 ff.). The same teach St. Gregory of Nyssa (Orat. catech. c. 1; M 45, 13 f.), the author of the homily among the works of St. Chrysostom (M 56, 356 f.), and others.

519. Argument 2. The Son is hypostatic Wisdom. But hypostatic Wisdom has the intellect of the Father as its principle. Therefore the Son proceeds from the intellect of the Father.

Regarding the major premise: This is established from Proposition LXVI, n. III. [3] "We preach Christ... the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:23-24). Concerning this matter there has been no doubt in the church since the times of the Arian heresy. Cf. Athan., Orat. 2 contra arian. from num. 32 (M 26, 390). Cyrill. Alex., Thesaur. assert. 15 (M 75, 246 ff.). Hilarius, De Trin. l. 12, n. 35 ff. (M 10, 454). August., De Trin. 7. 3 (M 42, 936).

Regarding the minor premise: Since all divine persons are wise and wisdom itself, the unique reason why the second person is called Wisdom specially is the special relation of origin. But if the Son is called Wisdom because of his origin, he proceeds from the intellect; for the principle of wisdom is the intellect (cf. August. l. c.).

Furthermore, Wisdom says of herself: "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High" (Eccl. 24:5). But the mouth of the Most High is the intellect of the

[3] Theophilus Antioch. et Irenaeus (cf. supra n. 479) understand Wisdom to be the Holy Spirit against all other Fathers: this opinion is rejected, because Wisdom is said to be begotten (cf. infra n. 572).

Most High. Therefore the Son is called begotten Wisdom because he proceeds from the intellect of the Father.

520. Argument 3. The Son alone is called "the image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:15), "the brightness of glory and the figure of his substance" (Heb. 1:3), "the vapor of the power of God, a certain emanation of the brightness of almighty God sincere, the brightness of eternal light, the spotless mirror of God's majesty, the image of his goodness" (Wis. 7:25-26).

From all these things the Fathers conclude that the Son proceeds from the intellect of the Father, especially from the appellation of image, to which almost all other names can be reduced. For the image of God is not painted externally, but God himself is its begetter, in whom contemplating himself, he delights in the same, just as the Son himself says: "I was the one in whom he delighted." When therefore did the Father not see himself in his image or when did he not delight, so that anyone might dare to say: The image is from nothing, nor did the Father delight before the image existed? For how does the maker and creator see himself in a created and made substance? For such must the image be as the Father is" (Athan., Orat. 1 contra arian. n. 20; M 26, 54). "The living image of the living one, and born from him, does not have diversity of nature, and in nothing different does he hold the power of that nature from which he is not different. Therefore what the image is, by this he profits, so that the nativity of the only-begotten God signifies the Father God, and he signifies as the form itself and image of the invisible God; and through this he does not lose the united likeness of nature, because he does not lack the power of nature" (Hilar., De Trin. l. 7, n. 37; M 10, 251; cf. 9,5; De syn. c. 13). Cf. Cyrill. Alex., Thesaur. assert. 12 (M 75, 182 ff.); August., De Trin. 7, 1 (M 42, 931). Many other sayings of the Fathers have been collected by Petavius, De Trin. 2, 11 et 6, 567, and Ruiz, De Trin. disp. 2, sect. 2.

St. Thomas gives the reason thus: "It belongs to the nature of image to have likeness according to nature or at least according to a sign of nature [as in an artificial image]. But likeness alone does not suffice, but it is required that the image originate from its exemplar. Therefore, as Augustine says in 83 Questions, q. 74, one egg is not the image of another, because it is not expressed from it. Therefore, in order that something be an image, it is required that by force of origin it be like its exemplar. But the unique immanent act from which by force of origin such likeness arises is intellection. Therefore the Son, in order to be an image, must proceed from the intellect of the Father" (1, q. 35, a. 1 2). It also follows that the Son in the strict sense is not the image of the divine essence or of the Holy Spirit, although he is similar to him, because he does not proceed from him. How the same things apply to the names of mirror, character, seal, etc., is evident per se (cf. Ruiz disp. 64, sect. 3 et 8).

521. Scholium 1. Whether Word can be said only personally or also essentially.

Every perfect act of understanding seems to be called Word. But to understand pertains to the essence of God. Therefore the notion of Word seems to be found in the essence and consequently in all divine persons.

But ecclesiastical usage does not tolerate the Father being called Word [4], or Word being begotten from Word. Cf. August., De Trin. 6, 2; M 42, 925 and the scholastic doctors In 1, dist. 2 or In 1, q. 34. a. 1. The reason is that it is proper to Word to be produced; but the divine essence is not produced.

But someone might say: Since word is the intrinsic term of intellection, how can it be that the intellection of the Son or of the Holy Spirit does not beget Word? For a complete action cannot be conceived without its intrinsic term. I respond that this and similar difficulties arise from the fact that someone thinks of the intellection of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as threefold. But just as there is not a triple essence, but one and the same numerically, which is the Father and Son and Holy Spirit; so there is not triple, but one numerically intellection and one numerically love common to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

---

[4] It is different concerning the Greek word λόγος, which has multiple meanings. Thus God can essentially be called λόγος, i.e., reason and exemplar cause of creatures etc. (Cf. Petar, De Trin. l. 6, c. 3, n. 4 ff., et J. Bilz, Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Johannes von Damaskus 118 ff.).

Petavius l. c. also says that St. Ambrose calls the Son "Word from Word." But in this he errs; for the treatise De fide orthodoxa contra arianos seu de Filii divinitate is not by Ambrose but by some unknown person, whom St. Augustine thinks to be Gregory, an eastern bishop (ep. 148, n. 10; M 33, 626). But neither is this admitted, but it is probably by Gregory of Elvira († post 392). This writer, in order to exalt the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, says: "This is the reason of the name, that you may believe the unity of substance in the Father and Son, although you cannot define the thing itself, which is ineffable, so that whether you say light from light, or word from word, or lord from lord, whatever you say of him, you may nevertheless believe the Father and Son to be of one essence" (c. 5; M 17, 559). Therefore he does not even say that the Son should be called Word from Word, but only emphasizes: whatever you call him, it is necessary to confess that he is consubstantial with the Father. In c. 6 he adds: "What is the Son from that which the Father is? Another the same. For he is also called Word because he proceeded from the proper divine mouth." Therefore he explains his own mind correctly. Nor indeed should it be repeated that the Son is Word from Word. What Petavius brings from Marius Victorinus is of no moment in dogmatic matters, as he himself indicates. Theologians indifferently say that the blessed see creatures in the divine essence or in the Word. St. Augustine, from whom this expression "to know in the Word" is taken, understands Word as the second divine person (De Gen. ad litt. l. 4, c. 24, n. 41; M 34, 313), to whom the intellectual manifestation of creatures is appropriated. Others understand that expression of the word which is the divine essence itself as representative of all things. Thus e.g. Platel (De Deo n. 78), Piccirelli (De Deo Uno et Trino 495; cf. supra n. 241). These therefore must concede that word in the divine is said not only personally but also essentially (thus Antoine, De Trin. c. 2, a. 6), yet in such a way that the divine essence is only improperly called word (cf. S. Thomas, In 1, dist. 27, q. 2, a. 2). But the Father and Holy Spirit are not personally word.

Therefore this one intellection is both speaking Word and Word spoken, and that one love is both breathing love and love breathed (Kleutgen, De ipso Deo n. 971).

Therefore the same essential understanding, insofar as it is included in paternity through the mode of one conferring fecundity, is the proximate principle (quo) for producing Word, and the same essential understanding, insofar as it is included in the Son through the mode of a produced term, is Word itself, and the same essential understanding is communicated by the Father and Son through spiration to the Holy Spirit, in whom it exists indeed through the mode of produced perfection, but not through the mode of Word, concerning which more later (cf. Ruiz disp. 60, sect. 6).

With these suppositions the question is easily solved, whether to speak is common to the three persons or belongs to the Father alone. For just as properly speaking Word is said personally in the divine and not essentially, so also to speak. Hence just as Word is not common to the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, so it is not true that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit is one speaker. For to speak is nothing other than to bring forth word... and thus the person alone who brings forth Word is speaking, although each of the persons is understanding and understood and consequently spoken by Word (or expressed by Word). Moreover, if to speak is taken less properly, as it is the same as to understand, it belongs to all persons. Thus St. Thomas (1, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3. Cf. August., De Trin. 7, 1: M 42, 931; 15, 14; M 42, 1076: Anselmi Monol. c. 32 34 35 39: M 158, 185 188 189 205).

522. Scholium 2. Whether the Father is wise with begotten wisdom.

St. Augustine had sometimes taught this (De div. quaest. 83, q. 23; M 40, 16), but later he retracted this opinion (Retract, 1, 26; M 32, 625). And indeed this opinion is false in the rigor of words; for it signifies that begotten wisdom is the formal cause by which the Father is constituted wise. But the Word is not in any genus of causality or principle in relation to the Father, but the Father is wise by essential wisdom and therefore already prior by reason, before he produces the Word. Similarly it should not be said that the Father is wise with unbegotten wisdom, or the Son is wise with begotten wisdom; for the names of begotten and unbegotten signify relation, but wisdom is an essential and absolute attribute. Therefore in these and similar propositions the touchstone, so to speak, for testing their truth is that the word "deity" be put in place of the attribute. Thus here, if the Son were wise with begotten wisdom, he would also be God with begotten deity, which certainly cannot be said (cf. above n. 121 511).

Almost the same must be thought about the expression: "The Father understands by the Word," which therefore sounds badly, because it would per se signify a formal relation, which is falsely attributed to the Word. Therefore all three persons understand by essential intellection, to which corresponds one

Word, which Word is the term of intellection common to the three persons. Nevertheless all persons understand in the Word, insofar as by this expression is signified the relation of object, just as also the blessed see all things in the Word. But it is evident per se that thus all things are also seen in the Father and Holy Spirit, because the divine essence itself is representative of all truth. But this expression is appropriated to the Word because of the special mode of his procession. Briefly: The divine persons do not differ in the mode of understanding, but in the mode of having intellection (cf. Suarez, De Deo 9, 10; Ruiz, De scient. Dei disp. 58, sect. 5; disp. 74, sect. 4).

Nevertheless the argumentation of the Holy Fathers against the Arians is correct: The Father was never without wisdom. But if he had been without the Word, he would have been without wisdom. Therefore he was never without the Word. Therefore the Word is eternal. Thus e.g. St. Athanasius, Or. 4 contra arian. n. 4 (M 26. 471).

For God could not have his essential wisdom unless it were terminated to the produced Word. Because therefore essential wisdom necessarily postulates the Word, from the absence of the Word the absence of essential wisdom is rightly inferred, and conversely from the eternity of essential wisdom the eternity of the Word is rightly inferred, not because the Father receives from the Word that he may understand, but because his intellection is necessarily completed by the Word as term (cf. Petav., De Trin. 6, 9). It must be kept in memory that the ancient Greek Fathers wished to prove against the Arians the consubstantiality of the Son, not to explain speculatively the nature of the divine processions. Hence arises a different mode of speaking, not different doctrine (cf. Bilz l. c. 135 ff. et Chr. Pesch, Theol. Zeitfragen II 16 ff.).

523. Scholium 3. Can the Word be called speech (sermo)?

Answer affirmatively: for the church itself in the mass and office of the Sunday within the octave of the nativity says: "Your almighty speech, Lord, came from the royal throne" (cf. Wis. 18:15). Many Fathers also called the Son by this name. But the name of Word is more fitting, because speech signifies a diction artificially composed of many words, but word is a simple diction. Less fittingly is the Word called reason, eloquence, voice, tongue of the Father, although all these are sometimes read (Ruiz, De scient. Dei disp. 55, sect. 5 6).

Proposition LXXIII. The Word proceeds from the knowledge of all truth, whether absolute or conditional, insofar as the object is true. Theological Explanation (Sum. 1, q. 34, a. 3).

524. Note: The Scholastics have written lengthy treatises on the question concerning from the knowledge of which things the Word proceeds. All indeed concede that divine knowledge is the most simple intuition of all truth, so that

whatever proceeds from God's knowledge necessarily proceeds from the knowledge of all truth. Nevertheless, many think that according to our mode of conceiving, the Father's intellect is constituted as the principle of producing the Son formally through the intellection of only certain truths, while the knowledge of other truths is held only concomitantly. But this entire question appears to be nothing but a dispute about words. Therefore, it will suffice to have indicated a few points.

525. 1. All concede that the Word is begotten through knowledge of the divine essence. For since the divine essence is that object which, if not known, God would know absolutely nothing, without doubt God would not beget the Word if He lacked this knowledge. The same applies to the absolute attributes.

526. 2. Some deny that the Word is begotten through the intuition of the persons, or at least of the Holy Spirit; nevertheless, some concede that the Word proceeds from a quasi-abstractive knowledge of the persons (cf. Scotus, In 2, dist. 1, q. 1, c. 2; Vazquez, De Trin. disp. 142, c. 34). However, it must be conceded absolutely that the Word is produced through the intuition of the persons. For God cannot intuitively comprehend the divine essence unless He also intuitively sees whatever is really identified with it. But the persons are identified with the divine essence. Therefore. Whence it follows that the Word formally expresses the three persons, which it would not express unless from its origin it were representative of them. This alone must be kept in mind: that divine intellection is not determined by any real influence of objects. Therefore, it is not because intellection is the principle of the Word that the objects of intellection are the principle of the Word. Therefore, the Word is not an image of itself or of the Holy Spirit. Next, it should be noted that intuitive vision does not presuppose its object as already existing at that time when it is known, since God sees intuitively even those things which are future in time. Similarly, the Word and the Holy Spirit, although in that sign of reason in which the Father produces the Word they are not yet supposed to exist, are nevertheless seen intuitively, insofar as the divine essence absolutely requires them. For the rest, it must not be forgotten that in the divine persons there is no priority of time or place, but only priority of principle or source.

527. 3. Scotus l. c. and Vazquez disp. 143 deny that the Word is begotten through knowledge of possibles. But the contrary is true, because the divine essence with absolute necessity leads to the knowledge of possibles, and the Word with the same necessity represents possibles. For God can neither comprehend Himself nor be comprehended without knowledge of possibles. The divine essence would not be the divine essence unless it were the foundation of possibles.

528. 4. The more common opinion denies that the Son is begotten through vision of creatures. Thus the Scotists, many of the Thomists, besides Molina, Vazquez, Suarez, and others. The contrary is taught by Valentia, Arriaga, and

Maurus. These opinions can be reconciled thus: In reality, the Word proceeds from the vision of creatures, because by supposition of the creative will, the divine essence determines the Father's intellect to see creatures, and the Son proceeding from such intellection necessarily represents creatures; but whatever the Son represents, He represents by virtue of His origin. Nevertheless, because that supposition is not necessary in itself, the Word would proceed equally perfectly even if God had decreed to create nothing; but then it would proceed from the knowledge that no creature would be future. Similarly, if God had decreed to make other creatures, the Word would proceed from knowledge of these. Applied to middle knowledge (scientia media), the same must be said: The Word does not absolutely require to proceed from knowledge of conditionals; but given conditionals, the Word proceeds from knowledge of them.

When therefore we speak of the present order, we can simply say with St. Thomas: "God by knowing Himself knows every creature. The Word therefore conceived in the mind is representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence in us there are diverse words according to the diverse things we understand. But because God by one act understands both Himself and all things, His one Word is expressive not only of the Father, but also of creatures" (1, q. 34, a. 3; cf. Contra gent. 4, 13). St. Augustine speaks in the same way: "God said nothing that He did not say in the Son. For by speaking in the Son what He was going to do through the Son, He begot the Son Himself, through whom He would make all things" (In Io. tr. 21, n. 4; M 35, 1566). The same follows from the doctrine of St. Hilary, De Trin. l. 7, n. 19 (M 10, 214) and other Fathers, whom you may see in Ruiz (De Trin. disp. 60, sect. 45; disp. 62, sect. 2; disp. 63, sect. 3). Cf. Suarez, De Trin. 9, 4-7; Borrull, De Trin. disp. 17.

ARTICLE II.
ON THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

Proposition LXXIV. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. De Fide (Sum. 1. q. 36, a. 2 3).

529. Note: All concede that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, since this is explicitly taught in Sacred Scripture (John 15:26); but the Greeks have pertinaciously denied that He proceeds from the Son since the times of Photius († 891). This error appears to have sprouted from the Nestorian heresy, although it is unknown who was its first author. Therefore, it must be proven only that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

530. Argument 1. From Sacred Scripture.

a) The Holy Spirit, just as He is the Spirit of the Father, so is He the Spirit of the Son. But He would not be the Spirit of the Son unless He proceeded from Him. Therefore, He proceeds from the Son.

Proof of the major premise: "If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to Him" (Rom. 8:9). Immediately before, the Holy Spirit was called the Spirit of God (the Father). "Because you are sons, God sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying: Abba, Father" (Gal. 4:6). In these texts there is no discussion of a created gift, but of the Spirit of Him "who raised Jesus from the dead," of the Spirit who sanctifies, dwells within, bears witness, etc.

Proof of the minor premise: The Holy Spirit cannot be called and be the Spirit of the Son for any other reason than because He has some relation to the Son. But no other relation is possible in the divine persons except the relation of origin. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son because He proceeds from Him. Surely those who concede that the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Father (Matt. 10:20) because He proceeds from the Father cannot deny for the same reason that He is called the Spirit of the Son. You have the Lord Himself saying: "For it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you." You also have the Apostle: "God sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts." Are there perhaps two, one of the Father, another of the Son? By no means. Therefore, since there is one Father and one Lord, i.e., the Son, so there is also one Spirit, He is surely of both. Why therefore do we not believe that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son, since He is also the Spirit of the Son? For if He did not proceed from Him, He would not, after the resurrection, have breathed upon His disciples when presenting Himself to them, saying: "Receive the Holy Spirit." For what else did that breathing signify, except that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him? (S. August., In Io. tract. 99, n. 6 7; M 35, 1888: cf. De Trin. 1. 4, n. 29; L. 15, n. 47: M 42, 908 1094.) Hearing... Paul writing: "God sent the Spirit of the Son into your hearts," but also seeing the Only-begotten breathing into the face of the apostles and saying: "Receive the Holy Spirit," let us learn that the spiration of the Son is the Spirit remaining in His own life and substance, and let us understand that He is neither begotten nor created by the Son.... Nevertheless, we have learned the spiration of the Spirit by the Son of God from the Sacred Scriptures, and we call both the Son of God the fountain and the source of the Spirit (S. Athan., De Trin. et Spir. S. n. 19: M 26, 1212; cf. Ep. 1 ad Serap. n. 20 21 24: Ep. 3, n. 1; M 26, 575 579 586 623; Gregor. Nyss., Serm. 3 in orat. dom.; M 44, 1147; Cyrill. Alex., In Io. 15, 26 27; M 74, 418 sq.; S. Leo, Serm. 75, in die Pentec. 1, c. 3; M 54, 401; Fulgent., De fide ad Petrum c. 11, n. 52; M 65, 696). The Scholastics agree with the Fathers in explaining those words: S. Thomas, Contra gent. 4, 24: Suarez 10, 1, 7: Ruiz disp. 67, n. 11-15.

531. But if the Greeks object that the Holy Spirit can be called the Spirit of the Son because the Son is consubstantial with the Father, from whom the Spirit proceeds, this objection is inept; for by the same reasoning the Word could be

called the Son of the Holy Spirit, because the Spirit is consubstantial with the Father, from whom the Word proceeds. Just as the Word cannot be called the Son of a person from whom He does not proceed, so no more can the Holy Spirit be called the Spirit of the Son if He does not proceed from Him.

532. b) The Holy Spirit receives from the Son. But a divine person cannot receive from another unless He proceeds from that person. Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

Proof of the major premise: "When the Spirit of truth comes, He will guide you into all truth. For He will not speak on His own authority, but whatever He hears He will speak, and He will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, for He will take what is mine and declare it to you. All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that He will take what is mine and declare it to you" (John 16:13-15).

Here, if it is worth noting, observe the caviling of the little Greeks, who interpret the words ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήμψεται as: "He will receive from my Father," as if the nominative ὁ ἐμός, namely the Father, corresponds to that genitive. But immediately Christ gives the reason, because πάντα... ἐμά ἐστιν, where evidently the neuter gender is exhibited, which the rest of the context also demands by itself. - The future tense: He will hear, He will receive, does not signify that the Holy Spirit can receive something that He does not yet have, but that there will be an external manifestation of that which the Holy Spirit has had from all eternity. Therefore, the same thing is immediately repeated in the present tense: ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λαμβάνει (cf. August., In Io. tract. 99, n. 5; M 35, 1888). Moreover, that the Holy Spirit receives from the Son formally, insofar as He is the Son, unless it were sufficiently clear from the very words, would be evident from the fact that this reception is brought forward as the reason why the Holy Spirit will glorify the Son.

Proof of the minor premise: That "mine" from which the Holy Spirit receives is immanent knowledge with respect to external manifestation. "He will take what is mine and declare it to you." But immanent knowledge is the very essence of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the Holy Spirit receives His essence from the Son, or proceeds from the Son. "He will not speak on His own authority," because He is not from Himself, "but whatever He hears He will speak." He will hear from Him from whom He proceeds. "To hear is for Him to know, and to know is to be. From whom He has essence, from Him He has knowledge" (August., In Io. tract. 99, n. 4: M 35, 1887). Cyril of Alexandria teaches that these words "He will take what is mine" signify the natural property which the Holy Spirit has from the Son, just as the Son has from the Father (De Trin. dialog. 6; M 75, 1010 sq.). "Who proceeds from the Father and will take what is mine, so that He might not be believed alien from the Father and the Son, but of the same substance and divinity... from the Father and the Son, third in designation" (Epiphanius, Ancor.

c. 8; M 43, 30). "No one knows the Spirit except the Father and the Son, from whom He proceeds, and from whom He receives" (ib. c. 11; M 43, 35; cf. c. 67; M 43, 138).

The testimony of St. Basil from the beginning of the third book against Eunomius (M 29, 655) has become very famous, concerning which there was sharp dispute between Greeks and Latins at the Council of Florence (Mansi XXXI 732). For some read it thus: "In dignity indeed [the Holy Spirit is] second in being from the Son, as one who has being from Him and receives from Him and announces to us and depends entirely upon that cause (παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶναι ἔχον καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ λαμβάνον καὶ ἀναγγέλλον ἡμῖν καὶ ὅλως τῆς αἰτίας ἐκείνης ἐξημμένον), the discourse of piety teaches. But to use a third nature [i.e., to attribute another nature to the Holy Spirit] we have neither been taught from the Sacred Scriptures, nor can it be gathered by any consequence from the sayings of Scripture. For just as the Son is indeed second in order from the Father, because He is from Him, and in dignity, because [the Father] is His origin and cause, insofar as He is His Father, and because through Him there is access and approach to God and the Father, but not second in nature, because the deity is in both: so indeed also the Holy Spirit, even if He is second from the Son both in order and in dignity, nevertheless it does not rightly follow that He is of an alien nature, as is evident from this." But others read it thus: "In dignity indeed, [the discourse of piety] perhaps teaches that [the Holy Spirit is] second in being from the Son, but to use a third nature, we have neither from the Sacred Scriptures..." The rest as above until those words: "So indeed also the Holy Spirit, even if He is second from the Son both in order and in dignity," to which is added: "So that we might finally concede even this." Therefore, in the first reading that word "perhaps" (ἴσως) is added. The words which are cited above in Greek are omitted. And in the last reading that phrase "So that we might concede" is added. In Migne P. G. 32, 33 ff. it is shown that the former reading is more probably genuine. See other Fathers in Petavius 7, 5 and in Ruiz disp. 67, sect. 2.

Moreover, Christ Himself adds the reason why the Holy Spirit receives from Him, because "all that the Father has is mine." Therefore, if the Father has this, that He is the spirator of the Holy Spirit, the Son also has this. Therefore, Christ teaches that He has in common with the Father the power of communicating all things to the Holy Spirit. "Therefore I said that He will take what is mine." Thus these words are explained among others by S. Athan., Ad Serap. ep. 3, n. 1 (M 26, 625); S. Cyrillus Aler., De Trin. dial. 6 (M 75, 1011); S. Hilarius, De Trin. 8, 20 (M 10, 250).

533. c) The Holy Spirit is sent by the Son. But a divine person cannot be sent by a divine person unless He proceeds from that person. Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

Proof of the major premise: "But when the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father" (John 15:26). "If I do not go away, the Paraclete will

not come to you; but if I go, I will send Him to you" (John 16:7). These are so clear that even the Photians concede that the Spirit is sent by the Son.

Proof of the minor premise: One person is sent by another through an intimation of the will. But one divine person cannot intimate His will to another except by communicating it through procession. For since there is numerically one will in all three persons, the distinction required between him who intimates and him to whom it is intimated is lacking, unless such distinction is present through opposition of origin. It follows, therefore, that a divine person is not sent by another except insofar as He proceeds from that person and in proceeding receives the same will. Moreover, concerning mission we shall treat later (below n. 649 ff.).

534. d) The Holy Fathers gather an argument from the fixed order by which the Son is always placed as the middle between the Father and the Spirit (Matt. 28:19; 1 John 5:7; 1 Cor. 12:4-6). Concerning this matter St. Basil teaches: "Those are to be avoided who invert the sequence (ἀκολουθίαν) of persons handed down to us by the Lord, openly fighting against piety, and who place the Son before the Father, the Holy Spirit before the Son" (Ep. 125 [78], n. 3; M 32, 550). He gives the reason, because, as the Son is related to the Father, so also the Spirit is related to the Son according to the order of words handed down in baptism (De Spir. S. c. 18: M 32, 147 sq.). For a certain order among the divine persons cannot be other than the order of origin or the order of priority "from whom." Therefore, by the fact that the Holy Spirit is exhibited as the third person, priority "from whom" is conceded to the Son, or He is taught to be the principle of the Holy Spirit. The same teach Gregory Nazianzen (above n. 509) and other Fathers in Franzelin 468 ff. Cf. Ruiz disp. 67, sect. 6 ff.

535. Argument 2. From tradition.

The testimonies of the Holy Fathers are already held as sufficient in the previous argument. Ruiz brings many others (disp. 67, sect. 6-8). St. Ambrose says: "The Holy Spirit also, when He proceeds from the Father and the Son, is not separated from the Father, is not separated from the Son" (De Spiritu Sancto 1, 120; M 16, 733). Already Tertullian: "For the Spirit is third from God [the Father] and the Son" (Adv. Praxeam 8; M 2, 163 sq.); and St. Hilary speaks similarly (cf. below 541 549). Moreover, from the fifth century we have that profession of faith which the Catholic bishops of northern Africa delivered to King Huneric, in which it is said: "We believe the unbegotten Father and the Son begotten of the Father and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son to be of one substance or essence" (Victor Vit., De pers. Vand. 1. 3, n. 1; M 58, 219).

In the Athanasian Symbol, which is established to have been already in public use of the Church in the seventh century, it is read: "The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, neither made nor created nor begotten, but proceeding."

In the year 410 the bishops of the council held at Seleucia profess faith "in the living and holy Spirit, the living and holy Paraclete, who proceeds from the Father and the Son" (Lamy, Concilium Seleuciae et Ctesiphonti habitum a. 410, Lovanii 1868) [5] .

There exists from the fifth century a rule of faith in which it is said that the Holy Spirit proceeds "from the Father and the Son" (Denz. n. 19). The same was taught by the Third Council of Toledo (589), the Council of Aachen (789), the Council of Friuli (791) under St. Paulinus of Aquileia, concerning whom cf. Franzelin 609 ff., and other provincial councils. This doctrine was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, "On the Catholic Faith" 1: "The Father from no one, the Son from the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit equally from both" (Denz. n. 428). The Second Council of Lyons, "On the Supreme Trinity": "We condemn and reprove those who presume to deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son" (Denz. n. 460; cf. 463). The Council of Florence: "Let all profess that the Holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son" (Denz. n. 691). Others in Franzelin 510 ff. and Hurter II, n. 171 ff.

536. Argument 3. From theological reasoning.

The Son has all things that the Father has, except paternity (John 16:15). But the Father has active spiration and this not by reason of paternity. Therefore, the Son has the same.

537. Scholium 1. The doctrine of the Greeks concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone is rejected.

The Greeks attempt to prove their doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone by those texts of Scripture, the Fathers, and councils in which it is affirmatively stated: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. For they say that this affirmative proposition is equivalent to an exclusive one, so that the sense would be: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone.

But first, this word "alone" is never added; on the contrary, since in that very place of Scripture to which they appeal (John 15:26), Christ not only teaches that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, but also that He is sent by Himself, it is clear that no exclusive sense underlies that affirmation. Indeed, this would remain true even if it were said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. For regularly in Sacred Scripture it must be held that what is said of the Father must be understood of the Son, even if an exclusive expression is added, except only in those matters in which the Father and Son are distinguished according to opposite relations. For when the Lord says in Matt. 11:27: "No one knows the Son except the Father," it is not excluded that the Son knows Himself.

---

[5] Cf. Lamy, Le Concile tenu à Séleucie-Ctésiphon (Compte rendu du 3me Congrès scientifique internat. des Cathol., Bruxelles 1895, 2me section, p. 267 sqq.).

So therefore when it is said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, even if it were added that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not thereby be excluded, because insofar as it pertains to being the principle of the Holy Spirit, the Father and Son are not opposed, but only insofar as this one is the Father and that one is the Son" (S. Thom. 1, q. 36. a. 2 ad 1). Similarly already St. Cyril of Alexandria: "Many things are said to belong to the Father alone, although the Son does not lack all of them.... Therefore, the Son will nonetheless naturally be the same things as the Father, although some things are predicated of this one only. For all things that belong to the Father naturally and necessarily pass into the Word which proceeds from Him" (Thesaur. assert. 14: M 75, 238 sq.). Unless the Greeks admit this, they are necessarily Arians, because the Father is called the only God, the only powerful one, the only immortal one, etc. Régnon solves the objections of the Photians, La S. Trinité III b 268 ff.

The Greeks distinguish between ἐκπορεύεσθαι and προιέναι, but the Latins use only one word of proceeding. Hence if the Greeks say that neither in Scripture nor by the Holy Fathers is it taught that the Holy Spirit ἐκπορεύεσθαι (ἐκ, παρὰ) τοῦ υἱοῦ, and that the word ἐκπορεύεσθαι is referred by the Greek Fathers to that principle only which is without principle, i.e., to the Father (cf. Photius, De S. Spiritus mystagogia n. 5 91; M 102, 283 385), this is conceded by us. Likewise, nothing prevents them, if they wish, from reserving the two words αἰτία and αἴτιος to the Father as the principle not principiated. But on the other hand they ought not deny what even the Greek Fathers explicitly teach, that the Son is the fountain and principle (ἀρχήν) of the Holy Spirit, and that the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son is the same as that of the Son to the Father, and that the Holy Spirit is truly spirated by the Son (above n. 509 530, below n. 564). Moreover, they ought not blame the Latins for teaching that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son: for the word of proceeding among the Latins simply signifies a relation to another as principle, and states nothing about whether this principle is principiated or not principiated (cf. what I wrote in Theolog. Zeitfragen II 27 ff., and Schermann, Die Gottheit des Heiligen Geistes 61 69 ff. 100 113 ff. 185 ff. 221 ff. 240 ff.). Because the Pneumatomachi taught that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son alone (cf. Basil., Contra Eunom. 1. 3, c. 5; M 29. 665 et Eunomii liber apolog. n. 20 25: M 30, 855 862) and is created by Him (Denz. n. 58), it is understood why the Greek Fathers emphasized that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and is not a creature. Moreover, they also explicitly say that He proceeds from the Son. Πρόεισι καὶ ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ (Cyrill. Alex., Thesaur. assert. 34 1 75, 585). Το πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἡ παρ' ἀμφοτέρων (i. e. πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ. Epiphan., Ancorat. c. 67; M 43, 137. Cf. Haer. 74, n. 4: M 42, 480).

538. But if the Photians say that at least the words "and the Son" (Filioque) ought not to have been inserted into the symbol, whatever may be the case

concerning their truth, since the Synod of Ephesus defined in Act 6: "it is not permitted for anyone to produce or write or compose another faith besides that defined by the Holy Fathers who were gathered at Nicaea with the Holy Spirit" (Denz. n. 125), consequently the entire Western Church by that addition ceased to be the Church of Christ, just as if it had falsified Sacred Scripture—this appeal of the Photians to the law of the Ephesian Synod has been rightly called most deplorable by Dr. Laemmer (Scriptorum Graeciae orthod. biblioth. sel. I 54). To this objection made by the Greeks at the Council of Florence, Cardinal Bessarion, Archbishop of Nicaea, already responded that "supposing the truth of the dogma, it is ridiculous to think that it is not permitted to add truth to the symbol." But the Greeks, when they pertinaciously objected, according to the testimony of the same Bessarion, were so overcome that "having nothing to respond, they fell silent; for what could anyone impudently say against such great truth?" (De process. Spir. S., in ed. Arcudii ex anno 1670 187 et 207; vel M 161, 339 354.) Cf. Régnon l. c. 209 ff.

539. But the Ephesian decree can be considered either as a dogmatic statute or as a disciplinary statute. In the former way the sense is: nothing is permitted to be added or changed against or beside the revealed faith. And this was surely primarily the mind of the Ephesian Fathers, who on the occasion of a certain symbol being offered that taught the Nestorian heresy (Denz. n. 125) wished to prevent corruption of the Nicene symbol. In this sense that decree does not pertain to our matter; for we have demonstrated that the truth of the clause "and the Son" is contained in the sources of faith.

But if the decree is considered as a disciplinary statute, by it the right is taken away from individuals, whether bishops or priests or laymen, of composing new symbols for public use. But the right cannot at all be abrogated from the ecclesiastical magisterium itself of establishing new formulas of faith according to necessity and opportunity: for this right is intestinal to the Church and divinely conferred. Therefore, a later synod always has the power of interpreting symbols composed by prior synods and of inserting these explanations.

Therefore, the First Council of Constantinople already added to the words of the Nicene Council's symbol: "and in the Holy Spirit," these other words: "the Lord and life-giver, who proceeds from the Father, who with the Father and the Son is together adored and glorified, who spoke through the prophets" (Denz. n. 86). Hence when later the Ephesian Synod decreed that it is not permitted for anyone to profess another faith than the Nicene, the sense could by no means be that the Nicene symbol materially taken is the only legitimate formula of faith. Otherwise, the Ephesian Council would have condemned the Constantinopolitan Council, which no one would dare to say. Therefore, the interpretation of the Photians is false.

540. Moreover, the addition "and the Son" was first made in Spain, as is evident from various Spanish councils of the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries.

From there it passed into Gaul and thence into Germany (Denz. n. 86 nota) [6] . For a very long time the Roman Church resisted this addition to the symbol, not because it doubted the matter itself, for it had very often professed the dogma, but out of reverence for that symbol sanctioned from antiquity. Therefore, when Charlemagne requested approval of the addition from Leo III, the latter refused. Nevertheless, the custom later increasingly prevailed of retaining that addition, so that at the beginning of the eleventh century it had already been universally received. Moreover, in the Second Synod of Lyons and at Florence it was admitted by both Latins and Greeks (Denz, n. 460 691). St. Thomas clearly expounded this entire question in 1, q. 36, a. 2 ad 2 and De pot. q. 10, a. 4 ad 13, later Petavius 7, 2, in our times more fully Cardinal Franzelin, De Deo trino thes. 41 and in the booklet Contra Macarium Bulgakow sect. 3, p. 168 ff. Even certain distinguished Greek Doctors, such as Cardinal Bessarion and Beccus, Patriarch of Constantinople, and others notably refuted the difficulties of the Greeks, whose little works Peter Arcudius of Corcyra published: Opuscula aurea theologica, Romae 1670. and Hugo Laemmer: Scriptorum Graeciae orthod. biblioth. sel.

541. Scholium 2. On the different mode of speaking of the Greeks.

Just as the Latins usually say: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son," so among the Greeks the more common formula is: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son." The Photians want a different doctrine also to correspond to this different mode of speaking. But they err evidently. For first, both formulas are found both among Latins and among Greeks. Thus Tertullian: "I think the Spirit is from no other source than from the Father through the Son" (Contra Prax. c. 4: M 2, 159; cf. above n. 535). Hilary: "May I adore Thee our Father, Thy Son together with Thee, may I merit Thy Holy Spirit, who is from Thee through Thy Only-begotten" (De Trin. 1. 12, n. 57: M 10, 472). For the use of the other formula among the Greeks, Epiphanius is a sufficient witness, who often repeats: Το πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ (Ancorat. n. 8 9 11; M 43, 30 ff.). Likewise Cyril of Alexandria (above n. 537). Therefore, the Fathers considered that the same sense underlies both formulas.

542. Then the Greek Fathers explicitly declared what the particle "through" indicates, namely ἡ δι' οὗ φωνὴ ὁμολογίαν τῆς προκαταρκτικῆς αἰτίας ἔχει, i.e., if the Father is said to do something through the Son, it is indicated that He Himself is the first principle of that thing or the principle without principle (Basilius, De Spir. S. c. 8, n. 21; M 32, 106). Or, as St. John Chrysostom says: "If 'through Him' is said, this has been posited for no other cause than lest anyone suspect the Son to be unbegotten" (Hom. 5 in Io. n. 2; M 59, 56). Therefore, to indicate that the Father is the principle not principiated, but the Son the principle principiated, the Greeks say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father

[6] Cf. Karl Künstle, Antipriscilliana, Friburgi 1905, 67 sqq.

through the Son [7] . But the Latins, to express that both the Father and the Son are the true principle of the Holy Spirit, say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. By this formula the unity of the principle of spiration is directly signified, while the order of origin among the spirating persons is indicated indirectly through the names of Father and Son. But the Greek formula directly signifies the order of origin, while the unity of principle is contained in the signification of the subject, because the Father and Son are one God. The Latins also declared explicitly that they understand their formula in the same sense as the Greeks understand theirs. Thus St. Augustine, after he said that the Spirit proceeds principally from the Father, "therefore, he says, I added 'principally,' because the Holy Spirit is also found to proceed from the Son. But this too the Father gave to Him, not to one already existing and not yet having, but whatever He gave to the only-begotten Word, He gave by begetting. Thus therefore He begot Him, so that the common gift might also proceed from Him, and the Holy Spirit might be the Spirit of both" (De Trin. 15, 17: M 42, 1081). The Council of Florence speaks in the same way: "Declaring that what the Holy Doctors and Fathers say, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, tends to this understanding, that by this it is signified that the Son too is, according to the Greeks indeed the cause, according to the Latins the principle of the subsistence of the Holy Spirit, just as the Father also is. And since all things that are the Father's, the Father Himself gave to His only-begotten Son by begetting, except being the Father, this very thing, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, the Son Himself has eternally from the Father, from whom He also was eternally begotten" (Denz. n. 691. Cf. concerning this matter Bessarion, De process. Spir. S., apud Arcudium 320 ff.; M 161, 442 ff.).

543. With these things presupposed, it can easily be explained why St. Maximus and St. John Damascene deny that the Spirit proceeds from the Son and that the Son is the principle (αἰτίαν) of the Holy Spirit. For they wish to exclude from the Son the character of principal principle (αἰτίας προκαταρκτικῆς), but in other places they clearly propose the true doctrine. St. Thomas indeed thought that Damascene had an erroneous opinion on this matter (1, q. 36, a. 2 ad 3), but later theologians vindicate him from error, such as e.g. Franzelin th. 36, n. II, p. 536 ff., where he also expounds the doctrine of St. Maximus (cf. Régnon IIIb 193 ff. et I. Bilz, Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Johannes von Damaskus 154 ff.).

Proposition LXXV. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle. De Fide (Sum. 1, q. 37, a. 4).

---

[7] Concerning the use of prepositions per, ex, cum etc, in the doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity cf. Ruiz, De Trin. disp. 112.

544. Note: Certain Greeks hesitated to admit the Catholic doctrine because they thought that by the words "from the Father and the Son" two principles of the Holy Spirit were being established. For since the Holy Spirit is not produced from the divine nature, it seems that He proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are persons: but in this respect they are not one, but two. However, they failed to recognize that in supposita whose nature is one, there can also be one common property by which they are distinguished from a third supposit. This property common to the Father and the Son is called active spiration, from which the Holy Spirit proceeds as from one principle.

545. Arg. 1. From Sacred Scripture. Christ the Lord gives this reason why the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him: "All things whatsoever the Father has are mine" (Jn. 16:15). Therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, not according to that by which they are distinguished among themselves, but according to that by which they have numerically the same perfection: which is the same as proceeding from them as they are one principle.

546. Arg. 2. From the Fathers and theologians. St. Augustine: "Just as the Father and the Son are one God and relatively to creation one creator and one lord, so relatively to the Holy Spirit they are one principle" (De Trin. 5, 14; M 42, 921). St. Anselm: "Just as we do not believe the Holy Spirit to be from that whereby the Father and Son are two, but from that in which they are one, so we do not say there are two principles of Him, but one principle" (De process. Spir. S. c. 18; M 158, 311). The scholastics agree In 1, dist. 12, or In 1, q. 36. a. 4.

Only Durandus (In 1, dist. 29, q. 2) and Gregory of Rimini (In 1, dist. 12, q. 1) depart from this doctrine, who think that properly the Father and Son are two principles, though they can be called one principle in a less proper sense. Ockham and Biel, however, think they can be called one or two principles under different respects. Most commonly, however, theologians hold that the Father and Son should be said simply to be one principle, and that this locution is entirely proper. Thus, for example, Bañez: "Durandus's statement is rash; and Gregory's assertion is dangerous to the faith, not to say erroneous" (In 1, q. 36, a. 4). Ruiz says the same (disp. 70, sect. 1, n. 14) and almost all recent theologians.

547. Arg. 3. From councils. Council of Lyon II (1274): "With faithful and devout profession we confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles, but as from one principle, not by two spirations, but by one spiration... With the approval of this sacred council we condemn and reprobate all who presume to deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son; or who also with rash boldness assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles, and not as from one" (Denz. n. 460). The Council of Florence repeated this definition

in the decree of union (Denz. n. 691) and Eugene IV in the bull Cantate Domino (Denz. n. 704).

548. Arg. 4. Explanation. The name "principle" is a substantive name. But substantive names are not multiplied unless both the supposita and the formal reason which they signify are multiplied. Thus the name "God," because it signifies the divine essence, is not multiplied, because the divine essence is not multiplied, nor are there three gods, but one God. Similarly the name "redeemer" is not multiplied in Christ, because it signifies the person, which is one in Christ. But that form which the name "principle" signifies, when the Father and Son are said to be the principle of the Holy Spirit, or the spirative power, is not twofold in the Father and Son, but one. Therefore truly and properly the Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, not many. Just as therefore the name "God" indeed signifies one divine essence, but supposes for three persons, so the name "principle of the Holy Spirit," although it supposes for two persons, nevertheless signifies one spirative power. Therefore the name "principle" is rightly predicated not only of the Father and Son collectively, but also divisively, because this name signifies determinately, but supposes indeterminately, either for two persons or for one person (cf. below n. 603 note).

549. From these things all other locutions pertaining to this matter must be judged. Whatever names are used as adjectives can be said in the plural number, as: "The Father and Son are two spirating"; but those which are used as substantives cannot be said in the plural number, as: "The Father and Son are two spirators." For adjective names have number according to supposita, but substantives from themselves according to the form signified. But what Hilary says (De Trin. 2, 29; M 10, 69): "The Holy Spirit must be confessed with the Father and Son as authors," must be explained as placing a substantive for an adjective (S. Thom. 1, q. 36, a. 4 ad 7), just as sometimes adjectives are placed for substantives, as if one says there are not three immense ones, but one immense.

550. Furthermore, the Father as generating and the Father as spirating are not two principles, because multiplication of substantive names requires multiplication of supposita. Thus man is not a double principle, although he has intellect and will. Nor are the Father as generating and the Son as spirating two principles, because multiplication of form is lacking. Nor should it be said that active spiration is some supposit really one, common to the Father and Son, because a common supposit is a contradiction in terms, but from the divine essence and the two supposita of the Father and Son through active spiration as through a form there is constituted something singular, really one, which is one principle of the Holy Spirit. But it is singular really identified with two really distinct ones, just as one God is singular, really identified with three really distinct supposita (Ruiz disp. 70, sect. 3, n. 11).

551. But because the divine persons are not constituted formally as principle of the Holy Spirit except through the relation of spiration, properly the Father and Son cannot be said to be a double principle quod of the Holy Spirit, unless the name "principle" is taken merely materially. But since this name per se signifies form, one must stand by ecclesiastical usage and simply say that the Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. Hence if anyone were to say that the Father and Son are two principles quae of the Holy Spirit, he would be saying in the strict sense of the words: that the Father and Son are two persons, who formally, as they are two, would spirate the Holy Spirit, which is not true, since they spirate formally according to that in which they are one. Therefore no distinction should be introduced regarding unity or multiplicity between principium quod and principium quo, because the form by which the persons are principle is only one, just as also the form by which the three Persons are God is one; and therefore the three Persons are one God.

552. Corollary. From what has been said it is clear what should be answered to the question: whether the Holy Spirit proceeds more principally from the Father than from the Son. If by these words it is asked whether He proceeds earlier or more perfectly or more fully from the Father or less principally from the Son, the answer must be plainly negative, because where there is numerically one power and spirative operation, the foundation for comparison and excess of one over the other is lacking. But it can be said simply that the Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father to signify not inequality of principle, but the order of origin between the Father and the Son (S. Thom. 1, q. 36. a. 3 ad 1). Therefore it is rightly said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father immediately and mediately, in much the same way as in a chain of three rings inserted into each other the first ring is joined both immediately to the third and mediately through the second.

Proposition LXXVI. It is rightly inferred: The Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son; therefore He proceeds from the Son. Common opinion (Sum. 1, q. 36, a. 2).

553. Note: If it is established that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, it is also established that He proceeds from the Son by absolute necessity. For nothing in God is accidental or contingent. Hence if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not exist at all, because He would not be what He is, or would not be God. Therefore to pose the question: whether in the ontological order the Holy Spirit would be what He is unless He proceeded from the Son, is to pose a question absolutely useless and idle.

The question therefore is only whether before our intellect this logical inference is valid: The Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son; therefore He proceeds from Him. The Photians deny this, but Catholics along with the most

common opinion of the scholastics strenuously defended this inference in the Council of Florence. Scotus however (In 1, dist. 11, q. 2) and certain of his disciples think this inference cannot be defended by solid reasons, which opinion other theologians subject to more or less grave censures (cf. Ruiz disp. 68, sect. 5. n. 5).

554. Arg. 1. In the divine all things are one, where opposition of relation does not stand in the way. But if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, opposition of relation would not stand in the way between them. Therefore the Holy Spirit, unless He proceeded from the Son, would not be distinguished from the Son.

555. To the major. This major premise is admitted by all and is clearly taught by the Holy Fathers and councils, as for example by St. Gregory Nazianzen: "The difference of relation produces their mutual difference and appellation" (Orat. 31, n. 9: M 36, 142). St. Augustine: "We have said elsewhere that those things are said properly in that Trinity to belong distinctly to individual persons, which are said relatively to each other, like Father and Son and the Holy Spirit who is the gift of both" (De Trin. 1. 8, n. 1; M 42, 947). Ruiz reports many other sayings of the Fathers (disp. 9, sect. 5). The eleventh Council of Toledo (675) teaches the same: "In the relation of persons number is perceived. Therefore in this alone they suggest number, in what they are to each other, and in this they lack number, in what they are to themselves" (Denz. n. 280). The same Council of Florence: "And all things are one, where opposition of relation does not stand in the way" (Denz. n. 703). The same is clear from reason, because if the divine persons differed by some absolute perfection, not all three would be one true God (cf. below n. 593).

556. To the minor. Since by natural light we know nothing about real relations in the divine, but must learn everything in this matter from divine revelation, it must be said that the only internal reason known to us why the divine persons are really opposed among themselves is the origin of one from another. For revelation teaches this unique reason. Therefore we say that the Father and Son are really opposed because the Son proceeds from, is sent by, is generated by the Father. Therefore where in the divine there is no relation of origin, there is no reason for assigning real opposition. Hence the Holy Fathers emphasize that this alone is the reason for distinction. Thus St. Gregory of Nyssa: "We who confess the [divine] nature to be without difference, nevertheless do not deny the difference according to principle and principled (τὴν κατὰ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ αἰτιατὸν διαφορὰν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα), in which alone we admit one to be distinguished from another, in that we believe one to be the principle, the other from the principle" (Quod non sunt tres dii; M 45, 134). "Apart from the reason of principle the Holy Trinity admits no difference in any respect to itself" (Ὥστε τοῦ λόγου τῆς αἰτίας ὑπεξηρημένου ἐν μηδενὶ τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα πρὸς ἑαυτὴν

ἀσυμφώνως ἔχειν). (Contra Eum. 1. 1 in fine: M 45, 463.) Bessarion appeals to the former text of Gregory in the Council of Florence (Oratio dogmatica pro unione c. 6; M 161, 578) and thus concludes: "But I do not know whether anyone will find any other relation of the Son and Holy Spirit to each other besides that which is according to cause and caused, according to which the Son indeed relates to the Spirit as cause, but the Spirit conversely to the Son as caused to cause and therefore in different ways. Or let someone show me another relation between the Son and Holy Spirit, according to which one is referred to the other. But he will certainly never find one." John, the theologian of the Latins, also appealed to the doctrine of the Fathers in the Council of Florence: "It is according to Doctors both Greek and Latin that relation alone multiplies persons in divine productions, which is called the relation of origin, to which only two things pertain: from whom another and who from another" (sess. 18: Hardouin IX 203 sq. Denz. n. 703 nota).

557. Arg. 2. From refutation of Scotus's reasons. Scotus first argues thus: "By whatever something is formally constituted in being, by the same it is distinguished, because by the same something is being and one. But the Son is constituted in personal being by filiation. Therefore He is also formally distinguished by it from every other person."

Response: I deny the assumption that the Holy Spirit can be conceived by us as distinct from the Son unless He proceeded from Him. For He would agree with the Son both in absolutes and in relatives, or would be plainly the same person as the Son. Hence if we think nothing of the Son except filiation, we do not yet conceive the Son as distinct from the Holy Spirit, unless we simultaneously think that this filiation is also active spiration by identity. Therefore, although I cannot think of the Son except as a person, I can nevertheless think of the Son as indistinct from the Holy Spirit, as long as I have nothing from which I can prove that the Son is not the Holy Spirit Himself. But we have nothing of this sort except the relation of origin. Therefore only when this is conceived do I conceive the Son and Holy Spirit as two distinct persons.

Hence Scotus's argument can be distinguished thus: By what something is formally constituted in absolute being, by the same it is distinguished, I concede the major. By what it is constituted in relative being, I subdivide the major: It is distinguished from that to which it has a relation, I concede the major; from that to which it has no relation, I deny the major. And I distinguish the minor: The Son is constituted in personal being by filiation relative to the Father, I concede the minor; relative to the Holy Spirit, I deny the minor. And I deny the consequent.

558. Scotus confirms his reason, because if the Father did not spirate, but the Son alone, nevertheless the Holy Spirit would be distinguished from the Father. Therefore by parity of reasoning. But the parity must be denied, because

in that supposition the Holy Spirit would proceed mediately from the Father, which would suffice for us to conceive the distinction; but in the other hypothesis He would in no way proceed from the Son.

559. Secondly Scotus argues: "Generation is distinguished from spiration. Therefore [even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the distinction of the Son and Holy Spirit would stand]. Proof of the consequent: Because it is impossible for one person to receive being by two total productions; for by no production does anything receive being such that, if that production were circumscribed per impossibile, it would receive being any the less."

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: Generation is distinguished from spiration, if a relation of origin intervenes between them, I concede the antecedent; otherwise I deny the antecedent. For active generation and active spiration are not really distinguished, because one does not proceed from the other. Therefore the same holds for passive generation and spiration. To the proof of the consequent: If these productions are really distinct, I grant the assertion; if they are really one and the same, I deny the assertion. Just as therefore those two active productions are one thing, so by Scotus's principle it cannot be proved in any way that the corresponding passive processions are not one thing.

But if Scotus says that generation and spiration are at least disparate relations, although they are not opposite relations, and that this suffices for distinction, it must be answered that they are disparate relations either in reality or in reason, but real relations must be shown, which Scotus cannot show by this reasoning. For all real relations are divided into two classes, one of which contains relations of difference, the other relations of connection. But only this latter class of relations, which is founded on the notion of principle and principled, is acknowledged by the Holy Fathers as distinctive of the divine persons. For this class contains those which are said "relatively to each other" (Augustine). But such are not those relations which they call disparate, and therefore they reside in one and the same and do not bring about distinction of persons (Petavius, De Deo 7, 9, 5).

560. However, it is another matter that it can be shown from the disparate relation to intellect and will that he who proceeds from the will must also necessarily proceed from the Word, which argument some admit (Bañez, In 1, q. 36, a. 2 ad arg. Scoti 4. Ruiz l. c. disp. 68, sect. 6). This certainly is not against our proposition, because thus first the relation of origin is proved and from this the distinction of persons. For if it is established that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the will, after the Word has already proceeded from the intellect by priority of reason, by that very fact it is established that the Spirit also proceeds from the Word, because to this the Father has already communicated all things except active generation. Thus perhaps some Doctors can be understood, who seem to derive the distinction of the Son and Holy Spirit from a different manner of

proceeding, like St. Anselm: "When one is born, that one cannot be born with him who is other than him through this, because he is not born similarly, but proceeds... For even if the Son and Holy Spirit were not many through anything else, through this alone they would be different" (De Spir. S. c. 4: M 158, 292). Since Anselm expressly establishes that in the divine "all things are one, where some opposition of relation does not stand in the way" (ib. c. 2; M 158, 288), surely for him both reasons for distinction are one and the same. For from diverse origin opposite relation is causally inferred, but from opposite relation these origins formally have that they differ among themselves (cf. S. Thom. 1, q. 27, a. 3: q. 36, a. 2 ad 7; De potentia q. 10, a. 5). But other Holy Fathers, presupposing the distinction of the Son and Holy Spirit already established, want only to explain why the Holy Spirit cannot be called Son, and they explain this from the difference of origin, like St. Augustine (De Trin. 5, 14; M 42, 920). Concerning this matter cf. Franzelin, De Deo Trino thes. 40, 596 sqq.

Proposition LXXVII. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son through the will. Theologically certain (Sum. 1. q. 27, a. 3; q. 36, a. 1: q. 87. a. 1.2)

561. Note: This doctrine is not as expressly enunciated in Sacred Scripture as is the intellectual generation of the Word. Nevertheless, there are present those indications by which, with the help of tradition, we can prove that the matter is certain. Therefore, our proposition is established not by reason alone, but by positive arguments, without which speculative arguments in this matter are not of great moment. All arguments, however, can be conveniently deduced from consideration of the more proper names by which the third divine person is called as distinct from the Father and the Son.

562. Argument 1. The name "Holy Spirit" indicates procession from the will. This name is indeed very indeterminate in itself and can equally be applied to the Father and the Son; but because the origin of the third person has no analogy with created substantial productions, and consequently there is no name present which signifies as determinately per se as does the name "generation," therefore a more indeterminate name was chosen to signify the origin of the third person, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, as breath from a living being, Spirit Spirated. This name, therefore, is by usage a relative name and signifies him who has been produced by spiration from a formally holy principle, so that he himself is holiness spirated (Denz. n. 691 1084).

Now the very name of spiration in a purely spiritual nature, by opposition to intellection, can signify nothing except an act of the will. There is, moreover, a certain congruity in this name, insofar as the name "spirit" in corporeal things signifies a certain impulse and motive force. In spiritual things, however, the

motive force is in the will. Therefore, the word "spirit" very often, even among profane writers, signifies movements of the will: fortitude, audacity, magnanimity, pride... One is said to breathe love, hatred... Similarly, in Sacred Scripture, in very many places "spirit" is used for the principle moving the will (Judg. 14:6; 1 Kings 16:14; Ezek. 1:12; John 3:8; Rom. 8:14). Fittingly, therefore, the divine person is called Spirit, because he proceeds from the will (cf. S. Thomas 1. q. 36).

563. Much more clearly the relation to the will appears from the adjective "Holy." When this name is understood relatively, the procession from a holy principle is declared. Holiness, however, is in the will, just as wisdom is in the intellect. Just as, therefore, the Son is called Wisdom because he proceeds from the intellect, so the Spirit is called Holy because he proceeds from the will.

This is the reason why in Sacred Scripture works of sanctification are especially attributed to the Holy Spirit. For although these works proceed from all three persons, nevertheless they have a special likeness with the personal character of the Holy Spirit and therefore are attributed to him to manifest his personal property (cf. below n. 639). "The love of God is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us" (Rom. 5:5). "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace..." (Gal. 5:22). "All these [charisms] are the work of one and the same Spirit, distributing to each as he wills" (1 Cor. 12:11). "You have been sealed with the promised Holy Spirit" (Eph. 1:13). Christ by breathing gives the apostles the Spirit for sanctifying men (John 20:22). Cf. many other passages in Franzelin thes. 26, p. 399 ff.

564. Similarly, the Holy Fathers, both in proper words and in metaphors, describe the Holy Spirit as substantial sanctity and goodness. St. Augustine: "When the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy, nevertheless he is properly called Holy Spirit, as if he were the substantial and consubstantial holiness of both" (De civ. Dei 11, 24; M-41, 338). St. Basil calls the Holy Spirit "natural goodness and essential sanctity" (De Spir. S. c. 18, n. 47: M 32, 154), who, "since he is essentially holy, is called the fountain of sanctity" (Ep. 8, n. 10; M 32, 269). Gregory Nazianzen calls him αὐτοαγιότητα [auto-holiness] (Or. 25, n. 16: M 35, 1221). St. Athanasius describes the same with many metaphors. After he said: "The Spirit both is and is called the Spirit of sanctity and renewal, not sanctified by another nor made participant of sanctity, but in whose participation all creatures are sanctified," thus he calls him: "He is called and is the same unction... Ointment indeed retains sweetness and odor from perfumes, sharing in which, those who are anointed say: 'We are the good odor of Christ.' The seal, however, preserves the image of Christ who seals" (Ep. 1 ad Serap. n. 22-23; M 26, 582-583). "This ointment is the breath of the Son, the good odor and form of the Son" (Ep. 3, n. 3; M 26, 627). According to Cyril of Alexandria, the Spirit is from the Son, just as sweetness from honey, heat from fire, coolness from water. Therefore, he is not holy by participation or

composition, but is sanctifying by essence and nature (Thesaur, ass. 34: M 75, 594 ff.). Therefore, although the Holy Fathers do not explicitly conclude that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the will, nevertheless their doctrine provides the foundation for this conclusion.

565. This is the common doctrine of the Scholastics. Let St. Bonaventure be heard, for example: "To breathe in spiritual things belongs to love alone; and since love can be breathed rightly and orderly, and thus is pure, therefore that person who is love is called not only Spirit, but Holy Spirit. The Son is not thus called Holy Spirit, because generation is a natural motion, concerning which holiness or purity is not considered, as it is considered concerning the love of the will" (In 1, dist. 10. q. 3).

The Roman Catechism teaches the same: "Although the works of the most holy Trinity, which are done externally, are common to the three persons, nevertheless many of these are attributed as proper to the Holy Spirit, so that we may understand that they proceed to us from God's immense charity; for since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the divine will as if inflamed with love, it can be perceived that those effects which are properly referred to the Holy Spirit arise from God's supreme love toward us" (P. 1, c. 9, n. 7-8).

Finally, nothing is better known than that works of sanctification are attributed to the Holy Spirit by the Christian people, just as works of creation to the Father and of redemption to the Son, which manner of speaking has descended to us from the times of Origen.

566. Argument 2. Why the Holy Spirit is called love or charity or dilection, after what has been said, scarcely needs explanation. This name is indeed not directly attributed to the Holy Spirit as proper in Sacred Scripture, although St. Augustine (De Trin. 15, 17: M 42, 1079) thinks that "God is love" (1 John 4:8) was said of the Holy Spirit, but rather it was deduced by the Fathers from Scripture, because Scripture attributes works of charity to the Holy Spirit. For the rest, the matter is so well known that there is scarcely need to collect many testimonies. Gregory the Great presents as an axiom: "The Holy Spirit himself is love" (Hom. in evang. 30, n. 1: M 76, 1220). The Church sings in a hymn: "Living fountain, fire, charity." The Council of Toledo XI says of the Holy Spirit: "He is acknowledged to be the charity or holiness of both" (Denz. n. 277). St. Augustine has long treatises on this name (De Trin. 6, 5: 9, 10; 14, 7 ff.: 15, 17: M 42, 927-968; 1042 ff.; 1079).

567. It should be noted, however, that the word "love" signifies not only the act of loving but also the remaining term which is produced in the lover, although this term does not have its own name which formally signifies the relation of what is produced, just as the name "word" signifies relation to the act of intellection. Therefore, love can indeed be predicated of all persons, in which it differs from the name Word; nevertheless, the word "love" is apt for signifying

the relation of a term produced by the will, and according to this signification the name "love" is proper to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, in this way the name "love" relates to the third person just as the name "wisdom" to the second, because each by usage signifies the relation of what proceeds. To love or to cherish is also said notionally just like to generate. The term, however, which proceeds as love from dilection, must proceed through the will (S. Thom. 1. q. 37, a. 1).

568. Argument 3. Another name of the Holy Spirit is "gift." He is thus called twice in Sacred Scripture (Acts 2:38 and 8:20). The same can be gathered from John 4:10, compared with 7:39. This word is also found in the liturgy, as in the hymn: "Gift of God Most High." The Holy Spirit is not called gift only because he was given in time, in which sense the Son is also a gift, but because from eternity he is gift by personal property. For gift is said of what is given gratuitously or from love, and love itself has the nature of the first gift, through which all gratuitous things are given. Because, therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from love, he is gift, not as actually given, but as specially apt to be given. St. Augustine explains this name of gift especially in De Trin. 5, 11 ff.; in another place he says briefly: "And yet not without reason in this Trinity the Word of God is called only the Son, and the Gift of God only the Holy Spirit" (15, 17, 29; M 42, 1081). Already before him St. Hilary: "He commanded to baptize in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, in confession both of the Author and of the Only-begotten and of the Gift. There is one Author of all things. For there is one God the Father, from whom are all things; and one Only-begotten, our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things; and one Spirit, Gift in all things. All things, therefore, are ordered by their proper powers and merits: one power, from which are all things; one offspring, through which are all things: one gift of perfect hope. Nor will anything be found lacking to so great a consummation, within which there is in Father and Son and Holy Spirit infinity in the eternal, form in the image, use in the gift" (De Trin. 2, 1; M 10, 50). See other Fathers and subtle explanations of this name in Ruiz disp. 75.

569. Our entire proposition can be briefly confirmed by reason thus: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the will, because besides the will there is no other immanent operation except intellection, from which the Word proceeds, and because no other operation from innate order presupposes intellection, just as the procession of the Holy Spirit presupposes, except volition.

570. Scholium 1. Whether the Father and Son love by the Holy Spirit.

The same must be answered as in Proposition LXXII, Scholium 2: The Holy Spirit is not the formal cause by which the Father and Son are constituted as loving, but he is the term without which divine love cannot exist: whence from

the absence of the Holy Spirit the absence of essential love would rightly be concluded: the Holy Fathers use this argument against the Arians.

Because, moreover, the word "to love" can have notional signification, in which sense we are not accustomed to use the word "to understand," therefore it can more easily be said: "The Father and Son love by the Holy Spirit," than "The Father understands by the Word." For the sense of that proposition can be: The Father and Son by loving produce the Holy Spirit; but "to understand" does not signify production, since in this sense the verb "to speak" is rather used: "The Father speaks by the Word." Just as, therefore, a tree is said to flower with flowers, so the Father is said to speak by the Word or Son himself and creation; and the Father and Son are said to love by the Holy Spirit or proceeding love themselves and us" (S. Thom. 1, q. 37, a. 2).

571. Scholium 2. By love of what things the Holy Spirit proceeds.

If this question is understood thus: What is loved by absolute necessity in that act by which the Holy Spirit is produced? it must be answered: all those things are loved which God necessarily loves, i.e., the divine essence, attributes, divine persons, possibles, insofar as these can be loved. But if it is asked: What actually is the object of love in that act by which the Holy Spirit is produced? creatures must be added, because the Father and Son loving themselves love whatever they love. Just as the Father speaks himself and every creature by the Word which he begot, insofar as the begotten Word sufficiently represents the Father and every creature, so he loves himself and every creature by the Holy Spirit, insofar as the Holy Spirit proceeds as love of primary goodness, according to which the Father loves himself and every creature. And thus it is also clear that a relation is imported to creation both in the Word and in the proceeding Love quasi-secondarily, insofar as divine truth and goodness is the principle of understanding and loving every creature (S. Thom. 1, q. 37, a. 2 ad 3). Cf. above n. 524 ff.

572. Scholium 3. It remains to explain briefly the various names by which the Holy Spirit is named.

First, he is called the Spirit of truth (John 14:17; 15:26), both because he proceeds from truth, i.e., from the Word, and because he is sent to announce truth, and because he is the substantial love of truth and induces men to love truth and thus is opposed to the lying spirit of the world. The announcement of revealed truth is especially attributed to him, because this is a work of great charity. For we reveal our secrets to no one except him whom we love. Therefore Christ says: "No longer do I call you servants, because the servant does not know what his master does. But I have called you friends, because all things that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you" (John 15:15). Therefore, the gift of wisdom coheres intimately with charity. For it consists in rectitude of

judgment according to divine reasons. To have this rectitude by way of habit presupposes a certain connaturality with those things about which judgment is to be made. Such connaturality or compassion (sympathy) with divine things comes through charity. For divine truth has savor only for one who loves God. Therefore, the Holy Spirit makes man wise by giving both facility for judging rightly in the intellect and inclination for judging rightly in the will (S. Thom. 2, 2. q. 45, a. 2). Thus wisdom, insofar as it is intimately connected with charity, can in a special way be referred to the Holy Spirit, insofar as he is the principle of all sanctity: and perhaps in this sense certain Holy Fathers call the Holy Spirit Wisdom (Irenaeus, Theophilus of Antioch, Tertullian). But this manner of speaking was abandoned when the name of Wisdom was reserved to the second person.

573. Not infrequently the Holy Spirit is called by the Holy Fathers the union or bond or link of the Father and the Son. For because he is love, proceeding from the mutual love of the Father and the Son, through him the Father is in the Son and the Son is in the Father as the lover in the beloved. Concerning which St. Augustine says: "Whether [the Holy Spirit] be the unity of both or holiness or charity, or therefore unity because charity, and therefore charity because holiness, it is manifest that he is not one of the two by whom each is joined, by whom the begotten is loved by the begetter and loves his generator in return" (De Trin. 6, 5; M 42, 928). Cf. S. Thom., In 1, dist. 10, q. 1, a. 3.

To the same sense is reduced what St. Bernard calls the Holy Spirit a kiss. "Indeed, if the Father is rightly received as kissing, the Son as kissed, it will not be inappropriate to understand the Holy Spirit as the kiss, as one who is the imperturbable peace of Father and Son, firm glue, individual love, indivisible unity" (In Cant. serm. 8, n. 2; M 183, 811). How the metaphor of fire is to be explained need not be expounded, nor why the Holy Spirit appeared in the figure of fire.

574. The Holy Spirit is called water, because he washes the soul and quenches its thirst, and living fountain, from which abundant waters of graces flow forth. "Whoever drinks of the water that I will give him will never thirst, but it will become in him a fountain of water springing up to eternal life" (John 4:13-14). "He who believes in me, as the Scripture has said, out of his heart will flow rivers of living water. Now this he said about the Spirit, whom those who believed in him were to receive" (John 7:38-39). Cf. Cyril of Jerusalem, catech. 16, n. 12; M 33, 934.

575. He is called the Power of God, because God works graces through him. "Stay in the city until you are clothed with power from on high" (Luke 24:49). "For the Holy Spirit is a certain natural and living force and, so to speak, a quality of the deity of the Son" (Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaur. ass. 34; M 75, 603).

576. Because God works marvels through the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit is called the finger of God, which name is gathered from comparison of Matthew

12:28 with Luke 11:20. On this latter text the same Cyril notes: "He here calls the Holy Spirit the finger of God, who in a certain way arises from the divine essence and naturally depends on it, just as a finger from the human hand. For the Scriptures call the Son the arm and right hand of God... Just as, therefore, the arm is naturally fitted to the whole body and works all things that please the mind, and is accustomed to join using the finger, so also let us think of the Word of God as naturally fitted, so to speak, and emanating from him and in him; but in the Son the Spirit proceeds naturally and essentially from the Father, through whom anointing all things he sanctifies" (1. c. col. 575 ff.). Therefore, the name "finger" signifies consubstantiality, procession from the Father through the Son, operating power.

577. The Holy Spirit is called seal and ointment (cf. above n. 564), because he sanctifies and in a certain way deifies the just and thus renews them to the image of God and pristine splendor. Concerning which more will be said later (n. 662 ff.). Concerning other names see Ruiz disp. 76.

ARTICLE III.
A COMPARISON OF THE PROCESSIONS OF THE SON AND THE HOLY SPIRIT

Proposition LXXVIII. The Holy Spirit is not the Son, nor is His procession generation. A matter of faith (Sum. 1, q. 27, a. 4).

578. Note: In this Proposition two things must be distinguished: a) that the Spirit is not generated nor is He the Son, which is a matter of faith; b) what is the reason for this difference between the second and third Person, concerning which nothing is established from faith and various opinions are circulated.

I.

579. The Holy Spirit is not the Son nor generated. For He is never called by these names in Scripture. Indeed, since the Son is called the only-begotten, another generation is excluded. For we have learned in the tradition of faith that there is one only-begotten, but that the Spirit of truth proceeds from the Father (Basil., Ep. 125, n. 3; M 32, 550). "Nowhere in Sacred Scripture is the Spirit called Son... but the Son is called the Son of the Father and the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Father, and thus there is one divinity and faith of the Trinity" (Athan., Ep. 1 ad Serap. n. 16: M 26, 570). The Fathers often inculcate this doctrine and reject the contrary manner of speaking as impious. This faith is proposed in the symbols, where we not only confess the only-begotten, but where it is also explicitly declared that the Holy Spirit "from the Father and Son is not made nor

created nor begotten, but proceeding" (Denz. n. 39). The same has been established many times (Denz. n. 19 277).

This can also be persuaded by the fact that two processions of the same nature in God seem to be impossible, because a single procession, on account of its infinity, exhausts the entire productive power of God which is of the same nature. Thus to the generative power there can correspond only one generated.

II.

580. The Holy Fathers warn that the reason for the difference between the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit should not be investigated too curiously (for the sayings of the Fathers see Petav. 7, 13, and Ruiz disp. 5, sect. 1). But it must be noted why they prohibited such investigations, namely to repress the perversity of heretics who were unwilling to believe unless it was evidently shown to them why the Holy Spirit, although proceeding, was nevertheless not begotten. For thus writes St. Athanasius: Those [Arian heretics] continue to oppose the truth, like scribes, no longer from the Scriptures (since they find nothing there), but belching forth from the abundance of their own heart, they say again: If the Spirit is not a created thing nor one of the angels, but proceeds from the Father, therefore He too is the Son... For how is it that, if He is from the Father, He is not said both to be generated and to be the Son, but simply the Holy Spirit? These most shameful men cavil at this, who attempt to scrutinize too curiously the depths of God, which no one knows except the Spirit of God, whom they themselves slander (Ep. 1 ad Serap. n. 15; M 26, 566). But the Fathers by no means forbid first believing and then seeking understanding of the faith. "Certainly, when they have believed unshakably in the Holy Scriptures as most truthful witnesses, let them act by praying and seeking and living well, so that they may understand, that is, so that, as much as can be seen, what is held by faith may be seen by the mind. Who would prohibit this, or rather who would not exhort to this?" Thus St. Augustine concerning this very question (De Trin. 15, 27, 49; M 42, 1096).

III.

581. After other reasons were attempted, finally St. Augustine places the reason for the distinction in this: that the Son proceeds from the intellect, but the Holy Spirit from the will: "Therefore a certain distinction of nativity and procession is suggested in this intelligible matter, since it is not the same thing to perceive by thought as to desire or even to enjoy by will, as he who is able discerns and distinguishes" (De Trin. 15, 27, 50; M 42, 1097). The ancient scholastics followed this reasoning. Thus St. Thomas: "It remains that the divine processions are distinguished according to that from which they have their

specification.... And therefore some have said that the divine processions are distinguished by their principles. According to this I say that one procession is by way of nature or intellect, the other by way of will" (De pot. q. 10, a. 2). Likewise Scotus (In 1, dist. 10, q. 1), St. Bonaventure (ib.), and many others. But certainly everyone will agree with St. Thomas saying: "If anyone considers diligently, he can easily see that this does not suffice for the distinction of the divine processions, unless something else is added" (1. c.), namely it must be added why he who proceeds from the will is not generated, but only he who proceeds from the intellect.

IV.

582. Therefore if we compare in the divine the procession from the will with the procession from the intellect, we immediately perceive that there must necessarily exist a threefold difference between them:

a) The Holy Spirit, by the fact that He proceeds from the will, necessarily proceeds from two. For the Father cannot will before He has understood, nor can He understand without producing the Son and communicating with Him the power of breathing; therefore the Holy Spirit necessarily proceeds from two.

583. b) The Holy Spirit does not receive fecundity for producing another person. For just as the act of the will necessarily follows the act of the intellect, and therefore the Word produced from the intellect is necessarily fecund for producing love, so after the act of the will there can be no further immanent action, and therefore he who proceeds from the will cannot be immanently productive. By this very fact the second person has greater similarity with the first person than the third has.

584. c) The Holy Spirit, because He proceeds as love, is not by the formal reason of His procession similar to His principle, as the Word is, but only because the divine essence is communicated. For no one would say that love as love is a formal representation of the thing loved, as a word is of the thing understood. Love does not make similarity, but presupposes it.

These are the differences that exist between these two processions. Therefore either in all of these or in one of them is the reason why the Spirit is not the Son. And most commonly theologians insist only on the third difference. For this is the difference between intellect and will: that the intellect becomes actual by this, that the thing understood is in the intellect according to its similarity; but the will becomes actual not by this, that some similarity of the thing willed is in the will, but from this, that the will has a certain inclination toward the thing willed. Therefore the procession which is considered according to the nature of the intellect is according to the nature of similarity; and to that extent it can have the nature of generation, because everything that generates generates something like itself. But the procession which is considered according

to the nature of the will is not considered according to the nature of similarity but rather according to the nature of impelling and moving toward something. And therefore what proceeds in the divine by way of love does not proceed as begotten or as Son, but rather proceeds as Spirit, by which name a certain vital motion and impulse is designated, insofar as someone is said to be moved or impelled by love to do something (S. Thom. 1, q. 27, a. 4). This reason, which St. Augustine already proposed (De Trin. 15, 27, 50; M 42, 1096), has its foundation in Sacred Scripture, which attributes the nature of image to the Son alone (above n. 520), which cannot be explained otherwise than because the Son by virtue of His procession is formally similar to the Father. The same reasoning is found among many Holy Fathers, such as St. Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen, Basil, Epiphanius, Cyril of Alexandria, etc. (in Ruiz disp. 6), likewise among the scholastics: Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Scotus, among the Thomists and most commonly among all others.

585. It should be noted, however, that although the most formal reason of similarity by virtue of production is not generally attended to by men when they name someone Son, this does not harm this exposition. For from revelation our concept of generation has been refined in the same way as the concept of hypostasis. Because in created things, wherever a living thing is produced by a living thing in a vital manner, generation is present, it could never have come into the minds of men to doubt whether there could also be vital production which would not be generation, but this consideration arose from the doctrine of faith. [8]

586. The second reason is not so commonly admitted by theologians: that the person of the Holy Spirit is less similar to the person of the Father than the person of the Son, because the Holy Spirit is not fecund. This reason is admitted and extensively expounded by Richard of St. Victor (De Trin. 6, 11 et 18 sqq.; M 196, 975 982-985). Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure (In 1, dist. 31, a. 1, q. 2), and others follow him. Let us hear Alexander of Hales: "Every image is a likeness... In the divine [likeness] is determined as to nature simply and by reason of nature. For the Son is a being from the Father, sharing with the Father in nature and by reason of nature, that is, by the notion by which they are one principle of the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit has unity with the Father in essence, but not in the common notion by which another person is produced by them. Because therefore

[8] Suarez endeavors to explain the same reasoning in another way thus (De Trin. 11, 5, 16): The divine nature most formally is actual intellection. But under this precisely most formal notion it is communicated with the second person, because this one proceeds as Wisdom from the intellect. Therefore the Word by virtue of procession most formally has the divine nature, but not the Holy Spirit, because love from its formal reasoning is something consequent to intellection and therefore to the divine nature most formally taken, and therefore the Holy Spirit by virtue of procession is not formally produced in the likeness of nature. But Ruiz most extensively refutes this explanation (disp. 8, sect. 5 sqq.), and rightly, because intellection is not more formally the divine nature than volition, since both are attributes consequent to the divine essence (cf. supra n. 119 nota).

the reason of image is: being from another, not different from that other in nature and by reason of nature, therefore to be the image of the Father belongs to the Son, but does not belong to the Holy Spirit" (1, q. 61, membr. 3, a. 2). Others reject this reason, like St. Thomas (1, q. 35, a. 2), because, they say, in the divine similarity is not considered according to relatives, but according to absolutes. Nevertheless this reason will not seem completely inept to us, if we consider that mere similarity according to nature cannot constitute the difference of Son and non-Son, but this difference comes from the most formal mode by which nature is communicated with one and not with the other. Therefore if it happens by the most formal reason of procession that one proceeds similar in productive power, but the other not similar, and this not as if by accident, but from the very intimate reason of such production, surely there is reason for imposing different names on these two proceeding ones to indicate the diverse procession. But because the name Son undoubtedly belongs to the second person, the third person is rightly said to be not the Son, because He differs precisely from the Son in that reason by which the Son is similar to the Father, that is, in the reason of producing another of the same nature, which the Son formally received by virtue of His procession.

587. St. Augustine proposes the first reason thus: "Here also this is understood in some way, as much as can be understood by such as we are, why the Holy Spirit is not said to be born, but rather to proceed: because, if He too were called Son, He would certainly be called the Son of both, which is most absurd. For no one is the son of two except of father and mother. But God forbid that we should suspect anything of this sort between God the Father and God the Son" (De Trin. 15, 27, 48; M 42, 1095). Anselm, Richard of St. Victor, and some other scholastics follow this opinion. But this exposition less manifests the intimate reason why the Holy Spirit cannot be called Son, than it simply shows that He ought not to be called Son. Because we name God according to those things which we know from creatures, we ought not to call Him Son in the divine who proceeds from two having entirely the same reason of productive principle, because in creatures, whatever is generated is never generated from two according to the same reason of principle. Therefore lest we introduce into God the monstrosity of bipartite paternity, we ought not to call the Holy Spirit Son.

For the rest, in this matter, which so exceeds our understanding and in which there are diverse opinions, it will be permitted to each to abound in his own sense, provided that the truths of faith remain intact (cf. S. Thom., Quaest. disp. de Potentia q. 10, a. 2).

588. Scholium 1. By some Greek Fathers the Holy Spirit is called the image of the Son. Thus, for example, St. Cyril of Alexandria says: "Just as, because the Son is the most absolute image of the Father, he who receives the Son receives also the Father, so with the same analogical reasoning preserved, he who receives the image of the Son, that is the Spirit, receives entirely through Him

both the Son and the Father, who is in the Son.... If indeed the Spirit is called the image of the Son, therefore He is God and not otherwise" (Thes. ass. 33; M 75, 571). Similarly St. Basil (De Spir. S. c. 9, n. 23; c. 18, n. 47: M 32, 109 153), St. Athanasius (Ep. 1 ad Serap. n. 20 24; M 26, 577 585), and others. This manner of speaking is explained by the fact that the Holy Fathers in those places only inculcate the perfect similarity of nature, which exists no less between the Holy Spirit and the Son than between the Son and the Father, and they do not regard the mode of procession, but manifestation ad extra (Régnon III 320 sqq.). Therefore the word image is taken there in a broader sense, insofar as it signifies any perfect similarity (cf. Ruiz disp. 64, sect. 6, and J. Bilz, Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Johannes von Damaskus 129 sqq. 178 sqq.).

589. Scholium 2. From what has been said, an answer has already been given to the question of what is the proximate principle (quo) of the divine processions. For proximately the divine processions are through intellect and will, and not through nature, as Durandus taught against almost all. The reason is: the Word and Love do not proceed immediately from the essence, as opposed to the faculties, nor, if they proceeded thus, would they be distinguished. Nature nevertheless is the ultimate principle and has radical fecundity. Hence insofar as we distinguish in God nature and relations, nature must be called the principle quo of production: but insofar as we distinguish intellect and will from nature, thus intellect and will are the proximate principle quo of production. But in order that the divine intellect be the principle of producing the Son, it is required as a condition that it be really identical with the relation of paternity. For in the Son and Holy Spirit, in whom this identity is not had, the intellect is not a productive principle. The Father indeed does not produce the Word through relation as principle, because the principle is that by which He Himself possesses what He communicates with the proceeding one, but through intellection, which is an absolute perfection, but this perfection is not a principle unless insofar as it connotes the relation of paternity (S. Thom. 1, q. 41, a. 5). Similarly we must philosophize about the production of Love (cf. Suarez 1,5 sqq.). Actions are of supposita; nevertheless the hypostasis, as distinguished from nature, is not the elicitive principle, but is presupposed as a condition before action (cf. IV, 79 sqq.). Hence the Father generates not by relation but by nature, but He is constituted Father by relation. Concerning the principle quo of the divine productions there are certain verbal disputations of theologians, not very useful (cf. Wirceburg., De Trin. n. 368sqq., and Piccirelli, De Deo Uno et Trino 1330 sqq.).

SECTION III.
ON THE DIVINE RELATIONS.

ARTICLE I.
ON THE EXISTENCE OF RELATIONS IN GOD

Proposition LXXIX. There are real internal relations in God. De fide (Sum. 1. q. 28, a. 1).

590. Note: From philosophy it is known that relation is the disposition of one thing toward another. For a relation to be real, it is required that the subject which is related be real; that the term to which it is related be real; that the form by which it is related be real; and that there be a real distinction between the subject and the term.

If the form or foundation of a real relation is an accident, we have a real accidental relation; if it is substance itself, we have a real substantial relation. But since there are no accidents in God, it is evident that divine relations, if any exist, are substantial.

Furthermore, real and substantial relations in God have this in common with predicamental relations in creatures: they are not predicated according to substance or essence, and by this they are distinguished from the transcendental relations of creatures. For man according to substance is a creature, but God is not according to substance generating or generated. Nevertheless, in divine matters the "being toward" (esse ad), in which relation formally consists, is not something added to substance or essence, as is the case with predicamental relation in creatures, which not only has being toward another but also being in another as in a subject. For real divine relations do not have being in another in this mode, but are subsistent "being toward," and under this aspect they conduct themselves rather like transcendental relations of complete created substances.

Therefore, every relation besides "being toward" necessarily also has "being in," whether in itself or in another as in a subject. Whether a relation is substantial and in itself, or accidental and in another, is not discerned from the concept of relation in the abstract but from such a relation in the concrete. Faith teaches that there are internal relations in God which are both subsistent and consist in "being toward," such that this "being toward" is a most real being, but not a being really distinct from the divine substance. Nevertheless, under one

aspect the divine relation is a real and substantial being, under another aspect it is a relation. Being a relation belongs to it through "being toward," being a substance belongs to it through identity with the divine essence, or through "being in."

Hence it is clear that in divine relations the definition of relation is perfectly verified, yet they are relations of their own kind, such as are not found in creatures.

591. God is conceived and named by us as related in multiple ways. We call him relatively creator, governor, and similar things. But these are external relations, whether and how they are real is taught elsewhere (III, n. 39). Here we ask whether relations belong to God which are entirely resolved within the divine order. We already know that there are relations within God, such as the relation of attributes to essence; but these are relations of reason (above n. 123 ff. 149 ff.). But in this place we speak of real relations, which exist from the side of reality completely independently of our mind's consideration.

592. Argument 1. From Sacred Scripture.

According to Sacred Scripture, there is real paternity and real filiation in God, or true active and passive generation. Therefore in God there is a real relation between Father and Son, and the same applies to the relation between the spirator and the spirated. For the very names of Father and Son among all people signify internal and real relations. In these relations there clearly appear those three properties which belong to relations alone and to all of them, insofar as they are distinguished from absolutes: that they are simultaneous by nature, simultaneous in knowledge, and convertible. For neither can the Father exist or be conceived without the Son, nor the Son without the Father. Thus teaches St. Cyril of Alexandria: Relative names signify each other mutually, one giving birth to knowledge of the other reciprocally. Therefore the name Father is relative and similarly Son. For if the Father is not, because he generated by nature, no one would grant that the Son subsists either. For the Son exists because he has been generated; and if the Son does not exist as generated, neither will the Father exist according to due and consequent reasoning, the Father indeed because he generated. Therefore it is true that both mutually subsist together and perish together, and when one subsists, that other certainly subsists on account of which he is called and is what he is (De SS. Trin. dial. 4; M 75, 867 sqq. Cf. Thes, assert. 11; M 75, 147 sqq.). St. Athanasius: "This word Father is referred to the Son, for whoever calls God Father immediately conceives and acknowledges the Son" (Orat. 1 contra arian. n. 33; M 26, 79). Moreover, just as the Father is of the Son, so the Son is of the Father; therefore there is mutual reflection or convertibility, which belongs to relatives alone. Thus, for example, St. Augustine teaches: We say slave of master and master of slave, Son of Father and Father of Son, because these things are said relatively (De Trin. 5, 12, 13; M 42, 919). Therefore nothing

should be doubted that there are in God those things to which the name of relation in the true and proper sense belongs (cf. below n. 646). Therefore in God "being toward," in which the most formal aspect of relation consists, is really found; for with this aspect removed, the Father would not really generate, nor would the Son be really generated by the Father, and consequently Father and Son would not be really distinct. For besides the most formal aspect of "being toward," all things in God are absolute, by which the divine persons cannot be distinguished (cf. S. Thom. 1, q. 28, a. 1).

593. Argument 2. From the Holy Fathers.

The Greeks especially against the Eunomians in long treatises strive to prove that the essence of Father and Son is not diverse, since the names "generated" and "ungenerated" do not signify essence, but relations (cf. above n. 509). Thus Basil and Gregory of Nyssa in their books Against Eunomius, thus Gregory of Nazianzus in the Theological Orations, thus Cyril of Alexandria in the Thesaurus. For example, Gregory of Nazianzus: "Father is not a name of essence, O most acute men, nor of action, but indicates that relation which the Father has to the Son or the Son to the Father" (Or. 29, n. 16; M 36, 95). Among the Latins St. Hilary: "The apostolic faith, he says, does not have two gods, because it has neither two fathers nor two sons. In confessing the Father it has confessed the Son; in believing in the Son it has believed also in the Father, because the name of Father has in itself the name of Son.... Nature is not changed through nativity, lest according to the likeness of its kind it be the same... Let him who does not know that Father and Son are proclaimed to be one assign diverse nature to both... Neither does the truth of God from God make two gods, nor does the nativity of God suffer a singular God, nor are they not one who are mutually related. But they are mutually related when one is from one" (De Trin. 1. 7, n. 31 sq.; M 10, 226). St. Augustine expounds this doctrine most carefully in book 5 of De Trinitate, at the beginning of whose exposition (c. 5, n. 6; M 42, 914) he establishes these points: In God indeed nothing is said according to accident, because nothing in him is changeable, yet not everything that is said is said according to substance. For it is said in relation to something, such as Father to Son and Son to Father.... Therefore, although it is different for the Father to be and for the Son to be, nevertheless it is not a different substance, because these things are not said according to substance, but according to the relative: which relative, however, is not an accident. [1]

[1] Therefore in the same place (1. 7, c. 6) the Holy Doctor says of the person of the Father: "Person is said to himself, not to the Son, insofar as the substance of the Father subsists in itself and by its own power, not in another or by the force of some accident: It is absurd that substance be said relatively: for every thing subsists to itself" (ib. c. 4. Cf. Petar. 4. 11: Regnon 1 84 sqq.).

594. Argument 3. From the councils.

Council of Toledo XI (675 AD): "While the three persons are spoken of relatively, nevertheless one nature or substance is believed. For what the Father is, he is not to himself but to the Son, and what the Son is, he is not to himself but to the Father.... For in the relation of persons number is perceived" (above n. 507). According to the Council of Florence, in God all things are one, where the opposition of relation does not prevent it (Denz. n. 703).

595. Argument 4. From the authority of theologians.

Ruiz, having adduced the testimonies of theologians, concludes: "It is an error to say that the relations of God ad intra are not real. For, as St. Thomas says De pot. q. 8, a. 1 in princ. corp.: Following the teaching of faith, it is necessary to say that there are real relations in divine matters. The same is the opinion of all scholastics in 1, dist. 26 and 33" (disp. 9, sect. 6, n. 14). Similarly Vazquez: "Among Catholics it is a confessed matter that divine relations are truly real, not assisting God but intrinsic" (disp. 114, c. 1). Suarez: "Among Catholics it is beyond controversy that there are real relations between the persons of the Trinity" (5, 1, 2). Bañes calls this doctrine most certain according to Catholic faith (In 1, q. 28, a. 1), and thus all later scholastics in the same place.

596. Corollary. Therefore in God there are four real relations: paternity, filiation, active spiration, procession (S. Thom. 1, q. 28, a. 4). For no others have been revealed to us, indeed others are excluded (cf. Prop. LXXVI), because in God there are only two processions: for if there were more processions, there would be more than three persons, which is against faith. For in God there is only Trinity, not quaternity, as Lateran IV says (Denz. n. 432). But from each procession two relations exist. Therefore there are four relations.

But of these four relations, one is really the same as two others; for active spiration is not really distinguished from paternity and filiation, because there is no opposition of relations, but through it the Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. Therefore there are only three relations really distinct among themselves: paternity, filiation, passive spiration.

Proposition LXXX. The relations of paternity, filiation, and passive spiration are the three divine persons. Theologically certain (Sum. 1. q. 29. a. 4; q. 40. a. 1).

597. Note: What a person is (a rational supposit) is known from philosophy, so only a few things need to be recalled to memory. Therefore the name of person imports two things beyond the notion of substance: rationality

and singularity. [2] Since it is clear per se what rationality signifies, singularity especially comes into question. But this singularity, which constitutes the nature of a supposit, is opposed to a) universal substance, such as genera and species; b) partial substance, such as body or soul in man, which are essential parts, or foot and hand, which are integral parts; c) communion of integral substance with another substance by way of part; for those things which, as long as they remain divided among themselves, are various supposits, if they are substantially united, become one supposit, as if from many waters one water is made. Therefore a supposit is a singular, integral substance, divided from every other, or briefly: it is an individual substance. Hence person, since it adds the notion of rationality to supposit, is correctly defined: an individual substance of rational nature.

But just as universal or second substance is commonly called nature, so individual or first substance is commonly called subsistence, hypostasis, subject. Sometimes, however, subsistence is understood as that formal and abstract principle by which substance is individual (cf. Régnon, La S. Trinité I 129 sqq.). From usage in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, essence, substance, and nature signify the same thing, and on the other hand hypostasis, person, supposit, and subsistence.

598. These things having been explained, it should not be doubted that the nature of person belongs to God; for God is a singular, integral substance, divided from every other substance, and is endowed with reason. Indeed all these things belong to him in a far more excellent way than to any creature. Therefore philosophers concede that God is a person, although they must confess that they are ignorant of the proper mode by which God is a person in the nature of things.

599. But by revelation we are taught that this singular, integral divine substance, divided from every other, subsists in three really distinct among themselves (Denz. n. 79 213). But since in the definition of person and supposit this is especially intended, that communicability be excluded, we immediately recognize that the notion of person does not belong to the divine nature, because it is not individual in the fullest sense, but is communicated with several. Hence we must see what in divine matters effects that highest degree of singularity by which the divine nature is completely individual: to this question we respond that the highest degree of singularity in divine matters is constituted by those three relations. The word "relation" does not indeed signify person per se, but that which is signified by that word in divine matters is person.

600. Argument 1. From the councils.

---

[2] Among the Greek Fathers πρόσωπον often adds activity to the notion of hypostasis (cf. J. Bilz, Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Johannes von Damaskus, Paderborn 1901, 12 sqq.). Hence they usually call the three divine persons three hypostases, more rarely three πρόσωπα (cf. S. Basil, Ep. 38, II. 4: M 32, 332).

From the definitions of the councils it is established that all things in God are common except opposite relations (Florence; Denz. n. 691 703), and that number in divine matters is constituted by relations alone (Toledo XI; above n. 507). Similarly in the Council of Florence, John, theologian of the Latins, testified: "It is indeed according to doctors both Greek and Latin that relation alone multiplies persons in divine productions, which is called relation of origin, to which only two things pertain: from whom another and who from another" (Sess. 18; Denz. n. 703 nota 2). In the same council the most learned Cardinal Bessarion professed: "That the personal names of the Trinity are relative, no one is ignorant" (Orat. dogm. c. 6; Denz. l. c.). Hence, since this is the Catholic faith, that we venerate one God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity, neither confounding the persons nor separating the substance: for the person of the Father is one thing, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another (symb. athan.), it is evidently concluded that the very relations of paternity, filiation, and passive spiration are the three divine persons: for besides these relations all things are common and one; and these relations alone are the divine substance individuated with that individuation which excludes all communicability, and which makes numerable singularity.

601. Argument 2. From the Holy Fathers.

St. Gregory of Nazianzus teaches: "Property is by no means communicable," because the Father alone remains unbegotten, the Son begotten, the Holy Spirit proceeding (Orat. 39 in sancta lum. n. 12: M 36, 347). St. Cyril of Alexandria teaches: Since the nature of divinity is simple and uncomposed, it would not be distinguished by concepts into the duality of Father and Son, unless some difference underlay, not according to substance but conceived outside substance, through which the person of each subsisting in proper hypostasis is produced... [Hence] Sacred Scripture establishes the names of Father and Son, attributing proper hypostasis to each while preserving identity of nature: then it explains more broadly the nature of these names, which are toward something (Thesaur. assert. 11: M 75, 142 sqq.). St. Augustine: "What is properly said individually in the same Trinity is in no way said to themselves, but to each other or to the creature, and therefore it is manifest that they are said relatively, not substantially" (De Trin. 5, 11, 12; M 42, 918; cf. 7, 2, 3; M 42, 936; 7, 6, 12: M 42, 945). Others cf. in Prop. LXXVI.

602. Argument 3. From theologians.

St. Thomas explains the matter thus: "Person in any nature signifies that which is distinct in that nature. But distinction in divine matters is made only through relations of origin. But relation in divine matters is not like an accident inhering in a subject, but is the divine essence itself. Therefore just as deity is God, so divine paternity is God the Father, who is a divine person. Therefore

divine person signifies relation" (1, q. 29, a. 4). Exactly the same, if the thing, not the mode of speaking is considered, all scholastics teach. Thus for example Scotus: "It is the common opinion which says that persons are constituted through relations," and he proves and defends this doctrine with many arguments (In 1, dist. 26, q. unica). St. Bonaventure: "Personal properties must necessarily be relations," and the reason is because relation alone remains [i.e. is not communicated] in divine matters (In 1, dist. 26, a. 1, q. 2). The same is taught by Thomists and others, such as Suarez (De Trin. 5, 3, 9: 7, 7, 9), Vazquez (De Trin. disp. 158, c. 5), Ruiz (De Trin. disp. 87, sect. 5) etc.

But divine persons are constituted by relations insofar as relations are "being toward," because thus alone is there opposition between the related. But insofar as relations are "being in," they are identified with the divine nature, and thus they do not express incommunicability.

603. Scholium 1. How in divine matters both subsistent reality and relation are signified by the name of person.

Since the name of person in divine matters signifies both the reality subsisting in itself and relation, between which two we can distinguish by reason, scholastics ask whether by the name of person the reality which subsists is formally signified and relation materially, or the contrary. About this matter they have disputed much and have invoked the authority of St. Thomas in both directions (1, q. 29. a. 4, et De pot. q. 9, a. 4). Usually they are accustomed to speak thus: That form which is directly signified by the word "person" is relation, because this alone formally exhibits that incommunicability which is directly signified by the word "person"; but in the mode of signifying, the subsistent reality is exhibited more formally by the word "person" than relation. Thus Bañes (In 1, q. 29, a. 4), Suarez (1. 7, c. 8), Ruiz (disp. 32, sect. 78), others; which mode of speaking seems most reasonable. In other words the same can be expressed thus: The name of person according to abstract reasoning signifies subsistent

reality: but the formal reason for which it supposes in divine matters is relation (S. Thom., De pot. q. 9, a. 4). [3]

But in this disputation it should be noted that we can indeed form the concept of divine person so that first we conceive in confusion that reality which subsists, then the relation by which it subsists, so that in some way that reality may be conceived as affected by relation or relation as informed by the essence of subsistent reality. That we conceive relations in this mode as certain formal principles which affect subsistent reality is already shown from the fact that we do not say: paternity generates, as we say: the Father generates. This is a sign that we conceive relations as certain forms by which divine supposits are distinguished. According to this mode of conceiving we say that a divine person is constituted by relation, insofar as relation is that by which one person is formally distinguished from others and is one subsisting in itself.

But on the other hand it must not be forgotten that this quasi-composition is merely of reasoning reason without any objective precision between the things conceived, since person is nothing but the divine relation itself, which relation, because it cannot be an accident, is necessarily the subsistent reality itself. Therefore divine relation constitutes person in the same way that deity constitutes God. Consequently, two objectively precise formal principles do not concur to constitute the divine person, but one and the same principle is both subsistent reality and relation. But we necessarily represent this one reality by two concepts, because we do not have a concept of absolute which simultaneously signifies relative, nor a concept of relative which simultaneously signifies absolute (S. Thom. 1, q. 28, a. 2: De pot. q. 8, a. 2. Cf. Suarez 7, 3; Ruiz disp. 87, sect. 4: Franzelin thes. 23).

---

[3] The signification and supposition of names must be distinguished. Signification refers to that which is formally expressed by the name (from human usage): but supposition refers to the very thing whose place the name takes before the human intellect. Thus the name "person" formally signifies rational supposit: but if it is said of God, that thing for which it is used is real relation, which is in no way formally expressed by the name "person." Hence the truth or falsity of some proposition must be judged not from the signification of words alone but also from supposition. Thus this proposition "God generates" is true if the name "God" supposes for God the Father: it is false if it supposes for God the Son. Hence this syllogism is illegitimate: The divine Son is God; but God generates; therefore the Son generates.

Furthermore, regarding the mode of speaking this should be noted: To suppose a thing, to suppose for a thing, to be supposed for a thing signifies nothing other than: to represent a thing in enunciations, to take the place of a thing, to be used for a thing; in other words: these three are used promiscuously. E.g. S. Thomas says: "Equivocation is not attended to according to diversity of supposition, but according to diversity of signification. But the name of man attributed to Peter and Christ signifies the same thing, namely human nature, but does not suppose the same thing, because here it supposes the eternal supposit of the Son of God, there however the created supposit" Compend. theol. 211 in fine. "Whether essential concrete names can suppose for person" (S.1.q.39. a. 4: cf. a. 5). "The Son of God, who is supposed in this name Christ" (S. 3, q. 17, a. 1). "Hence the Word itself is supposed, when it is said 'this man'" (Contra gent. 4. 49 ad 10).

604. Scholium 2. How divine origins and divine relations are compared among themselves.

Since in divine matters procession or origin and the relation which arises from it do not differ really, it is certainly permitted also to say that divine persons are constituted and distinguished through origins, which mode of speaking occurs in reality both among the Fathers and among theologians. Indeed origins and relations according to their full concept are so simultaneous that no priority whatever can exist between them. For just as the intellection of the Father without any transition is from eternity immutably existing, so from eternity without any motion there is the pure and substantial act generating the Word and by that very fact the actual, eternal, immutable relation of the Father to the Word.

We represent relations and origins by diverse incomplete concepts, and therefore the question has arisen whether it is more fitting according to our mode of conceiving to say that persons are constituted by relations or by origins. St. Bonaventure teaches the latter (In 1. dist. 27), because, he says, it is established that origin is the principle of relation, not relation the principle of origin, and therefore generation is the principle of paternity, not the converse (l. c. q. 2). St. Thomas teaches the contrary, because that which constitutes person must necessarily be something internal to it: but the origin of some thing is not signified as something intrinsic, but as a certain way from the thing or to the thing, just as generation is signified as a certain way to the generated thing and as proceeding from the generator. Hence it cannot be that the generated thing and the generator are distinguished by generation alone, but it is necessary to understand both in the generator and in the generated those things by which they are distinguished from each other.... Hence since they agree in essence, it remains that persons are distinguished from each other through relations (1, q. 40, a. 2). Or, as others say, person is constituted through form, which is permanent or quasi in facto esse, but origin is conceived as something in fieri. In creatures too, from which our concepts are formed, origins do not pertain to constituting the incommunicability of person but intrinsically constituting forms.

Some difficulty can appear regarding the first person, who seems to be person before generating and thus able to have the relation of Father to Son. But this difficulty is easily solved, provided it is kept before our eyes that active generation is not an action which is elicited by the Father, but is the substantial act itself which is the Father. Therefore the Father is not first and then generates, but the Father himself is pure act, not only absolute but also relative without any composition and consequently without any priority between first and second act. The Father generates because he is; and he is Father because he generates—both are equally true, in the way that this being is a rational animal because it is man; and it is man because it is a rational animal.

We can nevertheless by some incomplete concept first conceive the Father confusedly as person, then as generating, then as relative to the generated Son. But this mode of conceiving teaches us nothing about the thing objectively taken, but is some way more convenient for us to apprehend somehow most difficult realities (cf. S. Thom. 1, q. 40, a. 2, et De pot. q. 8, a. 3; Suarez 6, 6: Vazquez disp. 158, c. 5; Ruiz disp. 91; Franzelin thes. 23; Kleutgen, De ipso Deo 1. 2, q. 5, a. 4).

Proposition LXXXI. There is no subsistence in the divine strictly speaking except the relative. Theological explanation (Sum. 1, q. 40, a. 3).

605. Note: The name of subsistence [4] can be said in multiple ways: a) For subsistence is opposed to inherence, and thus subsistent is said of whatever is not an accident, in which sense, for example, the human nature of Christ subsists. b) It is opposed to communication by way of a part, and thus subsistent is said of whatever is not hypostatically united with another, and a fortiori whatever plainly cannot be so united. In this sense the human nature of Christ does not subsist, but the divine essence does indeed. c) It is opposed to the communicability of the same essence among several individuals; and thus subsistent is the same as suppositum (hypostasis) or, where we are dealing with rational beings, the same as person (cf. Régnon, La S. Trin. I 141 sqq.). With these things premised, the disputation concerning absolute subsistence in God can scarcely be anything but about a manner of speaking.

I.

606. Günther teaches that the three divine persons "are nothing other than individual elements of one absolute divine personality" (Vorschule II 537). Namely, the threefold existence of the divine substance (l. c. I 119) is conscious of the identity [not numerical unity] of essence in distinct forms (l. c. II 537). Therefore, because the three divine persons perceive their distinct existence and activity to be not indeed numerically but essentially identical and intimately connected, there is therefore one absolute personality in God that is self-conscious, composed of three individual consciousnesses (l. c. II 291 sqq.). Therefore, the matter stands in the divine realm approximately as it does in some human family, whose individual members are conscious of themselves as being distinct individuals and simultaneously as being one family. This unity Günther calls "formal."

---

[4] The Latin word subsistentiae seems to have been formed around 400 A.D. by Rufinus to translate the Greek word ὑπόστασις: "Substantia designates the nature of some thing, by which it consists: but subsistentia shows this very thing of each person, that it exists and subsists" (Rufin., H. E. l. 29; M 21,499. Cf. Régnon, La S. Trin. I 216 sqq.).

607. Since Catholic dogma is openly perverted by these philosophical speculations, and in place of one God three gods are posited, who have among themselves relations of origin and perfect similarity (cf. Denz. 431), there would have been no need to present these matters, unless Günther had thought that Saint Augustine patronized this doctrine. For he wants Saint Augustine to teach that it can rightly be said that there are three essences in God, which are united solely by relation, but that the Church, for merely pedagogical reasons, lest simple people be led into error, says one essence and three persons (Vorschule I 119 sq.). Let us hear the words of Saint Augustine which Günther considers: "What therefore remains, except that we confess these terms were coined by the necessity of speaking, when copious disputation was needed against the snares or errors of heretics?... [Human poverty] feared to say three essences, lest some diversity be understood in the supreme equality. Again, it could not say that there are not three somethings, which Sabellius, because he said this, fell into heresy. It sought what to call the three; and it said substances [hypostases] or persons, by which names it did not want diversity to be understood, but it did not want singularity, so that not only unity might be understood there from the fact that one essence is said, but also trinity from the fact that three substances or persons are said. But when the term person by itself signifies not something relative but absolute, why do we not call these three simultaneously one person, just as one essence and one God, but we say three persons, when we do not say three gods or three essences, except because we want at least one term to serve this signification, by which the Trinity is understood, lest we remain completely silent when asked what three, when we confess there are three?" (De Trin. 7, n. 9-11; M 42, 941 sqq.) Therefore, says Günther, according to Saint Augustine we can rightly say by itself that there are three essences and one absolute person in God.

608. But he is wonderfully mistaken. Saint Augustine teaches nothing other than that by itself the name hypostasis or person does not signify something relative, but in God is supposed only for the relative. Therefore, it is not because those names of essence and person from their internal force can have only this sense, that the Church has used them in this determinate way, but because it was necessary from the abundance or poverty of words to choose some to somehow enunciate the ineffable mystery. By no means therefore does the holy Doctor say that there are really three essences in God, but that by saying three persons we can signify three essences by the force of words; therefore words are by themselves inadequate. But that there is one essence and three persons or one absolute and three relations he had already most clearly and expressly expounded earlier (l. 5, c. 7-8; M 42, 915). Therefore, even according to Saint Augustine it remains entirely true that there is no absolute person in the divine realm, but three relative persons.

II.

609. In a far different sense scholastic theologians disputed whether and in what sense absolute subsistence could be admitted in God. For the name of subsistence can be taken not in the concrete sense, as it is the same as person or suppositum, but in the abstract sense for the formal reason by which some thing is an integral substance divided from every other, which acceptation Cajetan is said to have first introduced (In 3, q. 3, a. 2). Some attribute this subsistence to the divine essence. Thus Suarez: "The perfection of which we are treating principally speaks of independence of being, which from its proper concept does not postulate complete incommunicability, but only that which is toward some thing somehow actually distinct on the part of the thing, so that it might be sustained in that or through that.... The word subsistence, therefore, although it is employed for hypostasis in many councils and authors, is nevertheless not always so. Now, however, by more frequent usage that word is not taken for the concrete, but for the abstract, as it itself sounds, namely for the reason of subsisting, to which corresponds as concrete the subsistent, which extends more broadly than person or suppositum, because it is also said of that which subsists communicably" (De Trin. 4, 11, 10-14). In this sense there is one subsistent God, but there are three persons having the perfection of subsistence.

610. This doctrine as regards the matter itself is entirely true, but as regards the manner of speaking it has a double inconvenience. First, indeed, according to the councils and Fathers, subsistence in the divine realm is the same as person, and therefore three subsistences [5] really distinct are always taught; which Ruiz shows with many examples (De scient. Dei disp. 34, sect. 2-3. Cf. Régnon, La S. Trin. I 43 sqq.). Consequently, second, those theologians who agree with Suarez are compelled to employ the word subsistence in a double sense, saying that in God there are three relative subsistences and one absolute subsistence; where the word subsistence is taken in one sense and another. But why should we abandon that signification which is sanctioned by usage in the Church and introduce confusion by the ambiguous application of the same word? Therefore, that manner of speaking is better preserved according to which subsistence is the same as person, and no absolute subsistence is admitted in God, but only three relative subsistences (cf. Denz. n. 254).

III.

611. Durandus and Cajetan and some others speak differently. They teach that relations do not give subsistence to the divine essence, but conversely the

[5] In the old Latin versions of Greek councils sometimes hypostasis is translated as substantia in the same sense as subsistentia (cf. Denz, n. 114 nota). In the same way sometimes the older Latin Fathers speak, like Augustine above n. 607).

essence gives it to the relations, and therefore there is one absolute subsistence, common to the three persons; and Durandus adds that there is no relative subsistence in God (cf. Régnon I 319 sqq.). Cajetan: "The divine nature subsists from itself and does not beg subsistence from the supposita, but rather confers it upon them" (In 1, q. 39, a. 4). "Therefore to subsist in the divine realm is essential and personal... both essence and person is formally subsistent, and simultaneously they are not four, but three subsistences" (In 3, q. 3, a. 2). Durandus indeed: "The divine suppositum subsists through essence and not through relative property" (In 3, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 7).

612. But from what has been said it is established that subsistence, if it is taken in the strict sense, as according to the Fathers and councils it excludes all communicability, cannot be except relative. Nevertheless, the divine relations are therefore subsistent because they are substantial relations, not indeed accidents. And this is what Saint Thomas teaches in these words: "Relations in the divine realm, although they constitute hypostases and thus make them subsistent, nevertheless they do this insofar as they are the divine essence; for relation, insofar as it is relation, does not have that it subsist or make to subsist; for this belongs to substance alone" (De pot. q. 8. a. 3 ad 7). Properly therefore neither does essence give subsistence to relations nor do relations give it to essence, but the one most simple divine essence is subsistent under the formal reason of the threefold relative. But if we wish to distinguish things physically and metaphysically indistinct in themselves by inadequate concepts, we can say: essence gives substantiality to relations, but relations give incommunicability to essence.

613. And so since there are three divine subsistences, it is clear that we can form an abstract notion of subsistence or person, which befits the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This concept, however, is not universal nor genus nor species, because it is not predicated of several who differ according to being, but it is a concept quasi-analogous by analogy of transcendence, which in the manner of some confused notion embraces ultimate individual differences. For it signifies indeterminately a singular mode of existing or signifies a vague individual. A vague individual, like 'some man,' signifies common nature with a determinate mode of existing, which belongs to singulars, namely that it be subsistent per se distinct from others.... But this is common according to reason to all divine persons, that each of them subsists in the divine nature distinct from others. And thus this name person according to reason is common to the three divine persons" (S. Thom. 1. q. 30, a. 4; cf. Contra gent. 4, 14, § "Similarly also"). More in Ruiz disp. 35.

614. Corollary. Concerning the mode of predicating singularly or plurally. From the fact that there is one essence and three persons in the divine realm, it follows that those things which pertain to essence should be predicated in the singular number, those which pertain to persons in the plural number. Hence it

should not be said that there are three quiddities, three reasons or three forms or three existences in God, because all these things pertain to essence; although these expressions can be tolerated, if the word relative is added and they are called three relative quiddities or existences, because also to persons as persons their own actuality and quiddity belongs. Likewise the three persons are three things (three beings or three absolutely), if thing is taken transcendentally, but not if it is taken substantially (S. Thom. 1, q. 39, a. 3 ad 3). Furthermore, those things which signify essence adjectively are predicated plurally of the three because of the plurality of supposita. For we say three existing or three wise, or three eternal and uncreated and immense, if they are taken adjectively. But if they are taken substantively, we say one uncreated, immense and eternal, as Athanasius says in the symbol of faith (l. c. in corp.). Therefore there are not three eternities or immensities or immutabilities... because substantial names are multiplied only if form is multiplied. Nevertheless three unities can be said, both because unity by usage is put for one, and because unity signifies indivision in itself and division from every other, which belongs to persons as they are persons. But most theologians do not concede three (transcendental) truths, because truth embraces the whole entity of a thing and is not multiplied unless things are multiplied totally and adequately: because nevertheless individual persons according to themselves are some intelligible thing, they can in some way be called three truths according to a less customary manner of speaking. Similarly the three persons are not simply three infinities, because infinity simply is the same as the divine essence, nevertheless they are three infinities in a qualified sense, that is, in the genus of relations. For the rest, it is clear that in this matter some latitude can be conceded in the manner of speaking, provided that one correctly explains his mind, because all words are inadequate and transferred from things which are most distant from this mystery. And so it happens that in very many of the things which have just been said, there are also held opposite opinions of theologians, concerning which the long treatises of P. Suarez (De Trin. l. 3) and P. Ruiz (disp. 24 sqq.) can be seen. Cf. below n. 648.

ARTICLE II.
ON THE DISTINCTION OF RELATIONS FROM THE DIVINE ESSENCE.

Proposition LXXXII. The relations or divine persons are distinguished from the divine essence virtually only. Common teaching (Sum. 1, q. 28, a. 2; q. 39, a. 1).

615. Note: Just as we are taught by revelation that there are three divine persons, so at the same time we are taught that there is one essence or divine

nature, and this has most frequently been defined by the Church in the very profession of the Most Holy Trinity.

Thus by the Council of Toledo XI (above n. 507), thus by the Council of Florence: "Of the three there is one substance, one essence, one nature, one divinity, one immensity, one eternity, and all things are one, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way" (Denz, n. 703), thus in the Athanasian Symbol, etc.

Nevertheless, in the twelfth century vehement disputes arose concerning the manner in which the divine essence relates to the divine persons, because Gilbert of Poitiers taught that God is not divinity nor are the divine persons substance. He was accused of this error in the Council of Reims (1148): a) "That the divine nature, which is called divinity, is not God, but the form by which God is, just as humanity is not man, but the form by which man is." b) "That, when the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are said to be one, they are understood to be so only by one divinity, nor can it be converted so that one God or one substance or some one thing can be said to be Father and Son and Holy Spirit" (Mansi XXI 711). This doctrine is followed by the writer of the little book "Sentences on Divinity," which Bern. Geyer edited (Münster 1909), who showed (p. 10 ff.) that the writer really thought thus, and (48 ff.) that this book was probably publicly torn apart in the Council of Reims. Against Gilbert's errors these canons were established in the council: 1. "We believe and confess that the simple nature of divinity is God, nor can it be denied in any Catholic sense that divinity is God and God is divinity. 2. When we speak of three persons, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, we confess that they are one God, one divine substance. And conversely, when we speak of one God, one divine substance, we confess that this one God, one divine substance is three persons" (Denz. n. 389 sq.). Or, as Otto of Freising says: "The Roman Pontiff [Eugenius III] defined that no reasoning in theology should divide between nature and person, nor should God be said to be divine essence only in the ablative sense but also in the nominative" (ib. nota 3). Gilbert revoked his errors (cf. Petav., De Deo 1. 1, c. 8).

Therefore the divine persons are necessarily in some way the same as the divine essence and in some way are distinguished from the essence, because they cannot be the same and distinguished according to the same formal consideration (ratio). Hence it must be seen part by part what distinction between persons and essence should be rejected, and what should be admitted (cf. above n. 99 ff. 145 ff.).

I.

616. Relations do not differ from essence as thing from thing.

For this is clearly contained in the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council published against Abbot Joachim (who taught tritheism): "There is one certain

supreme thing... which truly is Father and Son and Holy Spirit; three persons simultaneously and each of them individually; and therefore in God there is only Trinity, not quaternity, because each of the three persons is that thing, namely substance, essence or divine nature.... and that thing is not generating nor generated nor proceeding, but it is the Father who generates, and the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, so that the distinctions are in the persons and the unity in the nature. Although therefore the Father is one, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another, nevertheless not another thing, but that which the Father is, the Son and Holy Spirit are the same entirely, so that according to orthodox and Catholic faith they are believed to be consubstantial" (Denz. n. 432; cf. Régnon II 255 ff.).

Therefore there is no real composition between essence and relations, because essence is not one thing and relation another, but it is the same thing under another formal consideration: and therefore divine simplicity remains intact.

II.

617. Relation does not differ from essence as mode from thing.

We establish this against Durandus who teaches: "The first point is that the difference of essence and relation in divine things is not purely and precisely according to reason. The second is that it should not be said simply that they differ really. The third is that it is necessary to say that they differ in some way really, at least secundum quid and with determination, which determination he thinks is best expressed in these words: That they differ as thing and mode of having the thing" (In 1, dist. 33, q. 1, n. 23 ff.). That this opinion of Durandus is false, not all theologians concede, as can be seen among the expositors of the Sentences at the same place or among the commentators of the Summa at 1, q. 28, a. 2 and q. 39. a. 1. Indeed, in the Council of Florence the Latins often declared that according to their doctrine substance and person in divine things are the same in reality, but differ by our mode of conceiving (sess. 18: Hardouin IX col. 202), and again "we judge that substance does not differ from persons in reality, but only in concept and by reason" (sess. 25; ib. col. 380). The Holy Fathers teach the same (apud Ruiz disp. 11, sect. 3-6).

The reason is that any distinction which formally obtains on the part of the thing destroys divine simplicity and introduces into God "another and another," when according to Catholic faith there is only "another and another" there. These words are taken as a token from Epistle 101 of St. Gregory Nazianzen, which is the first to Cledonius, where he says of Christ: "The things from which the savior is are indeed another and another.... But I say another and another, contrary to what is in the Trinity: for there it is another and another, lest we confuse the

hypostases, but not another and another thing" (M 37, 179). These words were cited in the Council of Ephesus and in the Fifth Council.

Furthermore, in Durandus's opinion paternity is a mode really distinct from essence. Therefore it proceeds from essence, because otherwise it is not distinguished. Therefore there are more processions than two, and quaternity is introduced. Finally, the reason of the most sublime mystery also seems to be destroyed, because if persons are distinguished from essence in some way really, what wonder that they are distinguished among themselves? Because of these and other inconveniences, Durandus's opinion cannot be admitted.

III.

618. Relation does not differ from essence by formal distinction.

Scotus proposes formal distinction thus: "The formal consideration (ratio) by which a supposit is formally incommunicable, and the consideration of essence as essence have some distinction preceding every act of created and uncreated intellect." However, he explains very cautiously that this distinction should not be called real, if this word is taken in the usual sense, but that it is one which is opposed to formal identity, and therefore is better said negatively: "This is not formally the same," than: "This is thus and thus distinct," or it can be said to be: "Formal non-identity" (In 1, dist. 2, q. 7, § Sed hic restat).

But because Scotus's doctrine in itself is not so clear that it is not expounded variously by various people, it suffices to recall what was said above (n. 123 ff. 149 ff.) about the exclusion of all composition in God. For those points can easily be applied here with due changes, because here also between essence and persons objective precision is excluded, and abstract predicates are predicated of concrete things and concrete of abstract and abstract of abstract, such as: "The Father is divine essence," or "paternity is essence," or "divinity is paternity" and similar expressions, which occur among the Fathers and councils (Ruiz disp. 11, sect. 6). But these prove that no formal distinction can exist between essence and relations independently of the intellect's consideration. Nevertheless, Scotus's opinion is immune from all theological censure.

IV.

619. Although these things are so, nevertheless a distinction of reason between essence and divine relations is not to be denied. The Arians denied this distinction to establish their heresy. For if, e.g., being unbegotten is in no way distinguished from deity, whoever is not unbegotten is not God; but the Son is not unbegotten, therefore... The Holy Fathers most vehemently attacked this stronghold of heretics, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Or. 31, n. 23; M 36, 157), in those books which they wrote against the Arians, in which they expound and

demonstrate the distinction of reason in many ways (e.g. Gregory Nazianzen l. c. n. 13 ff.: M 36, 148 ff. cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunom. l. 12; M 45, 1067). The same was done in the councils which were praised above (n. 615 f.).

620. That this distinction is not merely of reasoning reason (rationis ratiocinantis) does not need proof. Since between the absolute predicates themselves and the divine essence there exists a distinction of reasoned reason (rationis ratiocinatae) (above n. 99 ff.), it must be affirmed here a fortiori. For in some way a greater distinction of reason is found here, since a real distinction of persons follows from it, when nothing of this sort is found in absolute predicates. Therefore the same supreme thing so contains in itself the consideration of the absolute and the consideration of the relative, that under this twofold consideration it can no less receive opposite predicates in itself than if there were several distinct things.

621. Theologians call this distinction virtual, because the same thing, on account of its infinite perfection, independently of our intellect's consideration, is capable of receiving in itself those things which otherwise cannot simultaneously be in one undistinguished thing, or of receiving in itself without contradiction predicates that are contradictory in created things. Thus according to the Lateran Council that supreme thing is Father and, insofar as it is Father, it is generating; and the same supreme thing is also Son and Spirit, and thus it is not generating. Yet on the part of the thing it is not that one generates and another does not generate, but the same thing generates and does not generate, not according to the same respect but according to diverse respects: but because that supreme thing independently of any intellect's consideration has these respects, therefore it is equivalent to three distinct things, and thus really and formally one, it is nevertheless virtually distinct. From this virtual distinction it comes about that our intellect forms several notions to understand in some way the perfection and power of this supreme thing. But in the thing itself the notion of essence and the notion of persons completely coincide. Hence through divine intellection relation is not distinguished from divine essence, but only virtual distinction is seen with respect to created intellect, because distinction of reason cannot be made except through intellect, which forms inadequate concepts of the thing.

622. Corollary. It follows that not only is divine nature formally of the essence of persons, which most theologians concede, but also that persons are of the essence of divine nature, which many deny. For there is essential predication where objective precision is excluded. But there cannot be divine essence which is not three persons, nor divine persons which are not divine essence. Because of this essentiality the predication of abstract from abstract is valid, such as "deity is paternity." Yet paternity is not Trinity, because Trinity besides the totality of divine essence signifies triple subsistence. Hence deity is not paternity as an absolute thing, but as it is identified with the Father. But that we can conceive

God thinking nothing of the Father proves nothing except the imperfection of our intellect; for the thing which is conceived is essentially Father, Son, Holy Spirit.

This doctrine is defended by e.g. Gregory of Valencia, Tanner, Franzelin (thes. XXI), Kleutgen; the contrary opinion is followed by Molina, Suarez, Vazquez, Ruiz, Piccirelli (1041 1046 ff.), Muncunill (n. 78 ff.).

Either opinion can be held, because the difference is only in the mode of speaking. Only this must be attended to, how in our opinion one should respond to this difficulty: If paternity is of the formal concept of essence, the Father in communicating essence communicates paternity. But the Father in communicating essence with the Son does not give him paternity. Therefore paternity is not of the formal concept of divine essence. The response is thus: I distinguish the major: He communicates that which is paternity, I concede the major; he communicates paternity formally as such, I sub-distinguish the major: as constituting, I deny the major; as perfecting, I concede the major (cf. below n. 630 647). You will say: Real opposition between Father and Son is impossible, if paternity and filiation are of the formal consideration of divine essence. Therefore they are not of the formal consideration of essence. Response: I deny the antecedent; for virtual distinction suffices. For with this supposed, essence can be communicated so that it is indeed neither separated physically nor metaphysically from paternity and filiation, and yet paternity is in the giver alone, but filiation in the receiver through generation. Therefore even if essence, precisely as common to three persons, is not the principle of opposition between three persons, nevertheless because essence so conceived is virtually distinguished from personal properties, opposition between persons remains, which are of the formal concept of essence. This indeed is the very mystery of the Trinity, which we do not understand positively, but we understand that contradictories are not taught, because the same thing according to the same respect is not affirmed and denied. Since in the Trinity all things are most perfectly one, it is only a matter of correctly arranging and stating our concepts. Because the ancient heretics denied virtual distinction, they concluded: Whatever is not unbegotten as the Father is not God. To which the Holy Fathers responded that the word "unbegotten" is said neither substantively nor accidentally but relatively. All Catholics say this, but by this reasoning the question whether relations are formally of the consideration of essence or not is not even touched, but only virtual distinction between properties and essence is established.

The other things which are objected are only various forms of the same difficulty: Whatever is of God's essence is of the essence of individual persons. But individual relations are not of the essence of individual persons. Therefore they are not of God's essence. Likewise: Essence is formally the principle of unity, but properties are formally the principle of distinction. Therefore properties are not formally of the consideration of essence. Likewise: Essence is formally communicable, but relation is formally incommunicable. These and other similar

objections do not need a new response. If anyone, however, seems to himself able to progress more easily in the opposite mode of speaking, let him embrace it; for he will be in the company of great theologians: nor should there be much contention about mere manner of speaking. Only then must he respond to the reasons which are proposed for our opinion, just as we must respond to the reasons which are brought forward for the opposite opinion.

Proposition LXXXIII. Divine relations, although they are true perfections, nevertheless add nothing to the perfection of divine substance. Theologically certain (Sum. 1, q. 29, a. 3; q. 28, a. 2).

623. Note: Perfection here is understood as that transcendental goodness which belongs to every being and consists in this, that a thing actually has whatever belongs to it. Perfect is that of which nothing is outside. Scotus, Durandus, some Thomists, and a few others think that divine relations are neither perfections nor imperfections, neither finite nor infinite, but that all perfection and infinity belong to relations by reason of essence. We do not say that the word "relation" formally signifies perfection, but we say that the thing which is signified in God by the name of relation is a perfection.

Part I. Divine relations are perfections.

624. Argument 1. Transcendental perfection is a property of any real being. But divine relation according to its formal consideration is real being. Therefore according to its formal consideration perfection belongs to it.

625. Argument 2. That to which transcendental perfection does not belong is objectively nothing. But what is objectively nothing cannot be really distinguished. Therefore divine relations, which are really distinguished among themselves, are really perfections.

626. Argument 3. What formally attributes subsistence to some being formally attributes perfection to it. But divine relations formally attribute subsistence to divine essence. Therefore the formal consideration of divine relation is perfection.

627. Argument 4. Divine persons formally as such are adorable and lovable. But adoration and love formally correspond to perfection. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas: "Person signifies that which is most perfect in all nature, namely what subsists in rational nature. Hence since everything that is of perfection must be attributed to God, because his essence contains in itself all perfection, it is fitting that this name 'person' be said of God" (1. q. 29, a. 3). In

the following article he shows that divine person is relation. Therefore according to St. Thomas divine relations are formally perfections.

Part II. Relations add nothing to the perfection of divine substance.

628. Argument. For relations to add something to divine substance, they would need to be distinguished from essence at least metaphysically with objective precision. But they are not so distinguished, but divine essence is each of those relations, as we have seen. "Although relation does not add above essence some thing but only a consideration, nevertheless relation is some thing, just as also goodness is some thing in God, although it does not differ from essence except by reason, and similarly concerning wisdom. And therefore just as those things which pertain to goodness or wisdom really belong to God, such as understanding and other things of this sort, so also that which is proper to relation, namely to be opposed and distinguished, is really found in divine things... But divine relations, although they signify that which is divine essence, nevertheless not by mode of essence, because not by mode of inexisting, but by mode of relating to another. Hence the distinction which is attended to according to relations in divine things does not designate distinction in essence, but only in this, which is to relate to another by mode of origin.... In no way is it to be conceded that the being of relation in divine things is one thing and that of essence another. But relation does not signify being, but being something, i.e., what something is. Hence two relations of one thing do not demonstrate its double being, but demonstrate that something can be said doubly of that thing, what it is, just as of a point it can be said what it is as principle and as end, because of the diverse relation of principle and end" (S. Thom., De pot. q. 8, a. 2).

629. Consequently each divine person has as much perfection as all have simultaneously. St. Augustine frequently emphasizes this: "In these [created] things one man is not as much as three men simultaneously.... But in God it is not so; for the Father and Son and Holy Spirit simultaneously are not a greater essence than the Father alone or the Son alone, but those three substances or persons simultaneously, if they are to be so called, are equal to the individuals" (De Trin. 7, 6, 11: M 42, 945). Again he teaches "that there is such equality in that Trinity that not only is the Father not greater than the Son as regards divinity, but neither are Father and Son simultaneously something greater than the Holy Spirit, nor is any individual person of the three something less than the Trinity itself" (ib. l. 8 prooem., col. 947). Cf. Council of Toledo XI, above n. 507.

630. Therefore properly in all divine persons there is one and the same perfection, and this not only eminently, insofar as individual divine persons possess the root of all perfections, i.e., divine essence, but also formally, because each person has in itself whatever is perfection in any way in the other persons, and only the order and mode of having this perfection is diverse. Thus the Father

has not only the same essence as the Son, but also the relative perfection of the Son, yet he does not have it as the Son has it; for the Father has it as giving, the Son as receiving. The Father has in himself the whole Son with all the perfection of filiation as the term of a most perfect vital operation: therefore he has in himself filiation as a perfection due to himself and his own; for unless he had it, he could not give it to the Son. Filiation is in the Father as perfecting the person of the Father, in the Son as constituting the person of the Son; and in a similar way paternity is in the Son as the principle of the Son's life. The Father contains the Word as the term of his speaking: the Word contains the Father as the mind speaking. So also, although far more imperfectly, created intellect has the perfection of its word, which it produces, and the word has the perfection of the intellect in which it subsists. Therefore the relative perfection of the Father contains in itself whatever is of perfection in the Son and Holy Spirit, because this relative perfection would not be the Father unless it had the Son and Holy Spirit as immanent terms. Therefore there are not three perfections in God, but one perfection, which contains in itself whatever is of reality in God. Under this notion of perfection, therefore, persons do not oppose themselves to each other, but include each other.

631. Hence it is clear how there is no dependence properly so called of one person on another. For there is dependence only where someone does not have from himself whatever is required to exist and subsist perfectly, but needs foreign aid. But every divine person has proper to itself the divine essence, which from its intimate nature is triply relative. Therefore each divine person requires two others, because divine essence cannot exist except in triple subsistence, but it requires them as it requires every other perfection which cannot be separated from essence, but necessarily, so to speak, springs forth from it. Thus therefore one person depends on another, just as the soul in understanding depends on intellect and in willing on will, which dependence connotes no imperfection, because intellect and will pertain intrinsically to the nature of the soul. In this broader sense dependence can be conceded, provided that any imperfection is removed (cf. Ruiz disp. 29 30 10; Franzelin thes. 15).

SECTION IV.
ON PROPERTIES, NOTIONS, CIRCUMINSESSION.

Proposition LXXXIV: There are personal properties in God. Theologically certain (Sum. 1. q. 40, a. 1).

632. Note: Just as we can conceive and name the divine persons in concrete terms, so also we can conceive in individual persons some abstract notion by which this person is constituted and distinguished from others. Thus the Father is the first divine person; but he is this person by his paternity. Hence by paternity as by a form he is distinguished from the Son and Holy Spirit. Therefore paternity is a property of the Father. A property is therefore some attribute which belongs to only one divine person and distinguishes it from the other divine persons.

I.

633. That there are personal properties in God is altogether certain. For it is held thus in the preface of the Mass of the Most Holy Trinity: "That in the persons propriety, and in the essence unity, and in the majesty equality may be adored." The Fourth Lateran Council: "This Holy Trinity is undivided according to common essence and discrete according to personal properties" (Denz. n. 428). Reason also shows this, because if the persons had nothing proper to themselves, they would be indistinct.

These properties are: paternity, filiation, passive spiration. Hence the properties are the same as the real relations. For in God that by which something is (quo est) and that which is (quod est) are not distinguished. Person and property are the same in reality, yet they differ according to reason. For personal properties are the same as persons in that way by which the abstract is the same as the concrete: for they are the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father himself, and filiation the Son, and procession the Holy Spirit. But we say properties are in persons, just as we say essence is in God, which nevertheless is God" (S. Thom. 1, q. 40, a. 1). But two things especially compel us to form these abstract appellations: first indeed the insistence of heretics. For when we confess that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God and three persons, to those asking by what they are one God and by what they are three, just as it is answered

that they are one by essence or deity: so it was necessary that there be some abstract names by which it could be answered that the persons are distinguished. Second, because one person is found in the divine to be related to two persons, namely the person of the Father to the person of the Son and to the person of the Holy Spirit. But not by one relation, because then it would follow that also the Son and Spirit would be related to the Father by one and the same relation. Hence according to the two relations of the Son and Holy Spirit, by which they are related to the Father, it is necessary to understand two relations in the Father, by which he is related to the Son and to the Holy Spirit (ib. 1, q. 32. a. 2). Therefore it does not suffice to say Father to signify the first person, but we must form abstract concepts of paternity and spiration to conceive that twofold relation.

634. A name has gained great celebrity which is sometimes numbered among the properties, i.e. the name of unbegottenness, ἀγεννησίας, because of disputes with the Arians (above 509). That this name in no way differs in reality from paternity is evident, because between these two there is no opposition of relation. But it differs in mode of signifying, because it formally signifies the negation of generation and of any passive procession, in which sense it is so attributed to the Father that it is denied not only of the Son, but also of the Holy Spirit. "The Holy Spirit is believed to be neither unbegotten nor begotten," says the Eleventh Council of Toledo (above n. 507). Insofar therefore as the relation of the Son and Holy Spirit is denied of the Father, this word unbegottenness is a relative appellation: for by saying the Father is unbegotten we signify that he is other than the Son and Holy Spirit; for if he were the same, he would have the same relation. Thus the word unbegottenness is said relatively in that way by which negation is reduced to affirmation, because it affirms that property of the Father by which it happens that he cannot have the property of the other persons. Therefore St. Augustine says: "When the Father is called unbegotten, it is said not what he is, but what he is not. But when a relative is denied, it is not denied according to substance, because the relative itself is not said according to substance... Let us say 'not begotten.' Do we therefore say anything other than 'not Son'? Moreover, that negative particle does not bring it about that what without it is said relatively, with it prefixed is said substantially... If I were to affirm substantially by saying Son, I would deny substantially by saying not Son. But because I affirm relatively when I say: the Son is, for I refer to the Father: I deny relatively if I should say: he is not Son... Therefore there is no departure from the relative category when unbegotten is said" (De Trin. 5, 67: M 42. 915 sq.). Cf. S. Thomas 1, q. 33, a. 4.

II.

635. That there are only three properties which per se primarily belong to persons and constitute them appears from what has been said. For those realities by which persons are primarily constituted are three opposing relations. Therefore the same are also the most radical properties by which persons differ among themselves. But other things which are counted among properties complete these three in some way, and bring it about that some person is conceived according to the total fullness of its property. Thus unbegottenness cannot be that by which one person is primarily distinguished from every other, because it is something merely negative, which necessarily presupposes a positive property already. Therefore the Father is primarily constituted by paternity, in which property unbegottenness is founded, because whoever generates in the divine is necessarily unbegotten; for generation is like a way to producing a term; but when the term is produced, generation does not proceed further, but ceases. Therefore active generation is the foundation of unbegottenness, because generation is prior to the cessation of generation.

Furthermore, the Father according to the total fullness of his property is not yet conceived when paternity and unbegottenness alone are conceived, but active spiration must also be conceived: because the paternity of the Father is such that it is simultaneously active spiration. Therefore, when this is not yet conceived, the concept of paternal property is not yet entirely explicit and complete, and the same must be said of the Son.

636. Hence with certain theologians it is permitted to say: There are three constituting properties: paternity, filiation, passive spiration; four distinguishing properties strictly speaking, namely those three and unbegottenness; five properties less strictly speaking; for active spiration can be added, by which the Father and Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit. Others, however, count unbegottenness and active spiration, or at least active spiration, not among properties but among notions, which manner of speaking is more common and better.

Proposition LXXXV: Personal notions must be admitted in God. Theologically certain (Sum. 1. q. 32, a. 2; q. 41).

637. Explanation: Because the Father is primarily constituted by paternity, without doubt this paternity is the formal reason by which, when conceived, we distinguish the person of the Father from other persons. But since any distinctive feature of a thing is usually called a notion of the thing, because a notion is that by which a thing becomes known to us as distinct from every other, the three personal properties are also rightly called notions (γνωρίσματα). But besides those constituting properties, other distinctive features of the divine persons are also found, which, although they do not constitute the divine persons, nevertheless serve to distinguish them. Therefore all properties are notions, but

not all notions are properties. For if with the common opinion of theologians we exclusively call paternity, filiation, and passive spiration properties, besides these there exist two other notions, namely unbegottenness and active spiration. Others, however, as has already been said, count either four or all notions among properties, according as they take this word property more broadly or more strictly.

638. St. Thomas explains this matter thus: "A notion is said to be that which is the proper reason for knowing a divine person. But divine persons are multiplied according to origin. To origin pertains both from whom another is and who is from another; and according to these two modes a person can become known. Therefore the person of the Father cannot become known through this, that he is from another, but through this, that he is from no one; and thus from this part his notion is unbegottenness. But insofar as someone is from him, he becomes known in two ways; because insofar as the Son is from him, he becomes known by the notion of paternity; but insofar as the Holy Spirit is from him, he becomes known by the notion of common spiration. But the Son can become known through this, that he is from another by being born: and thus he becomes known through filiation; and through this, that another is from him, namely the Holy Spirit: and through this he becomes known in the same way as also the Father, namely by common spiration. But the Holy Spirit can become known through this, that he is from another or from others; and thus he becomes known by procession; but not through this, that another is from him, because no divine person proceeds from him."

Therefore there are five notions in the divine, namely unbegottenness, paternity, filiation, common spiration and procession. But of these only four are relations. For unbegottenness is not a relation except by reduction. But only four are properties. For common spiration is not a property, because it belongs to two persons. But three are personal notions, i.e. constituting persons, namely paternity, filiation and procession. For common spiration and unbegottenness are called notions of persons, but not personal (1. q. 32. a. 3).

Therefore properties are conceived as certain realities existing in the divine persons, but notions are conceived as reasons by which the divine persons are made known to our intellect. For this reason God is not called quintuple because of five notions, but triune because of three personal properties.

From this is understood what in God are essential acts, what notional. Essential are acts common to all persons; notional are not common to all, which are to generate and to be generated, to spirate and to be spirated. The same acts are called by various names: thus to speak is the same as to generate: to be born is the same as to be generated, etc. These various names do not indicate that there are more notional acts than four.

639. Scholium: On Appropriations.

With the doctrine of properties and notions is intimately connected the doctrine of appropriations. For also in appropriation something is predicated of one person, not indeed exclusively, yet in preference to others. Therefore that which is predicated in such a way is not something relative, but something absolute, although sometimes in a broader sense appropriation is called when a name absolute per se is used in a relative sense, as the name of wisdom of the second person. Otherwise appropriation in the strict sense is had only when a common attribute or external operation is predicated of one person in preference to others: which is done so that from such an attribute or operation we may be led to understanding the personal property.

For there are certain absolute attributes which have special similarity with the personal property of one person in preference to others. Thus we have already seen works of sanctification appropriated to the Holy Spirit to manifest his procession from the divine will (above n. 563-565; cf. below n. 657). In a similar way to the Father, because he is singularly the principle, creation and power; to the Son indeed, because he proceeds from the intellect, wisdom and illumination is ascribed. Or as Leo XIII says in the encyclical Divinum illud: "Most fittingly the church is accustomed to attribute those works of divinity in which power excels to the Father, those in which wisdom excels to the Son, those in which love excels to the Holy Spirit. Not that all perfections and works produced externally are not common to the divine Persons, but that from a certain comparison and proximity of affinity which exists between the works themselves and the properties of the Persons, they are assigned to one rather than to others or, as they say, appropriated" (Acta S. Sedis XXIX [1897] 647). Cf. S. Thom. 1. q. 45, a. 6 ad 2.

640. St. Thomas (1, q. 39, a. 8) reduces all appropriations which occur either in Scripture or in Tradition to four orders. For since we employ appropriations so that from consideration of creatures we may be led to knowledge of God, we can find the likeness of God in creatures according to four respects: insofar as a creature is being, insofar as it is one, insofar as it has power of operating, insofar as it is the effect of some cause.

According to the first consideration, eternity is attributed to the Father, insofar as he is being without a producing principle; species or beauty is attributed to the Son, because he is the perfect image of the Father; use or enjoyment is attributed to the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit has a special reason of good or delectable gift from relation to the will, from which he proceeds. This appropriation is taken from St. Hilary (De Trin. 1. 2. n. 1; cf. above n. 568) and explained by St. Augustine (De Trin. 6, 10; M 42. 931). Otherwise in Hilary species signifies not so much beauty as manifestation (cf. A. Beck, Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Hilarius 16). Nevertheless from him Augustine and the scholastics drew this appellation and explained it in their own way.

According to consideration of unity, absolute unity is appropriated to the Father, because he presupposes nothing; equality to the Son, because he so

originates that he is the perfect likeness of the Father; connection (conexio) to the Holy Spirit, because proceeding from Father and Son he is in some way the bond of both. This appropriation is from St. Augustine (De doctr. christ. 1, 5: M 34, 21).

According to power of operating, power, wisdom, goodness are appropriated to the three persons, which needs no explanation. To this appropriation corresponds another, by which God is considered according to relation to his effects. But in effects "from him (the Father) and through him (the Son) and in him (the Holy Spirit) are all things" (Rom. 11. 36); where the preposition "from" signifies active and principal power; "through" signifies exemplar cause, through which the agent operates as through his wisdom and art; "in" signifies conserving cause and containing all things by its goodness. Others explain: All things from the Father, who wills all things; all things through the Son, who executes the will of the Father; all things in the Holy Spirit, who by his coming sanctifies all things (cf. S. Thom. 1, q. 39, a. 8).

It is easily understood that according to various considerations both several attributes can be appropriated to one person and one attribute to various persons. Thus power is attributed to the Father as first principle, to the Son as the arm by which the Father operates, to the Holy Spirit as the love that impels.

641. Christ the Lord directed prayers, propitiations, satisfactions to the Father, although they pertain to all divine persons, which example the church follows in praying to God the Father through Jesus Christ, who lives and reigns with the Father in the unity of the Holy Spirit. The reasons for this appropriation are: first, because thus we more easily understand that God is our Father, since he is the Father of Christ the Lord, who is our brother and the efficient and exemplar cause of our adoptive filiation. The second reason, because in the Father as in the first source and principle there resides prior by origin than in the other persons wisdom, volition or charity, power and providence, through which all goods are communicated with creatures: and because the Father speaks and commands through the Word, that all things might be made. The third reason, because the Son and Holy Spirit are given to us by the Father, and we seek their coming to us when we ask for heavenly gifts. The fourth reason, because by this manner of praying confession of the Trinity is reduced to practice. The fifth reason, because thus we confess Christ as our mediator and priest.

Sometimes however prayers are directed to the second person and third to signify that they have the same wisdom, charity, power with the Father. On the contrary, we never ask the other persons through the Father, because he as first principle acts through them, not vice versa (Ruiz disp. 82).

Proposition LXXXVI. The circumincession of the divine persons arises both from the unity of substance, from the nature of origins, and from relations. Theological explanation (Sum. 1. q. 42, a. 5).

I.

642. Just as the properties and notions most clearly manifest the difference of the divine persons, so their perfect equality becomes most evident from their circumincession. The perfect equality of the divine persons is a dogma of faith (cf. Lateran IV, De Trin. c. 1; Denz. 428); but how this equality is signified by the term circumincession must be explained.

Circumincession, which the Greeks call περιχώρησις or ἐνύπαρξις, and the earlier scholastics call circumincession, circumcession (circumpermeation), signifies the mutual inexistence of the divine persons among themselves. [1]

This inexistence Christ the Lord teaches in express words: "I and the Father are one. The Father is in me and I am in the Father" (John 10:30, 38). "He who sees me, sees the Father. The Father who remains in me does the works. Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?" (John 14:9-11.) Hence the saying of the Holy Fathers concerning the divine persons: Ἐν ἀλλήλαις αἱ ὑποστάσεις εἰσίν (S. Ioan. Damasc., De fide orthod. 1. 8; M 94, 829).

Similarly the apostle signifies that the Holy Spirit is in God, just as the spirit of man is in man (1 Cor. 2:11).

But it must be asked more precisely in what sense this mutual inexistence of the divine persons is to be understood.

643. First, therefore, circumincession is less well explained by certain theologians (among whom are Suarez and Ruiz) through divine immensity, as if it were chiefly signified that one divine person cannot be in any place where the other divine persons are not. If nothing else were understood, it would certainly not be true what the Holy Fathers and theologians suggest, that the doctrine of circumincession is a certain compendium of the dogma of the Most Holy Trinity. If Christ says that he is in the Father and from this concludes that whoever sees him sees the Father also, he says more than that the Father is present in him according to immensity. For certainly he does not wish to teach that he is within the Father only in the way that all creatures are. Yet every creature is within the immensity of God. Therefore if Christ says that he is within the Father, this "within" does not refer to immensity, but to something else.

Furthermore, the Holy Fathers say there is περιχώρησις between the Word and his human nature, but not between the other persons and the humanity of Christ, whence it is clear that they understand περιχώρησις to be something other than immensity.

Therefore Petavius says: In divine matters the περιχώρησις of one person in another has this addition, that one really exists in another and intimately pervades it, so that when one person is posited it is necessary that another be

---

[1] Cf. A. Deneffe, Perichoresis, circumincessio, circuminsessio, Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie 1923. 499 sqq.

posited, or that they cannot be separated from each other and exist apart. And this does not happen properly by reason of place or of what they call 'where,' as pleases those theologians whom I mentioned a little before, who wish περιχώρησις to be the intimate and mutual presence of persons and refer its cause to God's immensity and infinite 'where,' as they call it: to which I indeed cannot assent. For even if every notion of place and 'where' is excluded from the mind, and the divine hypostases are considered absolutely and by themselves alone, nevertheless περιχώρησις and the mutual existence of persons in themselves will be there. For indeed when one is posited it will be necessary that another be posited, nor will they be able to be separated from each other, and one will be intimately joined to another and will inhere and exist in it (De Trin. 4, 16, 5).

Indeed, it seems less fitting to say that those persons are present to each other according to 'where,' whose essence and substance is numerically one, especially since the Holy Fathers teach that circumincession is chiefly considered according to essence. For it cannot be understood how the essence of the Father is present according to 'where' to the essence of the Son, since it is plainly the same. Moreover, it should be noted that Suarez and Ruiz do not ignore nor reject other explanations of the Holy Fathers, but think that the most formal reason of circumincession consists in immense 'where,' while we with other theologians say that this notion does not formally enter the concept of circumincession at all, but rather has a consequent relation. Piccirelli indeed explains that reason of circumincession not concerning local 'where' but concerning a higher 'where' of internal immensity, which would be 'where' improperly so called (De Deo Uno et Trino 1357 sq.); but because this higher 'where' is not true 'where,' it would be better to abstain from this manner of speaking.

II.

644. Therefore, first of all, circumincession signifies the consubstantiality of the divine persons. Thus St. Athanasius: The Son is in the Father, insofar as it is permitted to understand, because the whole of what the Son is belongs to the substance of the Father... so that whoever sees the Son sees also what is proper to the Father and understands that the essence of the Son, as it is from the Father, so also is in the Father. The Father is also in the Son, since what is proper to the Father is what the Son is... For since the form and deity of the Father is the being [essence] of the Son, consequently the Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son (Orat. 3 contra arian. n. 3; M 26, 527). St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Son is not in the Father as we are: for we live and move and have our being in God. But truly the Son naturally proceeding from the essence of the Father as from a certain perennial fountain, is life naturally vivifying all things.... Therefore not as we are vivified in God, so also does he himself live and exist, but he truly is

naturally what he says himself to be, that is life, and naturally existing in the Father is one with him by identity of essence, which is deity (Thes, assert. 12; M 75, 178 sq.). St. Fulgentius: The true God is Trinity in persons and is one in one nature. Through this natural unity the whole Father is in the Son and Holy Spirit, and the whole Son is in the Father and Holy Spirit, and the whole Holy Spirit is in the Father and Son (De fide ad Petr. c. 1, n. 4; M 65, 674). This is the most usual explanation by which the Holy Fathers expound circumincession against the Arians (cf. Petae. 1. c. 4, 16: Ruiz disp. 107, sect. 5).

This is also the common doctrine of the scholastics, e.g. St. Thomas: According to essence the Father is in the Son, because the Father is his essence and communicates his essence to the Son not through any transmutation of his own. Hence it follows that, since the essence of the Father is in the Son, the Father is in the Son; and similarly, since the Son is his essence, it follows that he is in the Father, in whom is his essence (1, q. 42, a. 5). The same is held in the Decree for the Jacobites: "On account of this unity [of nature] the Father is wholly in the Son, wholly in the Holy Spirit: the Son is wholly in the Father, wholly in the Holy Spirit: the Holy Spirit is wholly in the Father, wholly in the Son" (Denz. n. 704). And in the Breviary in the hymn at Lauds on Monday throughout the year it is read: "In the Father the whole Son, and the whole Father in the Word."

Moreover, that the Son can be said to be in the Father on account of the unity of essence, a real distinction between Father and Son is presupposed, as is evident. Therefore the Son is not in the Father in the same way that the essence of the Father is in the Father. For since the essence of the Father is the Father himself, its inexistence in the Father is not the inexistence of one in another; but the Son is in the Father as another in another. Thus St. Hilary: "What is in the Father, this also is in the Son; what is in the unbegotten, this also is in the only-begotten; one from another and both are one; not two as one, but one in another, because not something different in both" (De Trin. 1. 3, n. 4; M 10, 78). Cf. Ant. Beck, Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Hilarius von Poitiers 84 sqq.

III.

645. But by this consideration of essential identity alone the concept of circumincession is not resolved, rather circumincession also embraces the origins of the divine persons. Because the Son and Holy Spirit are the terms of immanent operations, they necessarily remain in the principle from which they proceed. The Holy Fathers also hand down this reason. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria compares the Son with the word of the human mind: "For from the mind and in the mind

the word is always [2] , and therefore the mind is in the word. Or if they deny these things to be true, the mind indeed will be without word, and the word without mind, and thus what reveals the nature and reason of both will finally be empty and come to nothing. For the mind is always the root and origin of the word, and conversely the word is the fruit and offspring of the mind. For this never lacks a word, although it generates the word; but that has obtained the quality and form of the generator as its own nature and comes forth without any loss to the generator. For since there is mind because it has a word, and conversely word because it is full of mind, in what way finally will it be judged that there is mind without word or word without mind? But how does the reason of similarity of both apply to Father and Son? Because... the word remains in the generating mind and has the generating mind totally in itself... and the Son must exist simultaneously with the Father and conversely the Father with the Son...." (Dialog. 2 De Trin.: M 75, 767 sq.). The same concerning the Holy Spirit: The Spirit is not alien from the divine essence, but as a natural and substantial act proceeding from it and remaining in it, operates all things which God does (Thesaur. assert. 34; ib. col. 579). St. Fulgentius: Just as the word is born from the whole mind, so the one born remains within the whole. And because there is nothing of the thinking mind where the word is not in it, therefore the word is as great as the mind itself from which it is, and when it is with it, it is in it (Ad Monim. 3. 7: M 65, 204). St. Thomas: The Son is in the Father as the originated in the originator, and conversely the Father is in the Son as the originator in the originated (In 1, dist. 19, q. 3, a. 2). See the words of Pope Dionysius above n. 449.

IV.

646. Because the Son and Holy Spirit proceed as immanent terms, one person includes another as its correlative, insofar as a relation can neither exist nor be conceived without its term. Although therefore relatives formally as such are not so much one in another as one toward another, nevertheless they are completely inseparable, and to that extent there is circumincession according to the intellect, as St. Thomas says, or in the logical order, insofar as in the concept of one we have the concept of another. For this reason the Council of Toledo XI explains the intimate connection between the divine persons: Just as we see splendor inseparably inherent in light, so we confess that the Son cannot be separated from the Father. Therefore we neither confuse those three persons of one and inseparable nature, nor do we in any way declare them separable. Thus the Trinity itself has deigned to show us this clearly, so that even in those names

[2] Cf. Io. 1, 18: Ο μονογενὴς υἱὸς ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός = The Word proceeds into the intellect of the Father, and thus circumincession or circumpermeation is had.

by which it willed the persons to be recognized individually, it does not permit one to be understood without another; for neither is the Father known without the Son, nor is the Son found without the Father. For the relation itself of the personal name forbids the persons to be separated, which, even when it does not name them simultaneously, simultaneously suggests them. No one can hear any one of these names without being compelled to understand the other also (Denz. n. 281; cf. above n. 592).

Therefore circumincession is: the intimate mutual inexistence among themselves of persons immanently proceeding and distinctly without confusion on account of the unity of nature.

St. Basil explains this matter thus in epistle 38, praised by the Council of Chalcedon (Mansi VII 463) n. 4: Since therefore the Holy Spirit, from whom every distribution of goods to created things flows, coheres and is joined to the Son, with whom he is conceived simultaneously without any interval, and has his being from the cause which is the Father, connected to whom he also proceeds, his hypostatic property is declared by this sign, that he is known after the Son and with the Son, and that he subsists from the Father. But the Son, who makes the Spirit proceeding from the Father known through himself and with himself, and who alone as only-begotten shone forth from unbegotten light, has no community with the Father or Holy Spirit as regards the property of the notions (τῶν γνωρισμάτων) by which he is distinguished, but is recognized alone by those notions which I mentioned. But he who is God over all [the Father] alone has a certain principal notion of his hypostasis, το πατήρ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ μηδεμιᾶς αἰτίας ὑποστῆναι, and by this indication again he himself is properly recognized. Therefore we say that in the community of essence the notions which are considered in the Trinity cannot cohere or communicate, through which the property of the persons handed down in faith is constituted, since each is distinctly known by its proper notions, so that from the said indications the difference of hypostases is apprehended. But truly as regards being immense, not able to be comprehended, not created, not circumscribed by any place, and all other such things, there is no discernment in the life-giving nature, I mean in Father and Son and Holy Spirit, but a certain continuous and undivided fellowship is perceived in them. And through whatever thoughts one may have understood the majesty of one of those persons believed in the Trinity, through the same he will proceed without any discrimination whatever, seeing glory and majesty in Father and Son and Holy Spirit, with no space intervening between Father and Son and Holy Spirit in which the mind might wander as in a vacuum. For there is nothing which is inserted as a medium between them... But whoever has understood the Father has also understood him in himself and has simultaneously embraced the Son by perception of mind. But whoever perceives the Son has not separated the Spirit from the Son, but has expressed faith in all three mixed together in himself, consequently indeed according to order, but

conjointly according to nature. And whoever has mentioned the Spirit alone has simultaneously comprehended by this confession both him whose Spirit he is... Indeed if anyone has truly apprehended the Son, he will have him bringing with himself both his Father on one side and his own Spirit on the other. For neither can he who is always in the Father be cut off from the Father, nor will he who effects all things in it ever be separated from his own Spirit. Similarly also whoever has received the Father has simultaneously also received the Son and Spirit in power. For no section or division can be conceived in any way, so that either the Son is understood without the Father, or the Spirit is separated from the Son, but in these there is comprehended a certain ineffable and incomprehensible both fellowship and distinction, neither does the difference of hypostases tear apart the conjunction of nature nor does the community of essence confound the property of notions (M 32, 330 sqq.).

647. Corollary. From what has been said the perfect equality of the divine persons is understood. For those are called equal who not only have the same nature and the same qualities, but also the same quantity of perfection, so that there is no greater and less in them. But since in divine matters there is no perfection which is not the same as essence, necessarily all divine persons have the same quantity of perfection, just as they have the same essence. But relations do not constitute new perfections beyond the perfection of essence: for the essence itself from its intimate nature is threefold relative without any addition. Hence relations do not effect inequality of perfection, but distinction of relatives. But since beings are not therefore unequal because they are distinct, for equality itself presupposes distinction; therefore, that one person does not have the relation of another as formally constituting, this indeed imports distinction, not however inequality (cf. above n. 630). And therefore equality in divine matters and likeness is considered according to essentials; nor can inequality or dissimilitude be said according to the distinction of relations. Hence Augustine says against Maximinus (1. 2, c. 18, n. 3; M 42, 786): The question of origin is who is from whom; but of equality, what kind or how great someone is. Therefore paternity is the dignity of the Father, just as also the essence of the Father. For dignity is absolute and pertains to essence. Therefore just as the same essence which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so the same dignity which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. Therefore it is truly said that whatever dignity the Father has, the Son has, nor does it follow: the Father has paternity; therefore the Son has paternity. For the "what" is changed into "toward something." For the same is the essence and dignity of Father and Son, but in the Father it is according to the relation of giving, in the Son according to the relation of receiving (S. Thom. 1, q. 42, a. 4). Therefore any one of the divine persons has the whole infinity of perfection without any diminution, because it has that essence which is the perfection whether absolute or relative of the other persons.

APPENDIX.

CERTAIN PRECEPTS FOR SPEAKING ABOUT THE MYSTERY OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY.

648. Although many things pertaining to this have already been explained in various places, nevertheless it will be helpful to bring all things together here into one brief overview. Therefore:

1. Nothing should be innovated against the usage of speaking either approved by the church or sanctioned by the common consent of Catholic schools. For although terms perhaps do not have such a determinate signification from themselves that they cannot be used in different senses, nevertheless that signification to which they have been restricted by usage must be completely preserved, lest by confusion of words the dogma itself suffer detriment. Therefore a fixed manner of speaking has been established by various councils, such as Toledo XI, Lateran IV, and in the Athanasian symbol.

2. One must abstain from words which seem either to destroy the unity of divine nature or to deny the plurality of persons. Therefore, for example, one who says that God himself is distinguished in three persons improperly departs from the common and approved formula in the institutions of Christian doctrine, by which God is said to be one indeed in three distinct persons, not distinct in three persons, by the change of which formula this danger of error creeps in by force of words, that the divine essence is thought to be distinct in persons (Denz. n. 1596). Where it should be noted that in this dogma these voices are now synonymous by usage: essence, substance, nature, and on the other hand: person, hypostasis, subsistence.

3. Substantive names are predicated of persons in the singular number, but adjectives in the plural. Therefore substantively there are not three eternal nor three immense, much less three gods, but adjectively three persons are co-eternal to each other etc., as is held in the Athanasian symbol. The reason is that substantive names are not multiplied unless the form which they signify is multiplied; but adjectives are multiplied when the supposits to which they inhere are multiplied.

4. Relatives are not predicated of each other; hence paternity cannot be said to be filiation; but they are predicated of essential concretes, because these can suppose for persons, hence it can be said: God is Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Similarly notional acts are predicated, as: God begets, God is begotten.

5. Relatives, if taken adjectively, are not predicated of essential abstracts, because this would be formal signification. Therefore it is not said: deity begets. However, personal substantive names can be predicated of essence, as: essence is Father; because this predication is not formal but identical, i.e. it signifies only that in God essence and persons are really the same.

6. Notional acts are not usually predicated of abstract relatives, because actions belong to supposits, hence not paternity begets, but the Father begets.

7. Substantives which either exclusively signify essence or the whole consisting of essence and subsistence are not to be predicated in the plural number. Concerning appropriations finally all things have already been explained (cf. above 639 sqq. et S. Thom. 1, q. 30, a. 3: q. 39).

SECTION V.
ON THE MISSION OF DIVINE PERSONS.

Proposition LXXXVII. The mission of a divine person is its eternal procession with a relation to a temporal term. Theological explanation (Sum. 1, q. 43, a. 2457)

649. Note: The mission of divine persons, although it does not pertain to constituting the Trinity, because it nevertheless follows and manifests the diversity of persons, is rightly treated here by theologians. For we have already proved several times from the fact that the sender and the sent are predicated in Scripture, the distinction and properties of persons. Hence the concept of mission must be explained somewhat more accurately. We suppose that there is mission, because it is most clearly taught in Sacred Scripture (cf. John 5:23 ff.; 6:29 ff.; 15:26; Gal. 4:6, etc.).

I.

650. Mission necessarily includes a double term: the term from which and the term to which. For whoever is sent, is sent by someone to some term. Therefore mission presupposes a real distinction between the sender and the sent. But concerning the term from which, nothing needs to be said here, because it has already been shown that from this side mission can be nothing but the origin of one person from another (n. 533). Consequently the Father is never said to be sent, but to come; because coming does not, as being sent does, require the intimation of another person's will (cf. John 14:23). But how God is to be understood to come or depart has been explained in the treatise On God as One (above n. 175). Therefore a divine person is said to be sent by another from whom it received the will to come into the world. "The Word of God is therefore sent by him whose Word it is; it is sent by him from whom it was born: he who begot sends: what is begotten is sent... But the Father... is not said to be sent: for he does not have anyone from whom he is or from whom he proceeds. For Wisdom says: 'I came forth from the mouth of the Most High' (Eccl. 24:5), and of the Holy Spirit it is said: 'He proceeds from the Father' (John 15:26): but the Father from no one" (S. August., De Trin. 4, 20, 28: M 42, 907). Therefore the Father can send the Son and the Holy Spirit. But the Son can send only the Holy Spirit.

II.

651. But what is the temporal term to which the sent person comes? For if someone is sent, he necessarily begins to be where he was not yet, or at least in that manner by which he was not yet there. But a divine person cannot be sent in the former manner, because he is always and necessarily everywhere; yet he is not everywhere in every manner. Thus the Word was already in the world before the incarnation (John 1:10), but through the incarnation he came to his own in another manner (ibid. v. 11). Mission therefore consists in this, that a person begins to be somewhere in another manner than he was there before. But it is evident that this other manner cannot be a change of the divine person; therefore it is some created effect or some change in the creature. But this change can be twofold, insofar as the divine person is either joined with the creature in a special manner or manifested to it by a special sign. In the former manner the Word was sent into the world through hypostatic union: in the latter manner the Holy Spirit was sent, when he appeared in the baptism of Christ. Yet that visible sign is not the term to which the divine person is sent, since God is never said to be sent except to rational beings, but the sensible thing is the medium by which God comes to men.

652. Therefore a divine person is sent insofar as it receives from another divine person the will to posit that effect by which it is either joined with the creature or manifested to the creature. But it receives this will not by another's counsel or command, but by origin. Mission is therefore on one side the same as origin, but it adds something, namely a temporal effect: wherefore origin is spoken of eternally, but mission temporally: origin is necessary, mission is free. Both, however, both to proceed and to be sent, are notional attributes, yet they do not signify two origins, but the same origin: procession is completed within God, mission connotes a created term.

653. Scholion 1. Although not all divine persons can be sent, nevertheless all divine persons can be given. For someone can give himself or be given or donated by himself. For just as someone is of his own right and in some way possesses himself, so also he can donate himself. But in relation to the temporal term there is no difference between that mission by which God joins himself with man, and donation.

654. Scholion 2. Christ, since he has both divine and human nature, can be sent according to both, but according to the divine only by the Father; but according to the human by all divine persons, because all divine persons can give command or counsel to his human will (S. Thom. 1, q. 43, a. 8). But in Sacred Scripture Christ is never said to be sent by the Holy Spirit. Sometimes indeed

they apply to Christ those words of Is. 48:16: "And now the Lord God has sent me and his Spirit." But from the context it is the prophet Isaiah who speaks of himself. But those words of Is. 61:1: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the Lord has anointed me; he has sent me to preach to the meek," must be explained from the Hebrew text, where shelachani can only refer to lahve, not to Ruach.

Proposition LXXXVIII. The mission of divine persons is either visible or invisible. Theological explanation (Sum. 1, q. 43, a. 6-7).

I.

655. A visible mission is when the sent person manifests himself visibly to men. This can happen in two ways: either in that the divine person assumes some visible nature proper to himself and thus appears, as the Word appeared in human nature; or in that a visible sign is made which specially signifies some divine person, as the dove signified the Holy Spirit. Therefore we can distinguish substantial and representative visible mission (Suarez, De Trin. 12, 4, 17).

In representative mission two things are to be distinguished: the material sign which is made, and its signification. The sign is made by all divine persons, because operation ad extra is common: but the signification can be referred to one person exclusively; and thus the mission of the Holy Spirit can occur without the mission of the Son and vice versa. Similarly in the hypostatic union the humanity of Christ was effected by the whole Trinity, but terminates in the Word alone, in whom it subsists.

656. The differences between both visible missions are these: The Son hypostatically assumed the human nature in which he appeared: the Holy Spirit employed visible signs as external instruments to signify himself. The Son assumed human nature inseparably: the Holy Spirit employed those signs for a brief time. The Son assumed rational nature, because he willed to satisfy and merit: the Holy Spirit employed irrational signs, because he willed only to signify something. Christ's visible mission is primary, to which all others are somehow referred.

Concerning this matter St. Augustine says: "If therefore [the Son] is said to be sent, insofar as he appeared outwardly in bodily creature, who inwardly in spiritual nature is always hidden from mortal eyes, it is now readily understood also concerning the Holy Spirit, why he too is said to be sent. For there was made a certain form of creature in time, in which the Holy Spirit was visibly shown. This operation visibly expressed and offered to mortal eyes was called the mission of the Holy Spirit: not that his very substance appeared, by which he too is invisible and unchangeable, like the Father and the Son; but that men's hearts moved by temporal manifestation of the one coming might be converted from the

one who comes to the hidden eternity of the one always present... Therefore the creature was not so assumed in which the Holy Spirit appeared, as that flesh and that human form from the virgin Mary was assumed... But these things appeared as they ought opportunely to appear, with the creature serving the creator, and unchangeably remaining in himself at his nod, to signify and demonstrate him, as it was fitting for him to be signified and demonstrated to mortals, changed and converted" (De Trin. 1, 2, n. 10-11; M 42, 851).

II.

657. Invisible mission is that which is not made through external signs, but through internal gifts of grace. For not only in a visible manner, but also invisibly can a divine person become present in another manner than he was present before. Concerning this invisible mission it is said: "God sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying: Abba, Father" (Gal. 4:6). But no mission of a divine person can be understood, as has been said, except by some change made in the creature. But this change is nothing other than the infusion of sanctifying grace, which is taught elsewhere to be a created habit (De grat. V, n. 307 ff.). Through this habit man is elevated to a peculiar supernatural state. Because, however, every sanctifying effect is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, therefore through the gift of sanctifying grace the Holy Spirit is said to be sent, although all persons come to the soul through sanctifying grace. "If anyone loves me, my Father will love him and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him" (John 14:23). But just as in first grace or in first justification, so also in second grace, i.e., in the increase of sanctifying grace, the divine persons are sent. "Then [the Son] is sent to each one, when he is known and perceived by anyone, insofar as he can be known and perceived according to the capacity either of a soul progressing in God or perfected in God" (S. Augustinus, De Trin. 4, 20, 28; M 42, 907).

658. But since besides sanctifying grace there are also other supernatural gifts, such as gratiae gratis datae, theologians ask whether invisible mission occurs only through sanctifying grace or also through other supernatural gifts. But there can hardly be any other question than about the manner of speaking. For with every supernatural gift there are present sufficient elements for constituting the mission of a divine person. Nevertheless it is more consonant with the manner of speaking of Sacred Scripture that the Holy Spirit is not said to be sent except through sanctifying grace. For the Holy Spirit is said to be sent when he is given to us, so that he may remain with us and dwell in us, as in his temple (John 14:17, 23; 1 Cor. 3:16; 6:19, etc.). But this dwelling and indwelling of the Holy Spirit does not occur except in sanctifying grace. Hence according to the common opinion of theologians, mission simply so called is only that which does not occur without sanctifying grace (Suarez l.c. 12, 5, 6. Ruiz disp. 109, sect. 1, n. 20). But gratia gratis data such as the working of miracles is manifestative of

gratia gratum faciens... Thus therefore the Holy Spirit is said to be given to the apostles for the working of miracles, because gratia gratum faciens was given to them with a manifesting sign. But if only the sign of gratia gratum faciens were given without the grace, the Holy Spirit would not be said to be given simply, unless perhaps with some determination, according to which it is said that someone is given a prophetic spirit or of miracles, insofar as he has from the Holy Spirit the power of prophesying or working miracles (S. Thom. 1, q. 43, a. 3 ad 4. Cf. De verit. q. 12, a. 5 ad 2).

659. Scholion 1. Theologians ask whether visible mission is always ordered to internal mission either to be effected or manifested. They commonly respond that no visible mission has been made without any respect to invisible mission, since all things in this world and especially supernatural deeds by God are directed to the sanctification and beatitude of rational creatures. Just as therefore God demonstrated himself and the eternal processions of persons to men in some way through visible creatures according to certain signs, so it was fitting that also the invisible missions of divine persons should be manifested according to some visible creatures (S. Thom. 1, q. 43, a. 7). Yet they say this is not to be understood in such a way that visible mission necessarily occurs at the same time as invisible mission. Thus the visible mission of the Holy Spirit in Christ's baptism did not signify that Christ was then sanctified, but signified the sanctification of Christ made previously in his conception.

660. Further they ask whether the theophanies made to the Fathers of the Old Testament can be called visible missions. Some deny this, like St. Thomas l.c., because, they say, those apparitions were not made to signify the indwelling of divine persons. But persons are not said to be sent except to remain and dwell (cf. Ruiz disp. 109, sect. 9). Others think those apparitions can absolutely be called missions, because they were certain preludes and preparations of Christ's visible mission. "But in comparison with this they are not called and without addition should not be called 'mission of the Son of God'" (Franzelin thes. 42, p. 624).

661. Scholion 2. It is asked why sacraments are not called missions of divine persons, since in them external things are employed by God to signify grace, by which divine persons begin to be in the creature in a new way. It is answered, because sacraments are not a new effect specially produced by God to signify a divine person, but are existing things which are elevated to an efficacious sign of grace. Moreover in visible mission the external sign infallibly shows the presence of a divine person, but the sacramental sign does not have such infallibility, since its efficacy depends on the minister's intention and the recipient's disposition (Suarez, De Trin. 12, 5, 12).

Therefore in mission it is necessary that some sign be effected either by God himself or by angels: but whether it must be effected in a strictly miraculous manner, theologians do not agree. Yet it does not seem to be required, because the breathing by which Christ gave the Holy Spirit to the apostles can hardly be called a miracle. Nor is it required that visible signs subsist in that substance in which they are accustomed to subsist in the natural order. Thus the dove appearing over Christ was not necessarily a true dove; but it suffices that such things be a sign which truly appears to the senses. For theologians commonly gather from Sacred Scripture that divine persons are not said to be sent through merely imaginary visions, but only through signs which appear to external senses (S. Thom. 1, q. 43, a. 7 ad 2).

Proposition LXXXIX. In invisible mission not only created gifts but also the divine persons themselves are substantially given. Theologically certain (Sum. 1, q. 43, a. 3-5).

662. Note: We suppose here that in justification some created and physically permanent gift is infused into man, which sanctifies the soul by informing it; this gift is understood when there is simply talk of sanctifying grace (cf. conc. trid. sess. 6, can. 11; Denz. n. 821). Since moreover by this very created gift the divine persons are in some way present in the soul of the just, it is asked whether the mission of a divine person occurs through the created gift alone. We respond with the common doctrine of scholastics that in invisible mission not only created gifts are given, but the divine persons themselves.

663. Argument 1. From Sacred Scripture.

"The love of God is poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Either here love is understood as an uncreated gift, i.e., God's own uncreated love toward us, because it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through which all gratuitous gifts are given. "Hence since the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, he proceeds by reason of the first gift" (S. Thom. 1, q. 38, a. 2; cf. above n. 568); and thus the Holy Spirit is said as a certain supernatural quality to penetrate our hearts. Or a created supernatural gift is understood, and thus the Holy Spirit, author of this gift, is said to be given together with his gift. [1]

Christ the Lord expressly testifies that the person of the Holy Spirit is given and sent: "I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Advocate, that he

[1] Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7 says: "Through the Holy Spirit the love of God is poured out in the hearts of those who are justified, and adheres to them" (Denz. n. 800; cf. n. 821). But only a created gift adheres (cf. tract. de virt. theol. VIII, n. 19, 25).

may remain with you forever, the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive... he will teach you all things" (John 14:16 ff.; 15:26; 16:7 ff.).

But the Holy Spirit is so given that he dwells in men and makes them his temple. "Do you not know that you are God's temple, and that God's Spirit dwells in you?" (1 Cor. 3:16.) "Or do you not know that your members are a temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have from God, and you are not your own?" (1 Cor. 6:19.) "You are the temple of the living God, as God says: Because I will dwell in them and walk among them, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people" (2 Cor. 6:16). The Spirit dwelling in us gives life, impels to good, excites filial confidence, bears witness that we are children of God, helps our weakness, intercedes for us with unutterable groanings, and indeed intercedes according to God, because he searches hearts and knows what he desires (Rom. 8:11 ff.). By all these things there is undoubtedly described not some created and accidental gift, but the very person of the Holy Spirit, who certainly does not dwell alone, but with the Father and Son, to whom nevertheless this sanctifying indwelling is appropriated.

The Holy Spirit is called the ointment with which God anoints us: the seal with which he marks us: the pledge which he gives us. "He who anoints us is God, who also sealed us and gave the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts" (2 Cor. 1:21-22). "You were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance" (Eph. 1:13-14). Therefore the apostle warns: "Do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, in whom you were sealed for the day of redemption" (ibid. 4:30).

These therefore and similar expressions, frequently repeated in Scripture, cannot be verified through the mere infusion of created grace; therefore it is necessary to confess that in some more proper way the divine person himself is sent (Suarez, De Trin. 12, 5, 8).

664. Argument 2. From the Holy Fathers.

The Holy Fathers explain the words of Sacred Scripture concerning the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in such a way that they most clearly say that besides created gifts, the Holy Spirit himself or the whole Holy Trinity is given to us. Thus St. Athanasius, after he has collected various texts of Sacred Scripture, continues thus: "If the Holy Spirit were a created thing, certainly no communication of God would be in him for us, but we would be joined to a created thing and would be aliens from the divine nature, as not having been made participants of it in any part... But if moreover we are made sharers of the divine nature by communion of the Holy Spirit, certainly no one unless insane would say that the Spirit is of created nature, not divine. For it is not for any other reason that those in whom he is are made gods (θεοποιούνται). But if he makes gods, there is no doubt that he is of divine nature" (Ep. 1 ad Serap. n. 24; M 26, 586). St. Basil: "The Holy Spirit, shining upon those who are purged from every stain, through the

communion which they have with him, makes them spiritual. And just as bright and transparent bodies, touched by a ray, become themselves exceedingly splendid and emit another brightness from themselves, so souls bearing the Spirit (πνευματοφόροι) become themselves spiritual and emit grace into others" (De Spir. S. c. 9, n. 23: M 32, 110). Then he explains by many comparisons how the Holy Spirit is in us: "For in as many ways as 'in' is said, in so many ways we find this syllable serve concepts about the Spirit. For form is said to be in matter (τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ) and power in subject and habit in him who has it, and many other things of this kind. Therefore insofar as the Holy Spirit has the power of perfecting rational creature, completing its summit, he has the nature of form (τὸν τοῦ εἴδους λόγον ἐπέχει). For he who no longer lives according to flesh, but is led by the Spirit of God and is called a son of God and is made conformable to the image of the Son of God, is called spiritual... And just as art is in him who has acquired it, so the grace of the Spirit is always present in the recipient, but not perpetually operating. For art too is potentially in the artisan, but actually when he operates according to it. So also the Spirit is always present to the worthy, but operates as there is need" (ibid. c. 26, n. 61). Above others St. Cyril of Alexandria carefully expounds all texts of Sacred Scripture by which the Holy Spirit is said to dwell in us. Thus Dialogue 9 on the Holy Trinity (M 75, 1075 ff.): thus in the Thesaurus (assert. 34: M 75, 575-607): "If therefore with the Spirit dwelling in us through participation, God is he who dwells, and we are in him and he in us, because we bear the Spirit: how will not the Spirit be God, who essentially contains in himself the whole deity and divinity of the Father, whose Spirit he is and is given to creatures through the Son? For no one of sound mind would say that participation of God is accomplished in us through a creature, since created and uncreated substance are entirely different and dissimilar to each other." The Arians indeed said the Holy Spirit was not God but a creature, against whom St. Cyril and other Fathers always argue: "Unless the Holy Spirit were God, through his indwelling we would not be participants of the divine nature." Therefore they hold for certain that not only a created gift, but the Holy Spirit himself dwells in us. St. Epiphanius: "The Holy Trinity has only the just as holy tabernacle and holy temple. In this one infinite deity dwells, one incorrupt deity, one imperceptible deity, incomprehensible, invisible, ineffable, knowing and manifesting itself only to whom it wills" (Ancoratus n. 73; M 43, 154). Therefore he warns: "Ask from the Father that he may grant you the Son and reveal the Holy Spirit to you and grant you to have him in you, so that the Holy Spirit given to you may reveal to you all knowledge of Father and Son and Holy Spirit" (ibid. n. 16, col. 46).

665. Moreover such testimonies can easily be gathered from almost all the Fathers: for St. Augustine testifies: "the learned and great expounders of the divine Scriptures had not yet in that age diligently disputed why the Holy Spirit was not the Son, except that they proclaim him to be the gift of God, so that we may believe that God does not give a gift inferior to himself" (De fide et symb. c.

9; M 40, 191). Augustine himself proposes this doctrine in book 15 De Trin. n. 31-37 (M 42, 1082-1086), where he teaches that that love which is poured out in our hearts is the Holy Spirit. "He himself is signified where it is read: God is love. Therefore God the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from God, when he has been given to man, kindles him in love of God and neighbor, and he himself is love... No gift of God is more excellent than this. This alone divides between the sons of the eternal kingdom and the sons of eternal perdition... Therefore love, which is from God and is God, is properly the Holy Spirit, through whom the love of God is poured out in our hearts, through which the whole Trinity dwells in us."

Let these suffice. Whoever desires more, let him consult Petavius (De Trin. 8, 45) and Ruiz (De Trin. disp. 109).

Moreover he would greatly err who would think that by those things which the Holy Fathers say about the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, either the indwelling of the whole Trinity is excluded or created grace, effected by God in the soul, is excluded. Let St. Basil be heard, for example: "Whatever good has come to us from divine power, we say all is the work of operating grace (ἐνεργούσης χάριτος ἐνέργειαν), as the apostle says: 'But all these things are worked by one and the same Spirit, distributing to each one individually as he wills' (1 Cor. 12:11). But inquiring whether the bestowing of goods having its origin from the Holy Spirit alone thus comes to us, again we are led here by Scripture to believe that the author and cause of the bestowing of goods, which the Holy Spirit effects in us, is the Only-begotten God... Again led as if by hand by divinely inspired assistance, we are taught that all things are produced from nothing by that power, yet not by it without principle, but that there is a certain power subsisting ingenerately and without principle, which is the cause of the cause of all things. For from the Father is the Son, through whom are all things, of whom the Holy Spirit is always understood inseparably... And because the Spirit is of Christ and from God, as Paul says (Rom. 8:9), as he who grasps one end of a chain simultaneously attracts the other end also, so he who has attracted the Spirit, as the prophet says (Ps. 118:131), has simultaneously attracted both Son and Father" (Ep. 38, n. 4; M 32, 330 ff.). Behold, you have the whole Trinity both dwelling in the just and effecting graces.

666. Argument 3. From the authority of theologians.

After Peter Lombard (1, dist. 14) almost all scholastic doctors hand down this doctrine as indubitable. Thus St. Thomas in his exposition of that distinction says: "Here [the master] excludes the error of those saying that in temporal procession the Holy Spirit is not given but only his gifts," and in the following questions he defends and expounds the master's doctrine. The same in the Summa (1, q. 43, a. 3). All Thomists follow him. Cf. e.g. among the ancients Herveus Natalis (In 1, dist. 14, q. 1, a. 2), among the more recent Bañes ad h. l.: "It is certain that in justification not only the very gifts of grace and charity etc.

are given to man, but also the very person of the Holy Spirit according to substance. This opinion is so certain that the opposite is error." So also Alexander of Hales (S. 1, q. 73, membr. 4), so Albert the Great (S. 1, q. 32, membr. 1), so Ockham (In 1, dist. 14, q. 2), so Biel (ibid.), so Durandus (ibid. q. 3). So the Scotists, e.g. Krisper (De Trin. dist. 7, n. 4).

So teach the Greek theologians, like Beccus (in Libro inscriptionum, inscriptio 8, Laemmer, Biblioth. I 557) and Bessarion (ibid. p. 564), who says: "What finally do you understand, when you hear that the Spirit is sent by the Son? For it is clear that you understand his person, even if unwillingly, since grace, which does not subsist, is not sent. For according to Cyril we do not participate in insubsistent grace; but that very person of the Spirit, who completes the Trinity, having subsistence in divine nature, is sent" (apud Arcudium est inscriptio 7, p. 37-39). The same he said before the Council of Florence in orat. dogm. c. 7-8 (Hardouin IX 355 sq.).

So above other doctors St. Bonaventure to the question: "Whether that which grace posits in the one graced is created or uncreated?" responds: "In this question there is something which faith determines, something which reason investigates. Faith and Scripture determines that without the gift of grace it is impossible to please God. It also determines that without the uncreated gift, which is the Holy Spirit, man cannot be made acceptable to God nor assumed into adoption as sons of God: and therefore all who understand correctly concede that there is the gift of grace in the just, so that they also believe there is in them the uncreated gift, which is the Holy Spirit; and this is determined by faith and Scripture, and therefore whoever would think the contrary of this would be heretical" (In 2, dist. 26, a. 1, q. 2, concl.). Then he says that whether grace is also a created gift is not so certain, although it is far more probable. But this after the Council of Trent (sess. 6, c. 7 and can. 11) is an article of faith. Cf. V, n. 307 ff.

But the Council of Trent by those things which it teaches about created grace did not wish to exclude uncreated grace, and therefore later theologians by no means handed down a different doctrine about uncreated grace, but entirely the same as earlier ones. Cf. Salmanticenses (De SS. Trin. tr. 6, disp. 19, dub. 5, § 1), Gonet (II, disp. 13, a. 2, § 1, n. 31), Tournely (De Trin. q. 5, art. 6), Estius (In 1, dist. 14, § 3).

With Suarez, who most clearly explains this matter (De Trin. 12, 5, et De fine ultimo disp. 6, sect. 1, n. 8), and Ruiz (Disp. 109, sect. 3) the same have judged other most serious theologians of the Society of Jesus, as above others Lessius (De perf. div. 12, 11), Petavius (l. 8, c. 4-5), among exegetes especially Cornelius a Lapide (In 2 Petri 14). Indeed Arriaga, who establishes the same opinion as plainly certain, thinks there cannot be disagreement except about manner of speaking (De Trin. disp. 55, n. 1 et sect. 1, n. 2). Amicus judges the opposite opinion at minimum proximate to error (I, disp. 23, sect. 3, n. 62). That this doctrine always flourished in the Society of Jesus is evident e.g. from Gener (De

Trin. n. 758). In our days the same have taught Schrader (thes. 8 De gratia), Franzelin (De Trin. thes. 43), Kleutgen (De ipso Deo n. 1127; Theol. der Vorz. II, n. 224 sq.), others. But if some, like Oviedo, Ripalda, Viva, seem to have contradicted, they rather reject a certain manner of speaking than the thing itself. But if they had rejected the thing itself, according to the opinion of the best theologians they would have fallen into error, as is evident from what has been said.

Proposition XC. In the invisible mission, created grace is the foundation of a new relation whose terminus is uncreated grace. Theological explanation (Sum. 1. q. 48, nn. 3-6).

I.

667. This proposition is an explanation of the doctrine which we proved in the preceding proposition must be admitted. Therefore, with St. Thomas we say that the invisible mission of a divine person occurs only through sanctifying grace, that is, through a created gift (1. q. 43, a. 3). For whatever may be the question whether God can absolutely justify man by external acceptance alone and without producing any entity in the soul, it is first of all certain that justification does not actually occur in this manner: secondly, if it did occur thus, this could not be called a mission, because through external acceptance alone the divine person would not begin to exist in the soul in a new mode. Therefore, on this point we reject the doctrine of Gregory of Rimini, Ockham, and Gabriel (In 1, dist. 14), who think that a divine person can be sent and truly and properly dwell in the soul through external acceptance alone.

II.

668. This created gift which the Holy Spirit effects in the just person is not a merely absolute quality, but is simultaneously by its nature the foundation of a new relation by which the soul is intimately united with God, or whose terminus is the Most Holy Trinity itself. By this relation, therefore, God himself becomes ours, so that he is truly had and possessed by us, as St. Thomas explains: "In the procession of the Spirit, according to the way we speak here, insofar as it includes within itself the giving of the Holy Spirit, it does not suffice that there be a new relation of whatever kind of the creature to God [e.g., the relation of creation], but it is necessary that it refer to him as to something possessed (habitum), because what is given to someone is possessed in some way by that person. But a divine person cannot be possessed by us except either according to perfect fruition, and thus is possessed through the gift of glory; or according to imperfect fruition, and thus is possessed through the gift of sanctifying grace" (In 1, dist. 14.

q. 2, a. 2 ad 2). St. Bonaventure speaks in exactly the same manner: "The Holy Spirit is the gift in which all other gifts are given, and who is the fountain of all gifts; but the created gift is not excluded. For just as when someone holds a horse by the bridle, he is said to hold the horse, nor is the holding of the bridle thus excluded, because by holding the bridle he holds the horse: so the Holy Spirit, when he is said [by Damascene] to be the substance of gifts, the created gift is not excluded, but rather included. For the Holy Spirit is said to be given to us for no other reason than that he is so in us from God that he is possessed by us. But then he is possessed by us when we have a disposition by which we can enjoy him, and this is the created gift of grace" (In 2. dist. 26, a. 1, q. 2 ad 1).

Hence the created gift and the uncreated gift must not be separated from each other; because that relation according to which the Holy Spirit is said to be sent to us can neither exist nor be conceived without either one or the other. For relation necessarily requires a foundation, and this is the gift of created grace; and it requires a terminus, and this is the Holy Spirit.

669. Regarding this part, therefore, Lessius and Petavius do not seem to have spoken correctly, who say that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit indeed actually occurs through the gift of created grace, but could absolutely occur without this gift. Thus Lessius: "Therefore this donation [of the Holy Spirit] has great power, through which, even if no created quality intervened, we would acquire such great dignity and such great right" (De perfect. div. 12, 11, 78). Petavius: "For both intervene [in the indwelling]: both the Holy Spirit himself, who makes sons, so that if no created quality were infused, he himself would make us adoptive sons by his own substance; and the habit of charity itself or grace, which is a certain bond or connection by which that substance of the Holy Spirit is joined with our souls" (De Trin. 8, 6, 3). Therefore Lessius and Petavius by no means denied created grace, but they seem to have erred in this, that they thought the indwelling of the Holy Spirit could exist or be conceived without created grace. But perhaps they spoke only according to an impossible hypothesis, so that the meaning would be: even if per impossibile the Holy Spirit dwelt in us not through the mediation of a created gift, nevertheless through his substantial presence he would make us children of God. This question is not to be treated here, because only the nature of indwelling is to be explained here. Cf. below n. 676.

670. But here it can be asked whether created grace or the Holy Spirit is given first. For although there is no priority of time here, because relatives are necessarily simultaneous, there is nevertheless some priority of nature, and this is what is asked about. To this question St. Thomas responds: "The order of certain things according to nature can be considered in two ways. Either from the part of the recipient or matter, and thus disposition is prior to that for which it disposes: and thus we receive the gifts of the Holy Spirit prior to the Spirit himself, because through those received gifts we are assimilated to the Holy

Spirit. Or from the part of the agent and end, and thus what is closer to the end and agent is said to be prior; and thus we receive the Holy Spirit prior to his gifts.... And this is to be prior simply speaking" (In 1, dist. 14, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 2).

III.

671. But now it must be seen more accurately what kind of relation exists between the soul endowed with sanctifying grace and the Holy Spirit, or it must be seen in what special way God can be in the soul beyond immensity, by which he is equally present in all things. To this question St. Thomas responds: "There is one common mode by which God is in all things through essence, power and presence, as a cause in effects participating in his goodness. But beyond this common mode there is one special mode which belongs to rational nature, in which God is said to be as the known in the knower and the loved in the lover. And because by knowing and loving the rational creature attains by its operation to God himself, according to this special mode God is not only said to be in the rational creature, but also to dwell in it as in his temple.... But nevertheless in the very gift of sanctifying grace the Holy Spirit is possessed and dwells in man. Hence the Holy Spirit himself is given and sent" (1, q. 43. a. 3). But it is clear that this knowledge and this love need not be present through acts, but it suffices that they be present through habit, because the Holy Spirit dwells even in infants, who are not yet capable of acts. For it concerns supernatural love.

672. Furthermore, this love must necessarily be mutual, because in indwelling there is true friendship between God and man. But friendship by its very concept is mutual love of benevolence. Therefore God is in the soul of the just person not only according to some kind of affection, but also according to the special presence of one loving and loved and communicating himself with man for enjoyment, as St. Ignatius says: "Love consists in communication from both sides, so that the lover gives and communicates to the beloved what he has, or from what he has or can give, and thus reciprocally the beloved to the lover. Hence he teaches us to consider how much God our Lord has done for me, and how much he has given me from what he has, and how much the same Lord desires to give himself to me, insofar as he can according to his divine ordinance" (Exercit, spirit., 4. hebd., Contempl. de amore spirituali).

IV.

673. Therefore, by the very fact that true friendship exists between God and man, the intimate union does not consist in affection alone, but also occurs according to real union, insofar as this is possible. For as St. Thomas says: "Union is related to love in three ways: some union is the cause of love, and this indeed is union of likeness. Some union is essentially love itself, and this is union

according to conformity of affection. Some union is the effect of love, and this is real union, which the lover seeks concerning the beloved thing" (1, 2, q. 28, a. 1).

Therefore this friendship between God and the just man is a new title which demands the intimate presence of God in the soul, so that if God were not already there through essence, he would come into the soul and remain there on account of this friendship. Just as if in the humanity of Christ or in the most holy sacrament of the altar he were not present through immensity, God would nevertheless be there on account of the hypostatic union, and thus is truly said to be there in some special way. So also the Holy Spirit is substantially in the soul of the just person, not that one physical supposit is made from the soul and the Holy Spirit, since under this respect this union is merely accidental, but because the Holy Spirit would come according to substance to the soul, if he were not already there. "But because this union is one of friendship, yet is not entirely between equals, but with due proportion, therefore by virtue of it God remains in man as protector and ruler of him, of whom God takes care, not only by title of his general providence, but by the particular title of friendship. Finally, because in this friendship the consideration of divine majesty must always be maintained, therefore thus by virtue of it the Holy Spirit remains in man as in a friend to whom he is intimately united, yet simultaneously remains there as a friend to be honored with supreme reverence and veneration, and therefore also remains there present as in a living temple, which he himself adorns and prepares through created gifts, so that in it and by it he may be adored. And certainly the Sacred Scriptures indicate this mode of presence and indwelling" (Suarez, De Trin. 12, 5, 13).

V.

674. Therefore it will be able to be said in the truest sense that the Holy Spirit makes us holy through himself and through the communication of his substance, as Petavius speaks, De Trin. 8, 4, 8. But this must be understood thus, that the Holy Spirit first sanctifies efficiently through the diffusion of the love of God in our hearts, and then he himself is, as it were, terminatively that to which we are joined by the bond of grace, charity and friendship, and thus the indwelling Holy Spirit is the supreme and divine summit of our sanctification, as St. Basil and Cyril speak" (Franzelin thes. 43, p. 636). This is the reason why the Holy Spirit is called uncreated grace. The very person of the Holy Spirit and thus the whole Trinity is true uncreated grace, insofar as it is conferred on the just in a particular way.... But every gratuitous [supernatural] gift is most properly called grace; therefore just as that gift is uncreated, so also it is uncreated grace. Which Augustine handed down in these words (Serm. 61 de verbis Domini c. 1; M 38, 788): "For the grace of God is the gift of God, but the greatest gift is the Holy

Spirit himself and therefore he is called grace" (Suarez, De gratia, Proleg. 3, c. 3, n. 4).

675. This can be illustrated by two examples, the first of which is the hypostatic union, by which the person of the Word is the special grace of the humanity of Christ, not indeed informing grace, but assisting grace. In this manner, therefore, the Holy Spirit himself, as given and united to us in a special way through grace, can be called internal grace, even if he is uncreated and does not inhere in us. Nevertheless, the inequality in the example adduced must always be observed; for the Word is united to humanity substantially [because one supposit is made], but the Holy Spirit is united to the just accidentally; yet this does not prevent him from sufficing in his degree for internal grace. Hence there is another example more accommodated in this regard, because in beatitude, in the way that eternal life is grace and glory is consummated grace, not only the beatific vision, but also the light of glory is a certain internal grace, and in like manner the divine essence itself, insofar as it is united to the intellect through the mode of an intelligible species, can be called uncreated and internal grace, because it is both a supernatural and uncreated gift and is joined to the intellect in a certain intimate spiritual way to manifest itself to it, which union is accidental and not through inherence, but in a higher way, which is sufficient for the nature of interior grace. The same therefore can be understood proportionally in via concerning the Holy Spirit and the whole Trinity dwelling in us in a special way through grace" (ib. n. 12).

676. Scholium 1. On the formal nature of adoptive filiation.

Some theologians like Lessius and Petavius (l. c. supra n. 669) judge that the formal nature of adoptive filiation is not created grace, but uncreated; but through created grace man is only formally justified. This doctrine is taught to be false in the treatise on grace, where it is proved that we become truly adoptive children through created grace (V, n. 338 sqq.). Evidently the Holy Spirit does not communicate himself with us nor can he communicate in any other way except through the mediation of created grace. Therefore if the Holy Spirit makes us children of God through the communication of his substance, by that very fact he does this through that created grace which is the bond by which he himself is joined with us. Therefore created grace and uncreated grace are not two principles, one of which produces some effects of sanctification and adoption and the other different ones, but each principle produces exactly the same effects under another aspect, namely created grace produces them by informing, the Holy Spirit by terminating. But this does not prevent the Holy Spirit from being called the most noble element and highest summit of our justification and adoption, so that the whole perfection of our sanctification appears much more from the part of the indwelling Holy Spirit than from the part of created grace.

677. But certain theologians, attacking the opinion of Lessius, have proceeded beyond due limits. Thus Oviedo argues against Lessius as if he had said that something physically one is made from the Holy Spirit and us. Therefore he objects that this mode cannot be understood, then, if the Holy Spirit justified us in this way, we would be infinitely holy and children of God not adoptive but natural (In 1, 2, tom. 2, tract. 8, controv. 1, punct. 4, n. 34-38). But this is not to attack the opinion of Lessius, to whom it did not come to mind to say that the union which exists between the just person and the Holy Spirit is more than moral and accidental. Therefore Oviedo confuses these two things, namely: to be joined accidentally with the substance of the Holy Spirit and to be joined with the Holy Spirit into one supposit, which union is called substantial by opposition to accidental. Not this latter, but that former union Lessius clearly taught (De perfect. div. 12, 11, et De sum. bono 1. 2). If Oviedo had read these without prejudice, he would not have said that the example taken from the beatific vision is not to the point. For, he says, objective beatitude does not constitute the soul blessed formally or as an informing form (l. c. n. 37). But what is this against Lessius? For where did Lessius teach that the Holy Spirit constitutes us holy as a form properly informing? But according to Lessius, just as God in beatitude is joined with us as an intelligible species by which we see him, so the Holy Spirit is joined with us in this life as uncreated grace, which in its own way sanctifies us and makes us children of God. Therefore that example is very much to the point in this matter and is proposed by the greatest theologians. For the rest, P. Oviedo holds our opinion about the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and explains it in nearly the same way (I, tract. 1, controv. 2, punct. 4, n. 34-38).

678. Ripalda vehemently attacks the singular opinion of Lessius about the extrinsic principal form, namely the divine nature constituting us adoptive children of God. "This opinion seems to me suspect and unworthy of so great a theologian. For it approaches closely to the opinion of heretics asserting that we are justified through an extrinsic form, which Trent strikes with anathema" (De ente supernaturali disp. 132, n. 127). Concerning this censure P. Kleutgen judges it to be unjust and rash [2] . Similarly cardinal Franzelin says he rejects the arbitrary censure of Ripalda (De Trin. 636 nota).

But this censure is arbitrary, because Lessius with the council of Trent expressly teaches that we are formally justified by the gift of created grace. Indeed he teaches that we become adoptive children of God through created grace, but that "the grace of justification makes us children of God, not from its naked physical perfection but from the fact that it unites the Holy Spirit or the divine nature to us" (De sum. bono 2, 1, 4). But Trent nowhere defined that created grace makes us children of God precisely as it is a physical being and not

[2] "However such accusations may come from a Ripalda and other respected theologians, I can only regard them as most unjust and hasty" (Theol. der Vorz. II 727).

as it is the foundation of a relation to the Holy Spirit. Indeed unless Lessius conceived this relation as something added to created grace of justification already perfectly constituted from the free will of God and therefore separable from it, his doctrine would be entirely true. Therefore this alone is the defect in the doctrine of Lessius, that he proposed the grace of justification and adoption as twofold and entirely distinct from each other. Consequently, with a small modification added, the doctrine of Lessius becomes true and correct.

679. On the contrary, in the doctrine of Father Ripalda uncreated grace is so depressed that it does not satisfy those things which are most clearly proposed about this matter both in Scripture and in tradition. Indeed against the Fathers and greatest theologians he contends that the presence of the Holy Spirit in the soul can in no way be called participation in the divine nature. "For this binding and union is common to every creature through the action by which it is made by God; indeed this action claims God assisting and not distant from the creature, by reason of which, even if God were not immense, nevertheless he would be assisting and present to the things which he fabricates. Nor does it matter that grace claims this not only from the generic nature of creature, but also from the specific difference of grace itself, as if replicating the presence and assistance of God. Because, if the first and common binding of the divinity to the same place is not participation and possession of divinity, there is no reason why the second and replicated union arising from the difference of grace should be that high and excellent participation of divinity" (l. c. n. 95).

The response to this objection is found in the doctrine of St. Thomas, which was related above (n. 668-671), that not just any union suffices for this participation, but only the union of friendship, by which God gives himself to the creature to be enjoyed. This is the foundation of the entire doctrine about uncreated grace, which foundation because Ripalda does not consider at all, his arguments are beside the point and ineffective: and his doctrine in this matter is at least equally worthy of reproof as the doctrine of Lessius, indeed more so.

680. Also Viva, led astray by excessive zeal for attacking the opinion of Lessius, has wandered far from the correct manner of speaking. For he establishes: "Grace is not participation in the divine nature in its real being nor adductive of divinity identified with the Holy Spirit into the soul, so that the Holy Spirit comes formally to the constitution of adoptive filiation, which would root justice and sanctity; but it is participation in the divine nature only by way of likeness, so that the Holy Spirit relates himself only causally no less to the denomination of just than to the denomination of adoptive child" (De grat. disp. 4, q. 3, n. IV). How greatly the tenor of this assertion disagrees with the doctrine of the Fathers and theologians whom we adduced before does not need exposition. For nothing do the Fathers reject more than that in justification there occurs only a participation in the divine nature by way of likeness and not that

which they call οὐσιώδη, and that the Holy Spirit is in us ἐνεργείᾳ only, and not οὐσίᾳ and ἐνυπάρξει (cf. Petav. 8, 5, 13 sqq.).

681. Scholium 2. Whether the Holy Spirit can be called the formal cause of our justification and adoption.

We respond that he is not to be called this simply, both because formal cause simply so called is understood as informing form, and because the council of Trent establishes that the formal cause of our justification is created grace. But it is another question whether a theologian is worthy of reproof if he says the Holy Spirit can be called formal cause not in the sense in which the council of Trent speaks about formal cause, but in some broader and improper or analogous sense. To this question it must be responded that such a manner of speaking is entirely reasonable and worthy of no reproof.

682. For first of all, analogous or assisting forms are not unknown to philosophers. But that on account of which certain things are called "extrinsic forms" by them is nothing other than some proportion: which consists in this, that such things express certain relations to other things which they denominate, in which they conduct themselves in the manner of an ultimate terminus or act, and therefore seem to denominate in the manner of forms" (Suarez, Disput. metaph. disp. 16, sect. 1, n. 24). In this sense, therefore, any terminus is the form of the subject of relation.

683. Also in theology analogous forms occur. Thus the sacramental sign is said to be composed of matter and form. Thus God is called the species or intelligible form in the beatific vision. "For God through essence to be known, it is necessary that God himself become the form of the intellect knowing him and be joined to it not to constitute one nature but as intelligible species to the one understanding" (S. Thom., Comp. theol. c. 105). In these examples there is no discussion of informing form, but of external, assisting, analogous form.

684. Therefore it is only asked whether in indwelling a sufficient reason is found so that the Holy Spirit be called external, assisting, analogous form. But there can be no doubt about this matter. For theologians almost all concede that the Holy Spirit is truly the terminus of the relation which has its foundation in created grace. Therefore the Holy Spirit can correctly be called form in this analogous sense. Thus the Holy Fathers called him, like St. Basil, whom we heard saying that the Holy Spirit relates himself to the soul of the just person as form (eidos) to matter (n. 664). Similarly St. Cyril of Alexandria says: "God is Spirit, because he transforms toward God (τὸ διαμορφοῦν προς Θεόν) not as through created grace [i.e., as if he himself were a creature], but as giving himself to the worthy as participation in the divine nature" (De Trin. dialog. 7; M 75, 1090). Similar things are often read. Theologians who called the Holy Spirit form explained the matter perspicuously. Thus Petavius: "Holy men and adoptive children of God, although they have the Holy Spirit himself and his substance in

themselves, which thus as a certain form, though not properly so called, makes those adoptive children: they are nevertheless not one something with him except tropically and, as they are accustomed to say, morally. Therefore they are said to possess and have the Holy Spirit, which is σχέσις and μετάληψις σχετική" (De Trin. 8, 5. 12). In the same way Cardinal Franzelin explains the matter in our age: "God indeed is not nor can be to anyone a formal good in the sense that as a form properly so called he communicates himself and unites with a creature.... Nevertheless God himself so communicates himself to an intellectual creature and joins himself with it in a supernatural and wonderful way, that by this communication of himself through the mode of formal cause, setting aside imperfections, he elevates it to the most sublime state and dignity, which the Holy Fathers are accustomed to call θείωσιν. Such communication through the mode of formal cause is first of all the supreme union of all, the hypostatic...Another as it were formal communication of the highest good with a creature is seen in the beatific vision. Thirdly and finally, a somewhat formal communication of God the highest good is to be considered in all the just. For although they are not formally just by the very justice of God, but by justice, charity, sanctity inhering in them, which is poured into their hearts through the Holy Spirit; nevertheless this very inhering gift of sanctifying grace is like a spiritual bond by which just souls are united with God the sanctifier in a singular way" (De Deo Uno thes. 29, p. 340 sqq.).

Therefore in the sanctification of man the Holy Spirit conducts himself not only efficiently and finally, but also in another way, namely as terminus of relation, which as such is not in the genus of efficient cause, and consequently we can call this special relation also by a special name and say that the Holy Spirit conducts himself in the manner of assisting and analogous form.

Proposition XCI. Indwelling is not proper to the person of the Holy Spirit, but is appropriated to Him. Theologically certain.

685. Note: Petavius does not indeed deny that indwelling is common to all persons of the Most Holy Trinity, but he thinks that according to the doctrine of the Holy Fathers it can be said that there is a certain special manner by which the person of the Holy Spirit applies himself to the minds of the holy and just, which does not belong to the other persons in the same way. He says, however, that he wishes to propose this doctrine not entirely affirmatively, at least regarding the force and condition of this special mode, because he does not yet hold the matter sufficiently established. He thinks, however, that just as in Christ the man all divine persons indeed indwell, but the Word in a special way because it is like the form making this man God and Son, so the Holy Spirit according to his personal property is the form which sanctifies the just and renders them adoptive sons (De

Trin. 8, 6, 6 sqq.). But whatever Petavius brings forward to establish this doctrine is sufficiently explained through appropriation.

I.

686. One divine person cannot indwell without the others. This is evident both from the circumincession of the persons and from their common operation ad extra. For all divine persons effect created grace, all love the just with one and the same act of friendship-love. But indwelling consists in these things. For there is no hypostatic union between the just man and the divine person; but besides the hypostatic function, other relations ad extra are common. Therefore in Scripture not only the Holy Spirit, but also the Father and Son are said to indwell (John 14:23 ff.). Whence St. John Chrysostom: "Christ cannot fail to be present when the Holy Spirit is present. For where one hypostasis of the Trinity is present, the whole Trinity is present. For it relates to itself inseparably and is united with all perfection" (In ep. ad Rom. c. 8, v. 9-11. Hom. 13. n. 8: M 60, 519). See other sayings of the Fathers in Franzelin thes. 45.

687. Petavius indeed argues thus: If being able to be given is singular to the Holy Spirit and does not befit another person, then actually being given will be proper to the same. But this is to inform as it were the souls of the faithful and to make them holy and just. Therefore this very mode is proper to the Holy Spirit, nor can it be ascribed to another person (l. c. n. 6). Response: I distinguish the major: Being able to be given is singular to the Holy Spirit, insofar as he proceeds from his principle in a special way, I concede the major; insofar as he is united with us in a special way, I deny the major. I contradict the minor: Being given is making just on account of union with the just, I concede the minor; on account of the special mode by which the Holy Spirit proceeds from his principle, I deny the minor. I distinguish the consequent: Therefore this mode cannot be ascribed to all persons, as regards procession, I concede the consequent; as regards the mode of union with the just, I deny the consequent. For being given contains a twofold element: one is being joined with the term, and this junction is common to the Trinity; the other is proceeding from love, and this is not common to the Trinity. Therefore the Holy Spirit has a special character of gift from the part of the term from which, not from the part of the term to which.

But what the Fathers say about the Holy Spirit sanctifying us as αὐτουργός (autourgon) signifies nothing other than that he has the power of sanctifying from his nature, not that he received it as created. Therefore he is said to sanctify us immediately, because he himself is not a creature mediating between us and God; but through this there is not ascribed to him a special mode of sanctification which the other persons do not have. Equally easily are explained the other things which Petavius brings forward.

II.

688. But that indwelling, as it is a work of sanctification, is rightly appropriated to the Holy Spirit is easily understood. For because the Holy Spirit by virtue of procession is love and gift, therefore indwelling is appropriated to him, because in it the uncreated gift is given to us from love, and thus indwelling has a special likeness with the personal property of the Holy Spirit. But the reason of appropriation consists in this.

689. But that this appropriation may be explained somewhat more, these things can be established:

a) Since the Holy Spirit above the other persons is subsisting love, if per impossibile indwelling were not common to all persons, nevertheless the Holy Spirit on account of his personal property would indwell in the just, who are his friends. For the reason of indwelling is mutual charity.

b) In the same sense in which the Father without the Son would be ἄλογος (alogos), the Father and Son without the Holy Spirit would not love; for by loving they necessarily produce the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Father and Son are rightly said to love by the Holy Spirit (above n. 570). But since indwelling is a work of love, therefore the Father and Son are rightly said to indwell us by the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit does not indwell us by the Father and Son, because he himself, in order to love, must produce nothing ad intra. This however does not signify that the Holy Spirit indwells us in a special way above the other persons, because he does not indwell us by notional love, but it signifies that he has a personal property which the Father and Son do not have.

c) Created grace, although according to the character of efficient cause it refers equally to all divine persons, nevertheless according to the character of exemplar cause it more expressly represents the Holy Spirit as its exemplar. For just as created wisdom is more formally representative of uncreated wisdom, so created love is more formally representative of uncreated love.

Therefore according to this threefold respect indwelling has a special likeness with the personal property of the Holy Spirit, and consequently is rightly attributed to him (cf. Franzelin thes. 47; S. Thom., Contra gent. 4, 21).

690. Scholium. Whether the Holy Spirit also dwelt in the saints of the Old Testament.

Petavius denies this, because he thinks the Holy Fathers taught the contrary, and therefore according to his opinion about adoption he denies that the saints of the Old Testament were adoptive sons of God.

But this doctrine cannot be admitted; because adoption and justification are inseparably connected, and because, since the just of the Old Testament had sanctifying grace and were friends of God, nothing was lacking which is required for indwelling. Wherefore Leo XIII in the encyclical Divinum illud says: "It is

certain that even in those just men who were before Christ, the Holy Spirit dwelt through grace" (Acta S. Sedis XXIX (1897) 651).

Under a threefold respect, however, indwelling belongs to the New Testament more than to the Old:

a) The Old Testament, as precisely understood as the Mosaic law, was prefigurative of grace, not collative. But all grace which was granted in the Old Testament was given in view of the merits of Christ. Insofar therefore as the sanctifying grace even of the Old Testament was an effect somehow anticipated of the death of Christ, to that extent all sanctification belongs to the New Testament: and because sanctification is indwelling, this too is a property of the new law, not of the Sinaitic economy.

b) In the Old Testament grace was not given with as much largesse as in the New Testament. Specifically, sacramental grace was then lacking, through which a new mission and indwelling is made in the minds of Christians, especially in baptism, confirmation, ordination. Concerning which matter St. Cyril of Jerusalem: "Previously indeed grace came to the Fathers, but now with superabundance: there indeed [in the Old Testament] they received participation of the Holy Spirit, here however [on the day of Pentecost] they were baptized wholly and fully," and he warns catechumens to prepare themselves diligently to receive the sacraments, because in them they are going to receive the Holy Spirit himself (Catech. 17, n. 18; cf. Catech. 16, n. 25 sqq.; M 33, 954 sqq.). Others in Franzelin thes. 48.

c) Never before the day of Pentecost was the Holy Spirit sent with such great apparatus of external signs and greatest miracles. What the evangelist says: "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified" (John 7:39), how is it understood, unless because that certain giving or mission of the Holy Spirit was going to be after the glorification of Christ? For it was not that there was none before, but there had not been such. For if the Holy Spirit was not given before, by what were the prophets filled when they spoke?... How therefore was the Spirit not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified, unless because that giving or donation or mission of the Holy Spirit was going to have a certain property of its own in that very advent, such as had never been before? For nowhere do we read that men spoke in tongues which they did not know when the Holy Spirit came upon them, as then happened, when it was necessary that his advent be demonstrated by sensible signs, so that it might be shown that the whole world and all nations established in various tongues would believe in Christ through the gift of the Holy Spirit (S. August., De Trin. l. 4, n. 29; M 42, 908).

From what has been said can easily be explained those things which Petavius (l. 8, c. 7) brings forward from the Holy Fathers. Concerning Cyril of Alexandria alone some doubt whether he truly denied the substantial indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the saints of the Old Testament. Fr. Klentgen considers this probable (De

ipso Deo n. 1141), but Franzelin thinks (p. 664) that Cyril's sayings can be piously explained in the true sense.

691. Conclusion. Whatever the case may be, we are certainly permitted to rejoice that we are established not in the parsimony of the Old Testament, but in the largesse of the new covenant; not in the shadow of hidden truth, but in the sun of manifest truth; not in obscure suspicion of the divine persons, but in open confession of the Trinity. What therefore remains, except that he who believes these things by divine benefice should pray, that having been received sometime into the eternal tabernacles he may be worthy to see what is the fecundity of God the Father, that beholding and understanding himself he begets a Son equal and like to himself: and in what way the same and equal love of charity of the two, which is the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and Son connects the begetter and begotten among themselves by an eternal and indissoluble bond: and thus there is one essence of the divine Trinity and perfect distinction of three persons (Catech. Rom. P. 1, c. 2. n. 10). Until these things most happily befall us, here let us honor the Most Holy Trinity by believing, hoping, loving according to our strength, since

From whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things. To him be glory forever. Amen.

On the Triune God

In this profound and systematic exposition of Trinitarian theology, renowned Jesuit theologian Christiano Pesch presents a rigorous and faithful synthesis of Catholic doctrine on the Most Holy Trinity. Drawing from Scripture, the Church Fathers, Scholastic tradition, and sound philosophical reasoning, Pesch explores the mystery of the Triune God with clarity and reverence.

This volume, translated from the original Latin, guides the reader through the theological foundations of the Trinity's existence, the nature of divine processions, the reality of personal relations within the Godhead, and the missions of the Divine Persons. With careful distinctions and precise terminology, Pesch defends the faith against rationalist objections while illuminating the depths of this central mystery.

A valuable resource for theologians, seminarians, and serious students of dogmatic theology, this treatise stands as a model of the neo-scholastic method at its height—faithful to the Church, rooted in St. Thomas Aquinas, and ever attentive to the demands of reason enlightened by faith.

Contained in this Volume:

Preface • Prologue • Treatise on the Triunity of God according to persons

Claude Sonnet 3.7

Machine Translation